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The Sanitized Workplace
The workplace is not designed to accommodate people falling in
love. Love is an irrational emotion; the workplace is... built on a
foundation of rationality.
-Bureau of National Affairs'
Now, we have this officer telling a dirty joke, which
he... admits to have sexual overtones ....
... [I]n our workplace, one of the most serious offenses
somebody can commit is sexual harassment. It is something that is
pervasive in our society ... and it's something that we as people
want to stop ....
-Argument of the County Attorney
In re County of Cook/Sheriff of Cook Count




Does sex have a place in the workplace? According to most
management theorists and feminist lawyers, the answer is a resounding no.
Progress, they say, means precisely driving sex out of the workplace-
whether in the name of efficiency or equality.
It may seem paradoxical that such strange bedfellows would endorse
the same sanitizing impulse; feminists are rarely viewed as close
companions of corporate management. But upon further examination, it
isn't ironic or strange at all. One of American society's most cherished
beliefs is that the workplace is-or should be-asexual. The dominant ethic
says, "Work is work, and sex is sex, and never the twain shall meet." Call it
the ethic of workplace asexuality.
One may be tempted to attribute this ethic to Americans' prudishness,
and, of course, conservative sexual sensibilities probably have played a
1. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, CORPORATE AFFAIRS: NEPOTISM, OFFICE ROMANCE &
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 35 (1988).
2. 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1346, 1350 (2001) (Wolff, Arb.).
3. Abigail Cope Saguy, Sexual Harassment in France and the United States: Activists and
Public Figures Defend Their Definitions, in RETHINKING COMPARATIVE CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
56, 66 (Mich~le Lamont & Laurent Thrvenot eds., 2000) (quoting Catharine MacKinnon).
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role. But our commitment to workplace asexuality is, even more directly, a
legacy of our historic commitment to a certain conception of organizational
rationality. It wasn't Victorian churchwomen, but twentieth-century
organization men who took the lead in creating the asexual imperative: men
like Frederick Winslow Taylor, who saw managers as rational "heads" who
would control the unruly "hands" and irrational "hearts" of those who
assumed their places as workers in the modem organization. Although the
necessity of bureaucratic organization has come under challenge in recent
years, the drive toward asexuality is not fading along with it. Today, as
much as ever, sexuality is seen as something "bad"--or at least beyond the
bounds of professionalism-that should be banished from organizational
life. If sexuality cannot be banished entirely, then those who embody or
display it must be brought under tight control and subjected to discipline.
Although the drive to sanitize the workplace raises a range of
fascinating issues about the place of sexuality and other affective elements
of human life in contemporary organizations, it is beyond the scope of this
Article to deal with most of them here. My goal is more modest: to show
how sexual harassment law, as envisioned by some feminist reformers and
implemented by many human resource (HR) managers, has become an
important justification for a neo-Taylorist project of suppressing sexuality
and intimacy in the workplace. To put it plainly, sex harassment policies
now provide an added incentive and an increased legitimacy for
management to control and discipline relatively harmless sexual behavior
without even inquiring into whether that behavior undermines gender
equality on the job.
This development was not (and I hope still is not) inevitable. Indeed, it
is part of my aim to trace how it came about in order to reclaim some lost
possibilities and chart a more promising path for the future. Although
organizations are the main actors driving the sanitization process, the legal
system has played an important role in providing incentive and cover for
sanitization. In the United States, sex harassment has been viewed primarily
as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the
federal statute that prohibits sex discrimination in employment. 4 Title VII
says nothing about sexuality; it simply prohibits discrimination based on
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). Title VII reads in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or... to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual employee of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
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sex. Thus, under the statute, the concept of sex harassment might have been
elaborated to cover the full range of hostile and discriminatory actions-
both sexual and nonsexual-that tend to keep women (or men who fail to
conform to prescribed gender roles) in unequal jobs or work roles. Such an
approach would have paralleled developments in race discrimination law,
where courts had already adopted a broad view of racial harassment that
recognized its role in reproducing patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy that relegate minorities to lower-paid positions.
Instead, the federal agency and the lower courts charged with
interpreting Title VII defined harassment primarily in terms of sexual
advances and other sexual conduct-an approach I call the sexual model. In
earlier work, I showed that this sexual model is too narrow, because the
focus on sexual conduct has obscured more fundamental problems of
gender-based harassment and discrimination that are not primarily "sexual"
in content or design. 5 In this Article, I show that the sexual model is also
too broad, because the same focus on sexual conduct that has led courts to
ignore these larger patterns of sexism and discrimination is also leading
companies to prohibit a broad range of relatively harmless sexual conduct,
even when that conduct does not threaten gender equality on the job.6 In the
name of preventing sexual harassment, many companies are proscribing
sexual conduct that would not amount to sexual harassment, let alone sex
discrimination, under the law. Many firms are even banning or discouraging
intimate relationships between their employees. Worst of all, companies are
disciplining (and even firing) employees for these perceived sexual
transgressions without bothering to examine whether they are linked to sex
discrimination in purpose or effect.
The story of the development and implementation of sexual harassment
law is an account of one of the most ambitious recent attempts to use legal
liability to transform workplace relations. Understanding how the process
has played out provides us with critical insight into the dynamics of legal
reform. How can we understand the campaign to sanitize the workplace that
employers are undertaking in the name of sexual harassment law?
Libertarian critics claim that the threat of employer liability under Title VII,
combined with a vague definition of harassment, gives employers an
incentive to go overboard in regulating employee conduct. But this
explanation fails to account for the central puzzle of this reform effort: Why
are employers cracking down on sexual conduct, rather than equally serious
5. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
6. Throughout the Article, I use the terms "company" and "firm" as well as the more general
"organization" and "workplace." Unless specifically noted, I do not mean to limit my observations
to particular types of employment settings; rather, I mean to denote all types of settings, including
white-collar, blue-collar, and pink-collar fields; private- and public-sector employers; mental and
manual labor; and workplaces that are male-dominated, female-dominated, as well as relatively
integrated.
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nonsexual forms of harassment and discrimination for which they are also
liable? Firms often simply go through the motions or even resist legal
mandates; why have they responded so enthusiastically, even
overzealously, to this body of law?
As Part II shows, the answer lies in the fact that sexual harassment law
resonated with a widely shared conception of organizational rationality. The
legal system's focus on the harmfulness of sexual conduct tapped into an
age-old view of sexuality that was deeply ingrained in managerial ideology
and successfully exploited by feminist leaders. Classical organizational
theory holds that sexuality and other "personal" forces are at odds with
productivity and out of place in organizational life. Rather than challenging
this conception, many feminists who campaigned against sexual harassment
explicitly drew on it. They argued that men's sexual conduct subverted
women's equal standing as employees, while at the same time undermining
organizational productivity. Like classical organizational theory, feminist
arguments pitted workplace sexuality, and professional competence and
productivity, against each other.
As I elaborate in Section III.A, the confluence of legal, feminist,
managerial, and popular ideals created an environment in which
organizational actors have been able to steer the law to serve their own
ends. As sociologists of law have shown, human resource managers-the
inside managers and outside consultants who specialize in helping
organizations handle personnel matters-and management-side labor
lawyers consistently shape understandings of law and compliance with it in
a direction that emphasizes organizational aims, especially efficiency. In
the context of a legal system that highlighted the harm of workplace sexual
conduct, a feminist campaign that condemned it as inconsistent with
women's equality, a managerial tradition that defined it as in conflict with
organizational rationality, and a news media that sensationalized it, it was
almost predictable that HR managers and lawyers would mobilize sexual
harassment law in the service of suppressing sexual conduct. As Sections
III.B through III.E document, these experts have encouraged companies to
punish sexual conduct without attending to the larger structures of gender
inequality in which genuine harassment flourishes. They urge "zero-
tolerance" policies and "cultural sensitivity" approaches that err on the side
of prohibiting sexual conduct that might subjectively be perceived as
offensive (such as sexual jokes and remarks), or that might even
conceivably lead to sexual harassment claims (such as office romances).
Aided by extensive press coverage that has popularized the idea of
harassment-as-sexual-conduct and generated an intense fear of legal
liability, these experts' views are taking hold in organizational life, as Part
III shows. The motivations of these experts, and the employers who rely on
their advice, are complex. Obviously, it is in the experts' self-interest to
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interpret the law in a way that allows them to create a market for their own
services (such as sexual harassment policies and training programs). But
self-interest can coexist with idealistic, or at least ideological, impulses.
Perhaps, like early feminists, many professionals and managers genuinely
believe that workplace sexual conduct harms women. Perhaps many of
them see sexual harassment law as an acceptable-even progressive-
justification for imposing prohibitions that serve other management
interests. Perhaps both. Troublingly, as Section HII.D shows, there are hints
that employers sometimes seize on accusations of sexual harassment as a
pretext for less benign motives for firing employees, such as age
discrimination or sexual orientation discrimination. In other cases,
employers seem to be acting in good faith to enforce sexual harassment
policies that simply reach too far. Either way, no effort is made to
determine whether the alleged harassment was linked to sex discrimination.
In the hands of organizational actors, the concept of sex harassment has
been given a direction of its own, diverted from the larger goals of
employment discrimination law.
Although the reasons may not be obvious, I believe the attempt to
banish sexuality from the workplace threatens many important social
interests. Sanitization does not eliminate sex discrimination, but it may
unleash some discriminatory forces of its own. As Section III.F shows, the
focus on sexual conduct has encouraged organizations to treat harassment
as a stand-alone phenomenon-a problem of bad or boorish men who
oppress or offend women-rather than as a symptom of larger patterns of
sex segregation and inequality. As a result, companies can feel good about
punishing individual employees for sexual offenses while doing little or
nothing to address the overarching dynamics of harassment and
discrimination that preserve gender hierarchy at work. By displacing
attention away from genuine problems of sex discrimination and
associating feminism with a punitive stance toward sexuality, I believe the
drive toward sexual sanitization may even undercut the goal of achieving
gender equality.
To add to the problem, the emphasis on eliminating sexual conduct
encourages employees to articulate broader workplace harms as forms of
sexual harassment, obscuring more structural problems that may be the true
source of their disadvantage. Thus, women may complain about sexual
jokes, when their real concern is a caste system that relegates them to low-
status, low-pay positions, as Section IV.C shows. Even more worrying is
the prospect that some employees may make allegations of sexual
harassment that disproportionately disadvantage racial and sexual
minorities. As Section IV.D suggests, white women who enjoy sexual
banter and flirtation with their white male coworkers may regard the same
conduct as a form of sexual harassment when it comes from men of color.
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Heterosexual men who willingly engage in sexual horseplay with men
whom they regard as heterosexual may be quick to label the same overtures
as harassment when they come from openly gay men. These results are
unsurprising, for regulatory initiatives to stamp out sexual conduct are often
mobilized disproportionately against stigmatized minorities. But they do
suggest that one-size-fits-all, acontextual prohibitions on sexual conduct
may give individual employees, and management as a whole, too much
power to enforce sexual conformity in the name of pursuing a project of
gender equality that has been all but abandoned.
The truth is that managers cannot succeed in banishing sexuality from
the workplace: They can only subject particular expressions of it to
surveillance and discipline. Although some groups suffer more than others
when this occurs, everyone loses. It may well be true, as the libertarian
critics of harassment law have charged, that punishing sexual language and
conduct can infringe on employees' free expression,7 and, where that
occurs, it is not a harm to be taken lightly. But, as Section V.A elaborates,
7. As many readers are undoubtedly aware, a number of libertarian writers have criticized
sexual harassment law on the ground that it has led employers to adopt restrictions that
compromise employees' freedom of expression. For an example of such a critique by one of the
most prolific and influcntial libertarian writers, see Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of
Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1819-43, 1846 (1992) (arguing that
current sexual harassment law constrains protected speech in a content- and viewpoint-based
manner, and proposing that harassing speech directed at a particular individual be subject to
liability, but that undirected speech should remain free of constraints). For other examples, see
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 78-127 (2000) (arguing that sexual harassment law leads
to the invasion of employee privacy and prevents employees from having private space for
expression); CATHY YOUNG, CEASEFIRE! WHY WOMEN AND MEN MUST JOIN FORCES To
ACHIEVE TRUE EQUALITY 173 (1999) (stressing that current sexual harassment law "abridges
freedom of speech"); and Walter Olson, Shut Up, They Explained, REASON, June 1997, at 54, 54(criticizing "zero tolerance" sexual harassment policies that give no benefit of the doubt to
debatable or borderline speech), available at http://www.reason.com!9706/col.olson.html. For a
more extreme view, see Kingsley R. Browne, Title VI a,; Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 491-510 (1991) (arguing that Title
VII hostile work environment liability leads to prohibitions on verbal harassment that amount to
unconstitutional viewpoint-based restrictions on expression).
8. A growing number of feminist writers have begun to express concern that certain
interpretations of sexual harassment law may undermine employees' freedom of expression- See
NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 125-32 (1995) (arguing that harassment law gives employers incentives to
create and overzealously enforce policies that infringe on employees' expression); Cynthia L.
Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory
Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 698-99 (1997) (making a similar point); cf JUDITH BUTLER,
EXCITABLE SPEECH 97 (1997) (arguing against censorship of hate speech for a number of reasons,
including that "hate speech arguments have been invoked against minority groups," including
homosexuals and African Americans). Because people spend so many of their waking hours at
work and rub shoulders with a variety of other people there, the workplace may have become a
new public square in which it is especially important that people be able to express themselves.
See Estlund, supra, at 732-33; cf J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2304-06, 2319 (1999) (agreeing that harassment law may tread upon free
expression, but arguing that this collateral censorship is justified, and criticizing the libertarians
for ignoring broader problems of employer censorship and control of employees). Although I
share the concern that employers may be exercising too much control over people's ability to
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I am equally concerned about the threats to human intimacy and the
negative politics of sexuality that are ushered in by the drive toward
sanitization. With the decline of civil society, the workplace is one of the
few arenas left in our society where people from different walks of life can
come to know one another well. 9 Because people who work together come
into close contact with each other for extended periods for the purpose of
achieving common goals, work fosters extraordinarily intimate
relationships of both the sexually charged and the more platonic varieties.
When managers prohibit or discourage employees from dating each other,
they deprive people of perhaps the single most promising avenue available
for securing sexual partners. And, when managers punish employees for
sexualized interactions with each other, they create a climate that may stifle
workplace friendships and solidarity more generally. Evidence suggests that
many employees fear that a simple expression of personal interest in a
coworker may prompt an accusation of sexual harassment. We cannot
expect diverse groups of people to form close bonds and alliances-
whether sexual or nonsexual-if they must be concerned that reaching out
to one another puts them at risk of losing their jobs or their reputations.
Along with the loss of individual free expression comes an interference
with intimacy and bonding.
Even more is at stake than whether or not people can form close
friendships at work: The larger question is whether we as a society can
value the workplace as a realm alive with personal intimacy, sexual energy,
and "humanness" more broadly. The same impulse that would banish
sexuality from the workplace also seeks to suppress other "irrational" life
experiences such as birth and death, sickness and disability, aging and
emotion of every kind. But the old Taylorist dream of the workplace as a
sterile zone in which workers suspend all their human attributes while they
train their energies solely on production doesn't begin to reflect the rich,
multiple roles that work serves in people's lives. For most people, working
isn't just a way to earn a livelihood. It's a way to contribute something to
the larger society, to struggle against their limits, to make friends and form
communities, to leave their imprint on the world, and to know themselves
and others in a deep way. As I have explained elsewhere, work isn't simply
express themselves at work, it is not my goal to analyze the degree to which current
interpretations of sexual harassment law infringe on First Amendment law. Instead, I propose a
vision of the law that promotes employees' ability to form their own workplace cultures-
including cultures that involve sexual conduct and expression-provided that those cultures are
formed within broader structures of gender equality that give men and women equal ability to
shape them.
9. See Cynthia Estlund, Working Together- The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (2000) (asserting that "[tihe single most important arena of racial and ethnic
integration is the workplace" and that "even the partial demographic integration that does exist in
the workplace yields far more social integration-actual interracial interaction and friendship-
than any other domain of American society").
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a sphere of production. It is also a source of citizenship, community, and
self-understanding. 10
By encouraging and licensing management to punish sexual conduct,
our society contributes to a negative politics of sexuality as well as an
impoverished view of working life. The drive to sanitize the workplace
assumes that sexuality is properly a private element that will assume a
destructive quality if unleashed in a public setting. But as Section IV.A
argues, sexuality isn't simply an attribute of individual people-it's a
dynamic force that finds life in social relations shaped in institutional
spaces. Nor is sexuality always discriminatory or destructive to
organizational life: It can serve a variety of positive ends. Just as individual
employees may express themselves or embroider intimate relations through
sexual language and conduct, so too may employees as a group resort to
sexual interactions to alleviate stress or boredom on the job, to create vital
forms of community and solidarity with each other, or to articulate
resistance to oppressive management practices. Research suggests that
workplace romance may even increase productivity in some circumstances.
Contrary to prevailing orthodoxy, such uses of workplace sexuality do
not always harm or disadvantage women: A lot depends on the larger
structural context in which the sexuality is expressed, as Section IV.B
shows. As a well-accepted body of systematic social science research
demonstrates, women who enter jobs in which they are significantly
underrepresented often confront hostility and harassment from incumbent
male workers, and in some settings the men use sexual conduct as a means
of marking the women as "different" and out of place. However, a new
body of sociological research suggests that women who work in more
integrated, egalitarian settings often willingly participate and take pleasure
in sexualized interactions-probably because their numerical strength gives
them the power to help shape the sexual norms and culture to their own
liking. Rather than presuming that women will always find sexual conduct
offensive, this research suggests that we should ensure that women are fully
integrated into equal jobs and positions of authority, thus giving them the
power to decide for themselves what kind of work cultures they want to
have.
This analysis leads me to the conclusion that, in a pluralistic society, we
should neither encourage nor cede to management the unilateral power to
censor sexual conduct. Instead, we should strive to create structurally
egalitarian work settings in which employees can work with management to
forge their own norms about sexual conduct. With this goal in mind, current
sexual harassment law creates perverse incentives. The fear of liability for
specifically sexual forms of harassment legitimates the drive to
I 0. Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886-92 (2000).
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desexualize-while there is little countervailing pressure to integrate jobs
that remain stratified along gender lines. Thus, Section V.B proposes some
changes to sex harassment law that would give organizations greater
incentive to desegregate-rather than simply desexualizing. Under my
approach, an employer who continues to operate a sex-segregated
workplace would face a more stringent set of liability rules that make it
easier than it is now for plaintiffs to prove that nonsexual, as well as sexual,
forms of harassment are sex-based and sufficiently harmful to be
actionable. On the other hand, if an employer succeeds in creating a well-
integrated, structurally egalitarian workplace, the firm would face a more
lenient set of liability rules that would relieve it of responsibility for
sexually offensive conduct unless a plaintiff could show that the conduct
was used for the purpose of discriminating against her and actually affected
her ability to do the job. This is a simple set of reforms that could be urged
by enforcement agencies and crafted by judges in the relevant case law; no
legislative action would be required.
Section V.C proposes some compatible organizational reforms. For
example, I would like to see organizations abandon sensitivity training in
favor of incorporating their harassment policies into broader efforts to
achieve integration and equality throughout the firm. Along similar lines, I
urge that employers forgo measures to prohibit or discourage sexual or
dating relationships among employees and refuse to intervene, just as they
do with nonsexual friendships, unless there is clear evidence that a
particular relationship is undermining specific organizational goals.
Ultimately, my hope is that many organizations will rethink the traditional
conception of rationality in favor of a broader understanding that recognizes
sexuality and intimacy as part of the fabric and foundation of organizational
life. But my approach does not require companies to share this vision. My
goal isn't to use the law to require all organizations to permit open
expressions of sexuality, but rather to eliminate the existing legal pressures
toward desexualization in favor of opening up new possibilities of pluralism
and experimentation. In my view, employees and supervisors should be free
to work together to create a variety of different work cultures-including
more and less sexualized ones-so long as that process occurs within a
larger context of structural equality that provides all women and men the
power to shape those cultures. Once they are given a meaningful choice, I
believe many of today's managers and employees will choose workplaces
in which they are more, rather than less, free to express their full humanity
and to form close connections with each other.
Ultimately, however, as I emphasize in the Conclusion, legal reforms
alone will not alter the status quo. If I have learned anything from doing
this study, it is that the law can make a difference, but only if it resonates
with, and can inspire others to demand the realization of, broader cultural,
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political, and organizational visions. The contemporary drive to sanitize the
workplace came about through a complex interplay of forces in which
feminists, judges, HR managers, lawyers, and the news media all helped
create an understanding that sexuality disadvantages women and disrupts
productivity. In my view, we can only hope to halt the sanitization process
by articulating a more appealing vision in which sexuality and intimacy can
coexist with, and perhaps even enhance, gender equality and organizational
rationality. This is a tremendous task, but, for reasons I hope emerge clearly
from this Article, one I believe is worthy of the efforts of the next
generation of scholars, feminists, lawyers, and managers.
1I. THE HISTORICAL DREAM OF A SANITIZED WORKPLACE
A. Divorcing Productivity and Passion
The idea that sex has no place in the workplace is not new. At least
since the early 1900s, corporate managers have seen sexuality as something
that properly lies "outside" the workplace-something that preexists and
threatens it. This imperative was part of a larger wave of bureaucratization
that rolled in with the twentieth century. The emergence of giant
corporations with far-flung operations to be coordinated gave rise to a new
class of professional managers. Lacking legitimacy rooted in firm
ownership or ruling-class birthright, the new managers rested their authority
on their technical expertise: As managers, they knew the "one best way" to
organize work efficiently. 1
In contrast to the freewheeling intuitivism of some nineteenth-century
entrepreneurs, 12 the founding fathers of modem organizational theory
imagined firms as spheres of "passionless" rationality. 13 In the division of
labor they invented, managers would use their brains to do the logical
thinking-through and planning of organizational goals, and workers would
use their bodies to implement them. In the words of Frederick Winslow
Taylor, the steel company engineer-turned-consultant who invented the
11. See, e.g., ROBERT KANIGEL, THE ONE BEST WAY: FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR AND
THE ENIGMA OF EFFICIENCY 1- 19 (1997).
12. Consider, for example, railroad magnate Cornelius Vanderbilt:[H]e seemed to act almost on impulse and intuition. He could never explain the mental
processes by which he arrived at important decisions .... He seems to have had, as he
himself frequently said, a seer-like faculty. He saw visions, and he believed in dreams
and in signs.... Before making investments or embarking in his great railroad
ventures, Vanderbilt visited spiritualists ....
BURTON J. HENDRICK, THE AGE OF BIG BUSINESS: A CHRONICLE OF THE CAPTAINS OF
INDUSTRY 21 (1919).
13. 1 am indebted to Rosabeth Moss Kanter for the description of Max Weber's conception of
the organization as "passionless." ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE
CORPORATION 22 (1993).
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theory of scientific management, "[T]he workman who is best suited to
actually doing the work is incapable of fully understanding [the science
underlying it], without the guidance and help of those who are working
with him or over him."14 Managers were to be the "heads" and workers the
"hands" of the organization.
But as Max Weber recognized, it wasn't just people's hands that were
to be controlled; it was also their hearts. Just as the proper use of the
assembly line and time motion studies would help management harness
workers' bodily capacities to the ends of production, so too could proper
organizational structure suppress the personal elements of people's lives
that threatened the smooth functioning of the finn. Work organizations
were conceived as hierarchies of "jobs" or "slots" to be filled by generic
"workers," who would suspend their human qualities while they were at
work and focus their energies solely on production. According to Weber,
such depersonalization was bureaucracy's special brilliance:
Its specific nature... develops the more perfectly the more
bureaucracy is "dehumanized," the more completely it succeeds in
eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely
personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape
calculation. This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is
appraised as its special virtue. 15
Classical management theorists did not speak to sexuality explicitly,
but the implications of their analysis are clear. If work is the sphere of
rationality and order, and if the irrational side of life must be kept at bay,
then it is clear that sexuality must be banished. Few forces are perceived as
more at odds with rationality than sexuality. In our culture, sexuality is seen
as "part of an animal nature-biologically or psychodynamically driven,
irrational, innate-that exists prior to (and is at war with) civilization,
society, and the forces that would repress or tame it., ' 16 Sexuality is perhaps
perceived as the supreme threat to all that is rational and ordered-the
antithesis of the passionless logic that is supposed to rule organizational
life. Thus, except when it is commodified and made part of the product or
service to be sold, sexuality is viewed as external to the organization-
something to be purged and prohibited, or at the very least disciplined and
controlled. In the words of one prominent organizational theorist, Gibson
14. THOMAS C. COCHRAN, AMERICAN BUSINESS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 76 (1972)
(quoting FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 25-26 (1911)).
15. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 215-16 (H.H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills eds. & trans., Routledge 1991) (1948).
16. JAMES D. WOODS & JAY H. LUCAS, THE CORPORATE CLOSET: THE PROFESSIONAL
LIVES OF GAY MEN IN AMERICA 33 (1993). The foundational source here is SIGMUND FREUD,
CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 50-52 (James Strachey ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co.
1961) (1930). See also JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 80-81 (1985).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
20732003]
The Yale Law Journal
Burrell, "[T]he suppression of sexuality is one of the first tasks the
bureaucracy sets itself."17
Given the predominance of this way of thinking, it is little wonder that
the massive movement of women into the workforce seemed to pose a
problem for modem organizations. In an organizational environment that
regarded male workers as elements of potential volatility, the entrance of
women could only magnify and intensify the risk. For, within the collective
social psyche, women represent the emotional, "irrational" side of
existence."8 Women are closely associated with the processes of life and
death: reproduction and birth, nurturance and rejection, sickness and
disease, aging and death-and, of course, sexuality. For this reason, as
sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kanter has noted, Weber's defense of
passionless bureaucracy can be seen to converge with Freud's contention
that women-the bearers of passion and sexuality-are out of place in the
working world of men: "Resisting female enticements, men carry on the
burdens of government and rational thought; rationality is the male
principle, in opposition to the female principle of emotionality. Men master
their sexuality .... whereas women 'live dangerously close to the archaic
heritage."" 9
Decades later, this historical way of thinking about the place of
sexuality in work organizations would provide challenging terrain for a
women's movement that wanted to integrate women into equal roles at
work. In a culture that viewed women as the walking embodiments of
sexuality and regarded sexuality as a threat to organizational life, feminists
faced a difficult choice: They could challenge the notion that the workplace
is (or should be) asexual-and insist that sexuality is a common, not
necessarily undesirable feature of organizational life that exists whether or
not women are present. Or, they could embrace the ethic of asexuality-and
join the struggle to stamp out sexual behavior, in the name of ensuring
parity for women and productivity for the firm.
B. Equating Sexism and Sexuality
For the most part, the American women's movement has pursued the
latter strategy. Instead of challenging the ethic of asexuality, a powerful
strand of the movement mounted a legal campaign to curb men's sexual
conduct. Feminist activists and lawyers invented a claim for sexual
harassment, which holds companies responsible for unwanted sexual
conduct as a form of sex discrimination in employment. Through this
17. Gibson Burrell, Sex and Organizational Analysis, 5 ORG. STUD. 97, 98 (1984).
18. See. e.g., Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating
Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 491,492 (1996).
19. KANTER, supra note 13, at 306 n.29 (quoting Sigmund Freud).
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approach, feminists joined management's traditional drive to desexualize
the workplace and demanded its contemporary completion. Management
might believe the workplace was asexual, feminists claimed, but women's
entrance had occasioned overt displays of heterosexual male predation.
Men's sexual overtures subverted gender equality, feminists contended, for
women could never be respected as employees so long as they were
regarded as sexual objects. Not only did male sexuality threaten women's
interests, it also interfered with everyone's productivity-men and women
alike. Thus, feminists could claim, rationalizing the workplace required
reining in male sexuality.
The centerpiece of this feminist strategy was equating unwanted sexual
conduct with sex discrimination-a powerful maneuver that has crowded
out other notions of workplace harassment and justified the drive to root sex
out of the workworld. Feminist lawyers focused on Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, which holds employers liable for sex discrimination and other
forms of discrimination in employment. But Title VII does not mention
sexuality or even sex harassment; its purpose was to end discriminatory job
segregation .2  Thus, feminists might have pushed for a broad concept of sex
harassment that encompassed the entire range of hostile and discriminatory
actions-both sexual and nonsexual-through which supervisors and
coworkers labeled women workers "different" and inferior, thereby helping
to preserve historic patterns of sex segregation in employment that
consigned women to lower-status, lower-paying, female-dominated jobs.
Such an approach would have paralleled developments in race
discrimination law, where courts had already taken such a broad view of
racial harassment.2' In addition to this race discrimination precedent, there
was a body of theoretical work, and at least one important precedent
20. Those who spoke in favor of the amendment adding the prohibition against sex
discrimination to the original 1964 Act focused primarily on the injustice of sex segregation in the
labor market. See 110 CONG. REc. 2579-80, 2580-81 (1964) (statements of Reps. Griffiths and St.
George). Moreover, when Congress amended Title VII in 1972, both the House and the Senate
made clear that they considered sex segregation to be the primary evil that the statute was
designed to address. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 4-5 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2140 ("[W]omen are placed in the less challenging, the less responsible and the less
remunerative positions on the basis of their sex alone. Such blatantly disparate treatment is
particularly objectionable in view of the fact that Title VII has specifically prohibited sex
discrimination since its enactment in 1964."); S. REP. No. 92-415, at 7 (1971) (including similar
statements).
21. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) (recognizing a cause of action
for hostile work environment harassment based on race); see also Schultz, supra note 5, at 1715-
16 (explaining that judges created the theory of hostile work environment in order to prevent
employers from perpetuating racial segregation through informal means of racial intimidation and
harassment).
22. Psychiatrist and anthropologist Dr. Carroll Brodsky's book, The Harassed Worker, for
example, is an early source that used the term "sexual harassment." See CARROLL M. BRODSKY,
THE HARASSED WORKER 27-28 (1976). In contrast to early feminist work that defined sexual
harassment as a form of sexual exploitation, Brodsky defined the term in broad, nonsexual terms:
"Harassment behavior involves the repeated and persistent attempts... to torment, wear down,
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secured by a feminist lawyer in a sex discrimination case,23 that would have
supported such a broad vision of sex harassment and its link to larger
gender-based inequalities. That some lower courts would continue to adopt
such a broad approach suggests that it would have been a viable strategy for
feminists to pursue.24
But as I have recounted elsewhere, most feminists did not pursue this
path. Instead, feminist activists and lawyers pushed for a narrower
understanding of sex harassment, defining the concept in terms of unwanted
male-female sexual advances. They argued that such sexual advances were
frustrate, or get a reaction from another. It is treatment that persistently provokes, pressures,
frightens, intimidates, or otherwise discomforts another person." Id. at 2. Brodsky observed that
"[h]arassment is a mechanism for achieving exclusion and protection of privilege in situations
where there are no formal mechanisms available." Id. at 4. Thus, to Brodsky, the term "sexual
harassment" referred not only to sexual advances, but to all uses of sexuality as a way of
tormenting those who felt "discomfort about discussing sex or relating sexually." Id. at 28. In
Brodsky's conception, sexual harassment could be directed not only from men to women, but
from men to men, id., and not only from supervisor to subordinate, but also horizontally, from
peer to peer, and even bottom-up, from subordinate to boss, because competition for privilege
occurs in all these directions, id. at 48-59.
23. In Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co., Judith Vladeck, one of the first women to attend
Columbia Law School and a pioneering Title VII plaintiff's lawyer, proved that the defendant had
discriminated against one of its first female engineers, Cleo Kyriazi, and other women by
(1) relegating them to the lowest-graded jobs, (2) promoting them in fewer numbers and with less
frequency than men, (3) foreclosing them from participating in job programs that would help them
ascend from the low ranks, and (4) laying them off in greater numbers than men. 461 F. Supp.
894, 902 (D.N.J. 1978). Vladeck also showed that, as part of this broader pattern of sex
segregation and discrimination, Kyriazi's supervisors had allowed her male coworkers to harass
and humiliate her through sexual taunts and ridicule and comments denigrating women's abilities.
Id. at 934-35. In an inspiring opinion, Judge Stem found that the company's failure to address the
harassment directed at Kyriazi was an instance of sex-based discrimination that was connected to
a much larger pattern of illegal discrimination against her and the other women in the firm. Id. at
926. Judge Stem's analysis did not highlight the harassment's sexual content or inquire into
whether the harassers were motivated by sexual desire, but instead rightly stressed that the
conduct was designed to denigrate Kyriazi as a woman, see id. at 934, and that the company's
failure to address it "left [her] with the understanding that her superiors were discriminating
against her and in favor of her male co-workers," id. at 935.
24. See, e.g., Rimedio v. Revlon, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (holding a
company liable under Title VII where an account manager charged that her supervisor "harassed
her, threatened her with loss of her job, prevented her from exercising the authority and
responsibility commensurate with her position and generally treated her without respect"); EEOC
v. Judson Steel Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1286, 1295 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (holding a
company liable where women bricklayers were treated differently in the assignment of work,
overtime, breaks, and other day-to-day conditions of employment, and were also subjected to
harassment and sexual advances by their supervisor, because such actions "created a working
environment fraught with sex bias.., thus violating [the plaintiffs'] right to work in a
nondiscriminatory environment"); Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y.
1983), aff'd, 755 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding a fire department liable where recently hired
female firefighters were subject to a litany of both sexual and nonsexual forms of harassment, and
explicitly recognizing that the harassment was intended to drive the women away and preserve the
all-male composition of the department).
25. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1696-701 (explaining how activists and lawyers influenced
by radical feminist ideas formed arguments that emphasized the harm of sexual harassment as a
form of sexual exploitation, rather than adopting a broader definition that linked harassment to sex
segregation in employment and other gender-based inequalities in the workplace).
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discriminatory and harmful to women-an argument that inspired sympathy
among both liberal and socially conservative judges. Courts first accepted
this line of argument in an early group of cases commonly known as quid
pro quo harassment cases, in which male supervisors fired female
subordinates for refusing their sexual advances. Although alternative lines
of reasoning were available,26 the lower courts located the source of sex
discrimination in the sexual desire presumed to motivate the supervisor's
sexual advances. A heterosexual male boss's sexual come-on toward a
female employee is discriminatory, said the courts, because the boss would
not have been attracted to-and thus would not have made a sexual advance
toward-a male employee. In the words of Judge Spottswood Robinson,
writing for the D.C. Circuit in 1977, "[B]ut for her gender [the plaintiff]
would not have been importuned .... [T]here is no suggestion that the
allegedly amorous supervisor is other than heterosexual. 27
The 1980 guidelines adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the major federal agency responsible for enforcing
and creating policies to implement Title VII, consolidated this approach.
Building on the reasoning in the early quid pro quo cases, the guidelines
defined sexual harassment as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."
2 8
26. For example, judges might have located sex bias in a male boss's exercising his authority
to punish someone, as a worker, for refusing to perform a non-job-related service that was
expected of her, as a woman, if it would never have been expected of a male employee. This line
of reasoning would have applied to both sexual demands and to other nonsexual demands bosses
have been known to make of their female (but not their male) employees, such as cleaning,
serving food, or displaying properly "feminine" demeanor. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (holding that it is sex discrimination to require a female
candidate for partner in a Big Eight accounting firm to "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, [and] wear make-up" when this was not required of the men
(citation omitted)); cf Slack v. Havens, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, 885 (S.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd as
modified, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that it is race discrimination to require Black
women to do heavy cleanup work that is not part of their job description, while exempting white
female employees from the task). On a related note, judges might also have located the sex bias in
quid pro quo harassment in its link to vertical sex segregation. As discussed more fully below, see
infra notes 321-326 and accompanying text, the fact that women are so often supervised by male
bosses facilitates the exercise of sexist forms of authority and abuse.
27. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989-90 & n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding, for the first
time in an appellate case, that quid pro quo harassment is a form of sex discrimination actionable
under Title VII).
28. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, 74,677 (Nov.
10, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2001)). The guidelines define actionable
harassment as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature. . when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2)
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id.
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Although these guidelines did not have the force of law, they were given
broad deference by the lower courts-many of which read them to limit sex
harassment to sexual conduct. 29 By the time the Supreme Court decided its
first sex harassment case in 1986, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,30 the
equation of sexual harassment with sexual advances was firmly established.
Thus, the Justices could simply assume, without having to explain, why a
bank manager's unwelcome sexual advances against a female employee
would amount, if proven to be sufficiently hostile or abusive, to
discrimination "because of sex" within the meaning of Title VII.3' In these
sexually hostile work environment cases, as in the earlier quid pro quo
harassment cases, it was the presumed presence of sexual desire that
provided the inference of discriminatory intent necessary under the
32statute. As a result, the Court had no trouble reaching a unanimous
decision holding that sexual harassment violated Title VII.
Over time, the sexualized understanding of harassment that arose out of
the quid pro quo cases came to overwhelm the concept of hostile work
environment harassment as well. As a result, courts have tended to single
out sexual advances and other conduct of a sexual nature for disapproval,
and have tended to exonerate even serious patterns of sexist misconduct
that could not be easily characterized as sexually motivated.33 Thus, despite
the fact that the Supreme Court has never expressly held that a Title VII
claim for sex harassment requires conduct of a sexual nature for purposes of
a harassment claim, 34  systematic empirical research confirms that
29. See, e.g., Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., 618 F. Supp. 1438, 1441-42 (S.D. W. Va. 1985)
(relying on the EEOC guidelines to dismiss the claim of a woman who alleged that her foreman
picked on her all the time and treated her differently from the male employees); see also Schultz,
supra note 5, at 1717-20 (citing other cases ruling against plaintiffs because their harassment
claims did not involve readily recognizable sexual advances or sexually motivated conduct).
30. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
31. Id. at 64 ("Respondent argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that unwelcome sexual
advances that create an offensive or hostile working environment violate Title VII. Without
question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." (alteration in original)).
32. The Seventh Circuit's explanation in one hostile work environment case makes the
reasoning clear: "Sonstein wanted to have an affair, a liaison, illicit sex, a forbidden relationship.
His actions are not consistent with platonic love. His actions were based on her gender and
motivated by his libido.... [His] sexual desire does not negate his [discriminatory] intent; rather
it affirmatively establishes it." King v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533,
539 (7th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
33. In earlier work, I documented this pattern in great detail. See Schultz, supra note 5, at
1706-38.
34. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Drilling Services, the Supreme Court expressly stated,
for the first time, that "harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex." 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). But see infra note 64 and
accompanying text (discussing limits to this principle). Neither of the two sexual harassment cases
decided by the Supreme Court before 1998 discussed this issue, although the fact that both cases
included sexual conduct may have tended to confirm in the eyes of the lower courts the
impression created by the EEOC guidelines that sexual harassment refers to such conduct. See
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (involving allegations of sexual acts such as
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historically, in the lower federal courts, sexual harassment plaintiffs who
complain about sexualized forms of behavior have been significantly more
likely to win than plaintiffs who complain about other forms of sex-based
misconduct.
3 5
As I have explained in earlier work, this legal emphasis on sexual
advances was supported-and promoted-by some powerful strands of
radical feminism that influenced feminist lawyers.36 Deeply concerned
about the privatized abuse that characterized many women's lives, during
the mid-1970s, many radical feminists moved toward the view that
heterosexual sexual relations (or, in the language of the day, "compulsory
heterosexuality 3 7) were the main source of women's inequality. These
feminists, who inspired a grass-roots activist campaign to define and
politicize the problem of "sexual harassment," 38 saw workplace sexual
advances as a form of sexual dominance, akin to rape, and this view shaped
the form of the legal argument. In Sexual Harassment of Working Women,
law professor Catharine MacKinnon argued that such advances constitute
suggesting that a female rental manager must have had sex with a client in order to land an
account); Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. 57 (involving allegations that a female bank teller was
subject to numerous sexual assaults, including rape).
35. Law professors Ann Juliano and Stewart J. Schwab analyzed every federal sex
harassment case decided between 1986 and 1996. They found that "[p]laintiffs alleging
'harassment as sexualized behavior' have significantly higher win rates than other sexual
harassment plaintiffs." Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment
Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 580 (2001).
36. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1697-99 (describing the view of sexual harassment
subscribed to by early feminist activists who were influenced by radical feminist ideas); id. at
1702-03, 1704-05 (explaining how radical feminist views were translated into legal arguments).
37. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in POWERS OF
DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 177 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983); see also KATHLEEN
BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 164-65 (1979) ("Sex is power is the foundation of
patriarchy.... Institutionalized sexism and misogyny-from discrimination in employment, to
exploitation through the welfare system, to dehumanization in pornography-stem from the
primary sexual domination of women in one-to-one situations."); ANDREA DWORKIN,
INTERCOURSE 126 (1987) ("Intercourse as an act often expresses the power men have over
women. Without being what the society recognizes as rape, it is what the society-when forced to
admit it-recognizes as dominance.").
38. The first group known to have used the term "sexual harassment" were the members of
Working Women United (WWU), who in a May 1975 "Speak-Out on Sexual Harassment"
defined sexual harassment as "the treatment of women workers as sexual objects." Dierdre
Silverman, Sexual Harassment: Working Women's Dilemma, QUEST: FEMINIST Q., Winter 1976-
1977, at 15, 15. Dierdre Silverman, a WWU founder, argued that harassment exists "when job
retention, raises or promotions depend on tolerating, or submitting to, unwanted sexual advances,"
and varies in form "from clearly suggestive looks and/or remarks, to mild physical encounters
(pinching, kissing, etc.) to outright sexual assault." Id. Another WWU founder, Lin Farley,
defined harassment as "any or all of the following: staring at, commenting upon, or touching a
woman's body; requests for acquiescence in sexual behavior; repeated nonreciprocated
propositions for dates; demands for sexual intercourse; and rape." LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL
SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 15 (1978). For a more
complete account of the early feminist campaign against sexual harassment, see Schultz, supra
note 5, at 1696-701.
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sex discrimination precisely because they are sexual in nature39-and
because heterosexual sexual relations are the primary mechanism through
which male dominance and female subordination are maintained.40 She was
not alone. During this era, as feminist writer Ellen Willis has shown, rape
became the central metaphor for women's disadvantage, and "all sexist
behavior.., an extension of the paradigmatic act of rape."' 1 From this
perspective, it was a short step to the proposition that sex in the
workplace-at least between men and women in unequal positions42 -is a
form of discrimination that should be abolished.
Although this position originated with a certain strand of radical
feminist politics, over time it began to resonate with a more moderate
generation of liberal feminists who accepted the idea that sexuality was a
set of shackles that women should be able to remove upon entering the
neutral sphere that is supposed to guarantee equality: the workplace. In the
name of securing progress for women, these feminists joined the campaign
to eliminate sexuality from the work-a-day world. In 1978, for example,
anthropologist (and cultural icon) Margaret Mead wrote an article for
Redbook in which she urged society to protect women from sexual
harassment by establishing a taboo against male-female sexual relations in
the workplace-just like the incest taboo within families. She stated her
39. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 174 (1979).
40. MacKinnon's critique of the feminist proposition that rape is violence, not sex,
exemplifies this view:
The radical distinction between rape and intercourse-rape is violence, intercourse is
sexuality-is both the most basic and the least examined premise of this approach.
... But is ordinary sexuality, under conditions of gender inequality, to be
presumed healthy? What if inequality is built into the social conceptions of male and
female sexuality, of masculinity and femininity, of sexiness and heterosexual
attractiveness? Incidents of sexual harassment suggest that male sexual desire itself
may be aroused by female vulnerability.
Id. at 218-21. This analysis foreshadowed the more trenchant statement in MacKinnon's later
essay: "Women and men are divided by gender, made into the sexes as we know them, by the
social requirements of heterosexuality, which institutionalizes male sexual dominance and female
sexual submission. If this is true, sexuality is the linchpin of gender inequality." Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515,
531-33 (1982).
41. ELLEN WILLIS, Radical Feminism and Feminist Radicalism, in No MORE NICE GIRLS:
COUNTERCULTURAL ESSAYS 117, 144 (1992).
42. Since men tend to hold superior positions in most workplaces (whether as bosses or as
more senior workers), this logic easily led to a sex-has-no-place-in-the-workplace view. See JEAN
L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM 132 (2002) ("The obvious
conclusion to draw from [MacKinnon's] analysis is that so long as gender inequality exists, sex
must be kept out of the workplace, particularly where there are power differentials between the
workers.").
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position clearly and unequivocally: "You don't make passes at or sleep with
the people you work with."43
More than a decade later, law professor Susan Estrich, who had once
criticized MacKinnon for questioning the meaningfulness of a woman's
consent to sex,44 adopted a similar position. In an important article
published in 1991, Estrich criticized the courts for failing to recognize that
sexual harassment is
more offensive, more debilitating, and more dehumanizing to its
victims ... precisely [because] it is sexual. Not only are men
exercising power over women, but they are operating in a realm
which is still judged according to a gender double standard, itself a
reflection of the extent to which sexuality is used to penalize
women.
45
Based on this view, Estrich had no trouble arguing that sexuality should
be banned from the workplace. She wrote:
As things stand now, we protect the right of a few to have
"consensual" sex in the workplace (a right most women, according
to the studies, do not even want), at the cost of exposing the
overwhelming majority to oppression and indignity at work....
For my part, I would have no objection to rules which prohibited
men and women from sexual relations in the workplace, at least
with those who worked directly for them. Men and women could,
of course, violate the rule; but the power to complain, once in the
hands of the less powerful, might well "chill" sexual relations by
evening the balance of power between the tWO.
4 6
Estrich's position was linked to that of social psychologist Barbara
Gutek, whose "sex-role spillover theory" posits that sexual harassment
occurs because men inappropriately bring with them into the workplace
inegalitarian attitudes and actions-namely, habits of sexual
objectification-that they learned in the domestic sphere.47 In this early
feminist construction of the problem, sexuality was treated as a badge of
43. Margaret Mead, A Proposal: We Need Taboos on Sex at Work, REDBOOK, Apr. 1978, at
31, 33. It is interesting to note that Mead felt no compulsion to observe these taboos in her own
life. She conducted substantial research with Reo Fortune, her second husband. She met and fell
in love with her third husband, Gregory Bateson, while all three were doing fieldwork in New
Guinea. After Mead married Bateson, the couple did fieldwork together and collaborated on a
number of projects. See MARY CATHERINE BATESON, WITH A DAUGHTER'S EYE 19 (1984).
44. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 82 (1987).
45. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 820 (1991) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 860.
47. See BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR AND HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN AND ORGANIZATIONS 15-16 (1985).
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servitude, formed outside the workplace, that shouldn't be permitted to
mark women inside it.
Not only did this feminist rhetoric resonate with (even while it flipped
inside out) a social conservatism that has long sought to protect women
from sexual predation in the labor market, 48 the rhetoric also harkened back
to, and heralded a new incarnation of, the age-old Taylorist dream of a
sexless organization. Like the management theorists who preceded them,
these feminists justified prohibitions on sexual harassment in terms of the
"industrial logic" 49 of asexual professionalism and productivity. Based on a
series of in-depth interviews with feminist public figures and activists who
spearheaded the movement against sexual harassment, sociologist Abigail
Saguy found:
Many of the American activists use arguments about
professionalism and productivity to condemn sexual innuendo in
the workplace that falls short of sexual harassment. For instance,
when probed about the risk that over-zealous employers might
stamp out playful, harmless, fun flirtation in the workplace, one
respondent explains: "Why do people have to. .. ? Really they
don't have to have everyday seduction and flirtation in the
workplace... Has it been proven that that helps productivity?,
50
Strikingly, when MacKinnon was asked whether she was worried about
the risk of chilling sexual expression in the workplace, she responded,
"Somebody ought to get worried about the fact that no work is getting done.
And the workplace is not a place for sexual recruitment exclusively."'"
Even Camille Paglia-who has made a career out of attacking
MacKinnon's stance on most sexual issues-agreed that middle managers
should not "sexualize their jobs," because to do so would be
"unprofessional., 52  As Gutek put it, "Professionalization and
desexualization of work are not just worthy goals for their own sake; they
are good for business, for effective work organizations. ' '53 Thus, the
feminist campaign against sexual harassment successfully tethered radical
feminist arguments about equality to traditional managerial conceptions of
efficiency.
Drawing on the idea that sexuality undermines productivity and
professionalism, many feminists extended their arguments for prohibiting
48. See Ellen Carol DuBois & Linda Gordon, Seeking Ecstasy on the Battlefield.- Danger and
Pleasure in Nineteenth-Century Feminist Sexual Thought, in PLEASURE AND DANGER:
EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 31 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984).
49. Saguy, supra note 3, at 63.
50. Id. at 66 (alterations in original).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 68.
53. GUTEK, supra note 47, at 128.
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sexual harassment more broadly to condemn a wide range of sexual
conduct, even consensual conduct that would not meet the legal definition
of harassment.5 4 In some sense, it is not surprising that these feminists
marshaled the language of efficiency to suggest that sex had no place in the
workplace; Americans are deeply accustomed to thinking about reforms in
terms of their impact upon productivity. Of course, some of these feminists
used this language strategically, believing it would make courts and
companies more likely to take the problem of sexual harassment seriously.
In either case, their campaign succeeded. The news media helped
reinforce this broad view of harassment-as-sexual-conduct in the popular
imagination.5 5 The press has uncritically characterized everything from
consensual sex to forcible rape under the common label "sexual
harassment, 56 while devoting far less attention to the nonsexual forms of
sex harassment and discrimination that many working women and men
experience every day.57  Reporters covered cases involving sexual
misconduct extensively and publicized large (and perhaps unrepresentative)
jury awards for sexual harassment 5 8-a focus that has probably only served
to fuel the greater fear of sexual harassment claims that companies seem to
have in comparison to other forms of workplace sex discrimination.5 9 In
54. Saguy, supra note 3, at 66-67.
55. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 5, at 1692-96 (showing how the news media has helped
diffuse the sexual model into popular consciousness by devoting extensive coverage to cases
alleging sexual pursuit and predation, such as the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas controversy, the
Tailhook incident, and the Stroh's Brewery case).
56. See Anita Hill, A Matter ofDefinition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1998, at A21.
57. See generally SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN
WOMEN 77-111 (1992) (showing how the news media exaggerated the women's movement's
gains and failed to cover discrimination against women in various spheres of life, including
employment).
58. Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, A Tale of Two Sectors: The Spread of Anti-Harassment
Remedies Among Public and Private Employers 10, 15-16, 21, 24, at http://www.princeton.edu/
-dobbin/sexharrpapl .doc (last visited Mar. 19, 2003) (noting that the press covered early plaintiff
victories in sexual harassment cases in the late 1970s, publicized several high-profile settlements
and awards with large cash values around the time of the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, and advertised the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and its
provision of punitive damages in sexual harassment cases).
59. Although there is some evidence that employers' greater fear of liability for sexual
harassment may be warranted, I have come across no evidence that sexual harassment claims are
more costly than other discrimination claims-and have found some evidence that they may
actually be less costly. In a study of every California employment-law jury verdict reported in one
of three major reporters for 1998 and 1999, Professor David Oppenheimer found that plaintiffs
were significantly more likely to win in sexual harassment cases (68% success rate) than in other
employment discrimination cases (40% success rate) or in other sex discrimination cases (43%
success rate in pregnancy discrimination cases and a 38% success rate in other cases). David
Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination
and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Juror Bias Against Women and Minorities 31-32,
36-37 (Aug. 11, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). On the other hand, in
Oppenheimer's study, the median verdict in sexual harassment cases filed by women against men
was $224,933-a figure considerably lower than the $556,722 median verdict in pregnancy
discrimination cases or the $331,500 median in other sex discrimination cases (all of which were
filed by women). Id. at 37.
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such a climate, it is not surprising that many organizations began to adopt
prohibitions on sexual conduct that exceed the legal definition of sexual
harassment.60
Under the judicial decisions interpreting Title VII, a number of
constraints apply.6 1 For one thing, Title VII doesn't prohibit all sexual
60. Media coverage has a great deal of influence on employers, who learn about the law
through press coverage, and respond to the perceived risk of litigation and bad publicity as much
as to the objective risk of legal sanction. See, e.g., Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, Civil Rights Law
at Work: Sex Discrimination and the Rise of Maternity Leave Policies, 105 AM. J. SOC. 455, 460
(1999) ("Press attention to legal battles increases the perceived risk of sanction, in part because it
increases the visibility of the law and in part because negative publicity is a potent sanction in
itself."); id. at 482 (reporting that, in their own study analyzing employers' adoption of maternity
leave policies, employers responded "not to the objective risk of being sued but to press coverage
that [made] them aware of new legal standards"); Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal
Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 903, 918-20 (1996) (arguing that employment law may work through informal processes
such as bad press as well as through such formal sanctions as costly litigation); cf JAMES N.
DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAROLY, LABOR-MARKET RESPONSES To EMPLOYER LIABILITY 64
(1992) (finding that employers respond to wrongful-termination liability by cutting employment
far beyond the costs associated with defending lawsuits, and speculating that "[p]ersonnel
managers may be reacting to perceived rather than actual legal risks"). This tendency may be
exacerbated by what psychologists call the "availability heuristic," in which people tend to
overestimate the risk of salient objects or events. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). This heuristic would predict
that, when managers consider the risk of harassment liability, they will be more likely to recall the
vivid, unusual, and extreme examples that they have heard about in the media than the actual
outcomes of court cases.
61. Traditionally, the courts have articulated three types of broad elements of a claim for
hostile work environment harassment. A plaintiff must prove: (1) actionable conduct that occurred
because of sex within the meaning of Title VII, see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998); (2) that the conduct was "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment,"' Mentor
Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th
Cir. 1982)); and (3) that the employer is legally responsible for the conduct, see Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
In truth, the legal requirements are more complex than this streamlined description suggests.
For example, there is no uniform agreement about what conduct is required to prove actionable
harassment, even at the level of stating the formal elements of a claim. Some court of appeals
decisions still seem to expressly require conduct of a sexual nature. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM
Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that "'a hostile environment exists
when an employee can show (1) that he or she was subjected to... physical conduct of a sexual
nature, (2) that this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or
pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment"' (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991))), cert. denied, 71
U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2003) (No. 02-970); Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 354-
55 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[T]o establish a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that: '(1) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the
form of sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature; (2) the harassment was based on [the individual's] sex ....' (quoting Parkins v.
Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1998) (second alteration in
original))).
More ambiguously, other circuit decisions require proof of "unwelcome sexual harassment"
in addition to proof that the harassment was "based upon sex." See, e.g., Mota v. Univ. of Tex.
Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 523-24 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[Pllaintiff in a hostile work
environment claim must establish that: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) was subjected to
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62conduct-only "unwelcome" sexual conduct. For another, the conduct
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to "create an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive.'63 In addition, a recent Supreme Court
decision states that hostile work environment harassment need not be
motivated by sexual desire, although the decision still makes it easier to
prove harassment where the case involves conduct that is thought to be so
motivated.64
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on his sex ... "); O'Rourke v. City
of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir. 2001) (same); Succar v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 229
F.3d 1343, 1344-45 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (same).
Some circuits seem to have moved entirely away from the idea that harassment must be
sexual, and require only proof that the conduct was "based upon sex," see, e.g., Gregory v. Daly,
243 F.3d 687, 691-92 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that "harms suffered in the workplace are cognizable
under Title VII" when they "create[] [an otherwise actionable] environment because of plaintiffs
sex (or other characteristic protected by Title VII)"), while other decisions seem to suggest that
nonsexual conduct is actionable only if it rises to the level of gender-based animus, see, e.g.,
Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff had failed to
establish a prima facie case with respect to hostile work environment because het supervisor's
foul language "cannot reasonably be construed as having any sexual connotation or having been
motivated by a discriminatory animus" and that "there is no basis upon which to infer from the
telephone call that Mr. DeGeorge's hostility was motivated by Ms. Stewart's sex"); Deflon v.
Danka Corp. Inc., I Fed. Appx. 807, 814 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment for the
employer because the employee "fails to link [acts] to the fact that she is a woman" and "does not
show a gender-based discriminatory animus on the part of [the harassers]").
62. See, e g., Merilor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68; see also Schultz, supra note 5, at 1729-32
(collecting cases and explaining how the unwelcomeness requirement presumes that harassment
consists of sexual conduct and works against women who are not viewed as properly deserving of
sexual protection).
63. Harris v. Forklift.Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); see also Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S.
at 67. In addition to being objectively unreasonable, the conduct must also be subjectively
objectionable to the victim. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
64. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Drilling Services, Inc., the Supreme Court expressly
stated, for the first time, that "harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support
an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex." 523 U.S. 75, 80. At the same time, however,
the Court reiterated that it would remain easier to win cases involving conduct motivated by
sexual desire, because such conduct would be presumed to occur because of sex within the
meaning of Title VII:
Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw in most
male-female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged conduct typically
involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume
those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex. The same chain
of inference would be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment, if there
were credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual.
Id. at 81. By contrast, although the Court did not foreclose such a result, the Justices did not
expressly approve the same inference of causation with respect to other conduct that is likely to
occur because of sex, such as hostility directed at women who are severely underrepresented in
traditionally male-dominated fields. In this sense, Oncale does nothing to disturb the two-tiered
structure of causation that makes it easier to prove a harassment claim based on sexually
motivated conduct that I discussed in earlier work. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1739-44.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that, long before Oncale was decided, a number of courts of
appeals had already adopted the principle that conduct need not be sexual in nature in order to
constitute actionable harassment. See, e.g., McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir.
1985); see also Schultz, supra note 5, at 1733 n.250 (collecting additional cases). But, even in
circuits that had adopted this principle, as I showed in earlier work, subsequent courts tended to
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But these definitional limits at most work to constrain what judges and
juries can consider "sexual harassment" for purposes of awarding victories
in lawsuits; they do not constrain what managers may do in the name of
preventing "sexual harassment" in their own companies. 65 The problem is
not simply that Title VII does not constrain organizational action. The law
may actually create incentives for companies to go overboard in curtailing
conduct that does not meet the legal definition. As the critics of harassment
law have pointed out, the threat of employer liability that can be avoided
only by taking prompt remedial action may create pressure for companies
to punish employees who are accused of sexual harassment, even if an
investigation hasn't yet fully substantiated the allegation. 66 In addition, as
the libertarian critics charge, the fact that numerous instances of conduct
may be aggregated for purposes of creating a hostile work environment,
together with a vague standard for determining when that has occurred,
gives employers an incentive to censor individual employees' conduct well
before the legal threshold is met.67 In contrast to these pressures to sanitize,
there are few, if any, effective counterincentives. Although some employees
who have been disciplined for alleged sexual misconduct bring suit, there
are few if any legal limits on companies' power to punish such conduct.
6 8
ignore or undermine it by continuing to give greater weight to sexual conduct for purposes of
establishing a hostile work environment claim. See id. at 1732-38. Although I have not
systematically analyzed more recent cases, a quick review suggests that the lower courts have not
uniformly begun to take nonsexual conduct as seriously as sexual conduct for purposes of proving
harassment claims. See supra note 61.
65. See, e.g., Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1346 (7th Cir. 1995) (taking for
granted the proposition that employers are permitted to adopt sexual harassment policies more
stringent than what Title VII requires).
66- For a particularly thorough and insightful analysis of the legal incentives, see Estelle D.
Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The Employers'Paradox in Responding to Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment-a Proposed Way out, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1549-57
(1999). See also Browne, supra note 7, at 504-05 & n.162; Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment
as a Tort: Why Title VI1 Hostile Environment Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV.
375,412 (1999).
67. See Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law
Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627, 638-39 (1997); see also COHEN, supra note 42, at 134; Browne,
supra note 7, at 502-03; Jeffrey Rosen, In Defense of Gender-Blindness, NEW REPUBLIC, June 29,
1998, at 25,26.
68. See COHEN, supra note 42, at 147-48. Cohen notes:
If the workplace is not unionized or covered by civil service law, then there are very
few legal protections for the average employee against punishment or being fired. In
such a context, the employer cannot lose by taking action against an at-will employee
accused of harassment.... The employee who believes s/he was unjustly retaliated
against, penalized, fired, or silenced, either for making a harassment complaint or for
alleged harassment, has no realistic legal recourse or effective remedies.
Id.; see also Victor Schachter, No Longer the Fall Guy: The Accused Demand Fair Treatment in
Sexual Harassment Cases and Assert Their Rights, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE-PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 51ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
LABOR 447, 465 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1999) (arguing that "the groundswell of judicial opinion
is to give companies significant latitude to define misconduct and to determine if it has taken
place"); Alan L. Rolnick, Making Sure Your Sexual Harassment Response Is Fair, BOBBIN, Apr.
1997, at 92, 92-93 (stating that "[i]f you have conducted a decent investigation that gives you
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Within organizations, as we shall see, the limits on the legal definition
of harassment have proven no match for the managerial impulses and
cultural logics that the law and those who championed it have set in motion.
In the popular imagination, and in many workplaces across America, the
campaign to end sexual harassment has come to stand for ridding the
workplace of sexual conduct.
III. THE CONTEMPORARY CAMPAIGN
A. The Legal and Cultural Environment
A few years ago, when I first wrote about sex harassment, I showed that
the lower courts' focus on sexual advances and other conduct of a sexual
nature had led them to neglect equally serious, nonsexual forms of
harassment and exclusion that work to preserve traditional gender roles at
work. As I demonstrated, many women experience subtle and not-so-subtle
forms of hostility and denigration that make it difficult for them to succeed
in-and for others, even to aspire to-traditionally male-dominated lines of
work they would otherwise pursue.69 In other cases, male bosses reinforce
paternalistic authority by harassing or belittling women in traditionally
female fields who dared to step out of their proper place. 70 As research in
sociology has shown, sex harassment is a mechanism for labeling women as
different and inferior, and for claiming favored jobs and positions of
authority as preserves of men who embody an idealized masculinity. By
neglecting these sorts of motives and actions, I argued, courts were missing
the important link between sex harassment and sex segregation in
employment.
At the same time, I was also concerned that the legal emphasis on the
potential harm of sexual conduct might lead some companies to overreach
and prohibit even benign forms of sexual conduct that are not linked to sex
discrimination on the job. I speculated that the same sense of paternalism
that had led courts to punish "bad" women who do not comport with the
image of a proper victim might also encourage managers to protect "good"
women's sexual sensibilities from sexual talk and interaction that does not
threaten gender equality in the workplace. As part of this concern, I worried
that sexual minorities, and other employees who are viewed as sexually
deviant, might be singled out for accusation and punishment.
71
some reason to believe that the harassment actually occurred, and if you strictly limit
communications about the reasons for the alleged harasser's discharge, you probably will not find
yourself on the losing end of a lawsuit").
69. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1764-67.
70. See id. at 1757.
71. Vicki Schultz, Talking About Harassment, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 417, 428-30 (2001).
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Today, I am more confident of, and truly alarmed about, these
developments. After a thorough review of the relevant literature and case
law, including arbitration decisions involving grievances by employees who
were fired or otherwise disciplined for engaging in sex harassment,12 I am
persuaded that significant overreaching is occurring. Although there is a
need for more systematic evidence analyzing the magnitude of the problem,
my reading of the available evidence is that the libertarian critics of sexual
harassment law are partly right: In the name of preventing sexual
harassment, many companies are punishing benign forms of sexual conduct
that would not amount to sexual harassment or sex discrimination under the
law.73 These critics claim that the threat of strict liability for sex
harassment, combined with uncertainty about when individual instances of
conduct might combine to create an actionable environment, creates an
incentive for companies to go overboard in curtailing sexual conduct, as
noted above. Yet these factors cannot explain why organizations are
curtailing sexual conduct, as opposed to equally serious nonsexual forms of
harassment and discrimination. Only the fact that the legal system has
highlighted the harm of sexual conduct helps explain this trend. The sexual
model is the engine of sanitization.
Thus, although the libertarian critics are right about what is happening,
they are wrong about why: There is organizational overreaching, but it is
not an inevitable consequence of treating sex harassment as a violation of
Title VII. Instead, it is an example of a process that is more akin to what
sociologist Lauren Edelman has termed the "managerialization of law."
74
Sociologists of law have emphasized how organizations respond to legal
environments by reinterpreting legal ideals and infusing them with
managerial values. They have shown that, particularly when the law is
72. As part of the work for this Article, I have reviewed numerous harassment policies, read
volumes of literature from the fields of human resources and the law (including the "how-to-
avoid-liability" literature), digested scores of newspaper stories and ethnographic accounts of
what is happening in workplaces, interviewed a number of prominent consultants who advise
companies about how to deal with sexual harassment, attended conferences at which employment
lawyers have discussed the problem, and analyzed an enormous body of judicial and arbitration
decisions. I have also reviewed all the relevant empirical and academic literature I could find. In
this Article, I have attempted to place all this literature into a larger theoretical and historical
account of sex harassment law, an account I began elaborating elsewhere. See generally Schultz,
supra note 5 (documenting the historical development of sex harassment law in the U.S. courts);
Vicki Schultz & Eileen Goldsmith, Sexual Harassment: Legal Perspectives, in 21
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 13,982 (Neil J. Smelser &
Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001) (providing a definition of the term "sexual harassment" as it has
evolved in American legal and social culture).
73. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech vs. Workplace Harassment Law-a
Growing Conflict, at http://www.law.ucla.edu/faculty/volokh/harass/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2003)
(cataloguing examples); Walter Olson, Fear of Flirting: Harassment Law Resources, at
http://www.overlawyered.com/topics/harass.htmI (last visited Mar. 19, 2003) (same).
74. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM.
J. Soc. 1589, 1592 (2001).
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ambiguous, managerial actors will actively work to shape the meaning of
the law and compliance "through a set of managerial lenses chiefly
designed to encourage smooth employment relations and high
productivity., 75 They have highlighted the role of HR managers, and, to a
lesser extent, lawyers, in this translation process, showing how these
professionals interpret the law to maximize their own self-interest while at
the same time serving organizational ends.76 They have also shown how the
press contributes to the process, by bringing lawsuits to the attention of HR
professionals and managers and generating a fear of bad publicity that is
perhaps as powerful as the fear of liability itself."
This sociological account has force in explaining the drive toward
sexual sanitization, though it underestimates the role of courts and social
movement actors in jump-starting the process. As we have seen, the body of
judge-made law handed down to organizational actors was not ambiguous:
Influenced by feminist arguments, judges had defined sexual harassment in
a way that highlighted the harm of sexual conduct. Thus, the law already
had what I call a "cultural tilt" toward eliminating sexuality. The fact that
this legal ideal meshed with preexisting managerial values made it
possible-perhaps even easy-for HR managers and lawyers to argue that
the best way to protect organizational interests is to curb employees' sexual
conduct. These experts have warned companies to take such action or else
risk legal liability and crushing financial penalties, as we shall see, and
these warnings have not fallen on deaf ears. Promoting the need to control
employees' sexual conduct serves the experts' own self-interest, of course,
because it creates a market for their own services; yet my reading of the
literature and interviews with prominent HR consultants convinces me that
they also believe they are on the side of equality and justice. The fact that a
feminist-inspired body of law supports their position has provided them
with a legitimate justification to urge, and to implement, a new set of
historically unpopular controls on workplace sexuality. Ironically, then, a
legal and cultural campaign championed by some feminists has provided a
75. Id. at 1599.
76. See, e.g., Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 58, at 38-39 (showing how employers responded to
sexual harassment law by adopting grievance procedures and training programs developed by
"sclf-interested [personnel] managers with a particular form of expertise to sell"); see also Frank
Dobbin & John R. Sutton, The Strength of a Weak State: The Rights Revolution and the Rise of
Human Resources Management Divisions, 104 AM. J. Soc. 441 (1998) (showing that, by the
1980s, middle managers had reconstructed equal employment opportunity departments as
components of human resources management and begun to justify their projects in terms of
productive efficiency); Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated
Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & Soc'y REv. 47, 49 (1992) (showing how personnel
managers and practicing lawyers act as "filters" by interpreting, and exaggerating, the magnitude
of the threat posed by wrongful discharge law in a way that serves their own interests).
77. See supra note 60.
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new progressive rationale for an age-old managerial drive to create an
asexual workplace. The Sections that follow describe the emerging trends.
B. Sanitizing the Workplace:
A Summary of Current Developments
It would be one thing for companies to use sex harassment policies to
create workplaces in which all men and women can work together as equal
partners. To rid workplaces of sex-based harassment that conditions
employment on sexual favors or creates a hostile work environment under
Title VII would be something of which American companies-and, we, as
a society-could be rightly proud. But it is another thing for organizations
to prohibit or discourage workers from engaging in conduct simply because
it is considered "sexual"--without regard to whether the conduct impinges
on gender equality or rises to the level of sex discrimination under the law.
Yet, our nation's employers are being pressured to do just that. A huge
(and growing) literature warns companies that they should go beyond the
dictates of the law to curtail broad forms of sexual conduct-including
conduct that does not satisfy the legal definition of sexual harassment and
that does not necessarily undermine gender equality on the job-in order to
avoid liability for sexual harassment."8 The bulk of this "how-to-avoid-
liability" literature is put out by managers and HR professionals, but much
of the legal literature also sounds this theme.79
78. For examples of this literature, see Gary M. Kramer, Limited License To Fish off the
Company Pier: Toward Express Employer Policies on Supervisor-Subordinate Fraternization, 22
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 77, 138-43 (2000); E.E. Mazier, Love at Work: Hotbed of Woes for
Employers and Insurers, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Jan. 15, 2001, at 3; Stephenie Overman, When
Labor Leads to Love, HR Focus, Nov. 1998, at 1; Ed Piantek, Flirting with Disaster, RISK &
INS., May 2000, at http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/mOBJK/2000 May/62408701/print.jhtml;
and Cindy M. Schaefer & Thomas R. Tudor, Managing Workplace Romances, SAM ADVANCED
MGMT. J., Summer 2001, at 4.
79. Some of the sociological literature suggests that HR managers may be more likely than
lawyers to promote solutions that go beyond the clear requirements of the law. For example,
Dobbin and Kelly report that, in the years leading up to the Supreme Court's decisions in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998), HR managers touted sexual harassment grievance procedures and training
programs as methods to avoid legal liability, while legal journals emphasized that these
mechanisms had not been approved by the courts. Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 58, at 17-20. In
line with this distinction, Frank Dobbin and Erin Kelly found that, in their sample of 389
employers, "[o]rganizations that depend on the HR profession for advice [were] significantly
more likely to adopt grievance procedures and training, and those that depend on lawyers [were]
significantly less likely to adopt... grievance procedures." Id. at 32. On the other hand, they
report that, contrary to expectation, organizations that used lawyers were no less likely to
implement training programs, perhaps because "while the law journals were clear that training had
not been found by the courts to insulate employers from liability, some lawyers did a brisk
business in training." Id. at 34. In a slightly different context, Lauren Edelman, Steven Abraham,
and Howard Erlanger found that personnel journals were more likely than law reviews to inflate
the risk of legal liability for wrongful discharge. Edelman et al., supra note 76, at 67-68. Upon
closer inspection, however, these authors found more refined distinctions. Although both
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A 1992 article entitled Avoid Costly Lawsuits for Sexual Harassment,
which appeared in the American Bar Association (ABA) publication, Law
Practice Management, provides an illustration of the larger trends. It begins
by cautioning managers that even benign, fully consensual sexual
interactions can get the company into trouble:
Sure, your office may be free from the traditional form of such
harassment: an attorney or manager demanding sexual favors from
an unwilling paralegal or subordinate in exchange for promotion or
job retention. Yet courts across the land are now deciding that a
surprisingly wide range of other situations constitute sexual
harassment, for which employers are assessed big fines.
... [S]uccessful harassment lawsuits are now resulting even
when a subordinate was the willing sexual partner of a supervisor.
Or when an office is deemed to be "hostile" because of the
presence of sexual joking, flirting or pin-ups. Or even when one
employee makes a practice of staring suggestively at a co-worker. "
In response to legal incentives the Supreme Court established as long
ago as 1986 (and strengthened in 1998),81 the article counsels companies to
establish a policy to prohibit sexual harassment and to set up a grievance
procedure to punish those who engage in it. The article recommends
prohibiting and punishing sexual conduct that, in and of itself, would not
necessarily amount to sexual harassment under Title VII. "Nip These
Activities in the Bud!" warns the bolded heading-and then, relying on
MacKinnon's expertise, goes on to command companies not to let their
employees "[t]ell sexual jokes or make innuendoes," "[p]ost pin-up
personnel managers and practicing lawyers were more likely than academics to portray the threat
of liability as serious, the lawyers and academics were more likely to do so when they were
writing for personnel journals than when they wrote for law reviews or practice journals. Id. at 73.
Perhaps the real distinction lies less in a fundamental difference in the advice given by HR
managers as opposed to lawyers, and more in the forum or audience to which either group of
experts was dispensing the advice.
80. Phillip M. Perry, Avoid Costly Lawsuits for Sexual Harassment, LAW PRAC. MGMT., Apr.
1992, at 18, 18.
81. In Meritor Savings Bank, the Supreme Court held that companies are not automatically
liable for hostile work environment harassment created by supervisors, and it suggested that
companies may be able to avoid liability by establishing policies and procedures to police
harassment on their own. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71-73 (1986). In Burlington
Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, the Court
strengthened the incentive for companies to set up such policies and procedures by establishing an
affirmative defense to automatic liability for employers whose supervisors engage in hostile work
environment harassment that does not result in tangible employment actions. The defense requires
proof "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise." Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765.
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photographs on the walls," "[r]omance subordinates," or "[r]equest sexual
favors, touch or flirt with either willing or unwilling subordinates. ' 2
The article comes down hard on sexual joking, which it refers to as
"[i]nsensitive [s]ocializing. ' '83 "Recent court cases have shot down some
workplace traditions many people thought were good clean fun or part of
the normal socialization process," the article warns.8 4 It then quotes Robert
McCalla, the chairman of the Labor and Employment Law Section of the
ABA, as saying: "Suggestive joking of any kind simply must not be
tolerated., 85 Even if "the joking occurs only with an employee who openly
welcomes the joking and joins in," the business is still not protected against
a sexual harassment suit, the article cautions, because "[o]ther employees in
the office may file suit, claiming the joking creates a hostile work
environment.,
86
But it isn't simply sexual joking and interaction that must be curtailed.
Companies must also clamp down on consensual sexual relationships. Even
if an employee's affair is entirely welcome, that doesn't mean the firm is
protected from sexual harassment lawsuits-quite the contrary. "If the
woman who engages in an affair receives favors such as professional
advancement, then other women have causes of action, if they did not
submit and were not promoted," warns Lawrence Katz, a partner in a
Phoenix law firm (giving advice contrary to the EEOC guidelines and some
major court decisions).87 Furthermore, if the relationship goes sour, the
subordinate can retaliate by claiming that the supervisor's advances were
unwelcome, or charging that a later failure to be promoted was retaliation
for her refusal to continue the relationship. Because of this threat of
liability, the piece cautions, companies must take steps to monitor whether
employees are intimately involved. With this information in hand,
management can separate the lovers, or, if they cannot be separated, "one of
the pair may be terminated. 88
82. Perry, supra note 80, at 20 (emphasis added).




87. Id. The EEOC has long taken the position that where a female subordinate enters into a
sexual relationship with her male supervisor consensually and the female subordinate is later
promoted, other subordinates may not challenge the promotion as motivated by sex discrimination
because both male and female subordinates alike have been foreclosed from the opportunity to
advance by having an affair with the supervisor. See EEOC Policy Guidance on Employer
Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, EEOC Notice 915.048 (Jan. 12, 1990). Most
circuit courts agree. See, e.g., DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d
Cir. 1986). Apparently, only the D.C. Circuit has found employers liable where supervisors
favored employees with whom they were having a sexual relationship. See King v. Palmer, 778
F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
88. Perry, supra note 80, at 24.
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This statement is part of a larger trend toward using discipline to drive
sex out of the workplace. To enforce the ban on sexual conduct, the article
says, attorney Katz advises that the sexual harassment policy should "state
that anyone who harasses will be dealt with very harshly-up to and
including termination."8 9 Indeed, if companies are to fulfill Title VII's
mandate to take appropriate steps to remedy harassment, they must be
willing to discipline both supervisors and coworkers who engage in sexual
misconduct. How severe should the discipline be? According to a partner at
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius in Philadelphia, "[Ylou must be sure the person
raising the complaint feels there is an adequate response."90 Supervisors
who make sexual threats should be fired because, "' [i]f the supervisor sues,
it is a lot easier to defend than a sexual harassment case."' 91 But even in the
"troublesome grey area" of sexual joking, the use of progressive
discipline-reprimand, suspension, and ultimately termination-is
warranted.9 2 Nowhere does the article suggest that preventive or remedial
measures other than punishing individual harassers might be considered.
The effort to eliminate sex harassment by punishing individual
transgressors neglects larger structural issues, such as the link between sex
segregation and sex harassment. Nowhere does the article encourage
companies to consider whether the sexual conduct they are punishing is
motivated by sex bias or is a manifestation of larger forms of sex
discrimination in the company. Instead, echoing Susan Estrich's position,
the article suggests that sex harassment is different from sex
discrimination-and that it is precisely the sexual nature of sex harassment
that presents the threat that must be contained. "'Sexual harassment has the
potential to be so inflammatory that it presents a bigger risk than most other
kinds of discrimination,' says Nancy Williams, a partner with the Seattle
law firm of Perkins Coie.' 93 Williams warns that "increasingly, the courts
are saying, 'Mister Employer, you have to provide a pretty sterile
workplace.' 94 In language that sounds in legal panic, the article urges:
"Take action now to cleanse your workplace of any sexual harassment."
95
There is growing evidence that companies are heeding such advice. The
1992 Law Practice Management article illustrates the four major
developments that emerge from the literature. First, in the name of
preventing sexual harassment, many companies are adopting broad
prohibitions on sexual conduct that does not rise to the level of actionable
harassment under Title VII, as I discuss more fully in Section C below.
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id. at 22.
91. Id. (quoting Nancy Williams, Partner, Perkins Coie, Seattle, Wash.).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 20.
94. Id. at 24.
95. Id. at 20.
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Second, companies are enforcing these policies by disciplining and firing
employees who violate them, as elaborated in Section D. Third, some
companies are banning, discouraging, or otherwise moving to control
sexual relationships between their employees--even when those
relationships are consensual, as documented in Section E. Crucially,
companies are taking these steps to prohibit sexual conduct without
examining whether that conduct undermines gender equality, as I explain in
Section F.
In the Sections that follow, I discuss not only the evidence from the
professional literature, but also the relevant empirical data. At this point, a
cautionary note is in order. It is true that there is less systematic empirical
data than one would hope for analyzing the extent to which companies are
actually clamping down on these various types of sexual conduct. We
clearly need more research into this set of issues, and I do not claim that the
existing empirical evidence alone constitutes ironclad proof. But I do hope
to persuade readers that, when considered in the context of the strong legal
incentives, traditional organizational imperatives, and current cultural
pressures to control employees' sexual behavior, the available empirical
data tend to confirm rather than disconfirm the wealth of anecdotal proof
that many companies are curtailing broad forms of sexual conduct. It seems
telling that virtually all the available evidence points in favor of the
proposition that companies are following the experts' advice to curtail such
conduct-and little or no evidence cuts against it.
C. Prohibiting Sexual Conduct
Although the available empirical research does not pinpoint precisely
how many companies prohibit sexual conduct that does not meet the legal
definition of sexual harassment, it is clear that a significant number are
doing so. Surveys confirm that the overwhelming majority of American
companies have policies prohibiting sexual harassment,96 and these policies
96. See, e.g., AM. MGMT. ASS'N, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 1
(1996) (reporting that 89% of firms surveyed had formal sexual harassment policies and 65% had
training programs); SOC'Y FOR HUMAN REs. MGMT., SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY 6, 8 (1999)
(reporting that 97% of the 496 members that responded to a faxed survey indicated that they had
written sexual harassment policies and 62% indicated that they had training programs, where 53%
of the respondents had only between 1 and 250 employees); Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 58, at 2
(reporting that in a sample of 389 employers contacted in 1997, 95% had adopted sexual
harassment grievance procedures and more than 70% had training programs). There is some
potential that these estimates may be inflated because larger companies, who may be more likely
to have adopted sexual harassment measures, might be more likely to respond to survey inquiries.
However, at least one earlier study of federal agencies that did not rely on self-selection found
similar results. See U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 40, 42 (1994) (reporting that of the
22 federal agencies contacted, 100% had sexual harassment policies and all had training
programs, one-third of which made training mandatory for all employees). Studies of potentially
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tend to reach broadly to forbid many forms of potentially harmless sexual
conduct without demanding inquiry into the surrounding factors that would
determine legal liability. To begin with, the policies define harassment
exclusively in terms of sexual conduct (as opposed to conduct that
discriminates on the basis of sex more generally).97 In fact, most of the
surveys and policies track the language of the EEOC guidelines, which, as
we saw earlier, define harassment in terms of "[u]nwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature." 98 In 1987, for example, a large national survey
conducted by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) reported that 90% of
sexual harassment policies contain a definition of sexual harassment, and
that "[t]he vast majority of company policies.., define sexual harassment
in language that is identical or similar to the guidelines formulated by the
EEOC in 1980." 99
More recent studies suggest that this focus on sexual conduct has
continued, and has been further extended and elaborated. In 1999, the
Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) reported that 93% of
the 496 HR professionals who responded to its randomly distributed survey
said their firms' harassment policies defined the term sexual harassment,
and that 67% provided examples of conduct that constitutes harassment. 00
The survey did not ask for the respondents' definition, but instead asked
respondents to check off the "primary type of harassment" alleged in
complaints received by their companies, with the following forms of sexual
conduct provided as choices:
smaller organizations have yielded somewhat lower estimates, but even these studies suggest that
the clear majority of organizations have adopted sexual harassment policies. See, e.g., James S.
Bowman & Christopher J. Zigmond, Sexual Harassment Policies in State Government: Peering
into the Fishbowl of Public Employment, SPECTRUM, Summer 1996, at 24, 25 (reporting that 68%
of the 50 states, whose departments of administration were surveyed in 1994, had sexual
harassment policies); Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Policies and Special Programs, DAILY LAB. REP.,
Dec. 28, 2000, at 30 (reporting that 64% of employers surveyed had sexual harassment policies in
their collective bargaining agreements).
97. It is clear that both those who conduct the surveys and those who respond to them define
harassment in terms of sexual acts, language, and materials. See, e.g., SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES.
MGMT., supra note 96; U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., supra note 96, at 5; Bowman & Zigmond,
supra note 96, at 24. One exception to the focus on sexual conduct appeared in the American
Management Association (AMA) survey, which included "[g]ender-related comments or physical
descriptions"-a phrase that could be interpreted to include some behaviors that are not
specifically sexual in nature. Interestingly, only 85% of the respondents classified this set of
behaviors as sexual harassment, compared to 91% who did so for "[s]exually explicit language,"
94% who did so for "[d]isplays of sexually oriented photos or clippings," and 98% who did so for
"[r]equests for sex in exchange for any consideration." Although other interpretations are
possible, the survey responses may indicate the extent to which the AMA members who
responded have internalized a sexualized definition of harassment. AM. MGMT. ASS'N, supra note
96, at 1.
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2001).
99. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, PERSONNEL POLICIES FORUM SURVEY NO. 144, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: EMPLOYER POLICIES AND PROBLEMS 4 (1987).
100. SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 96, at 7.
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- sexual jokes, remarks, teasing
- sexual touching
__ negative sexual remarks about a group
- pressured or asked for sexual favors
threatened or actual sexual assault
- displaying or distributing sexual materials or pictures
__ inappropriate e-mails
__ inappropriate use of the Internet
- pressured or asked for a date0 1
The fact that all of the specified categories involved sexual forms of
conduct shows that the SHRM-the leading organization of professionals
responsible for designing and implementing sexual harassment policies-
continues to see sex harassment in exclusively sexual terms. Furthermore,
the SHRM's definition covers some activities that rarely, if ever, rise to the
level of legally actionable sexual harassment, such as "sexual jokes,
remarks, or teasing." In fact, these activities "were the primary types of
harassment alleged in nearly half (48 percent) of the 1,214 sexual
harassment complaints" in the companies surveyed'0 2 -a finding that
shows many employees now conceive of sexual harassment in the terms
established by the HR professionals.
A 1994 survey of federal employees conducted by the U.S. Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB), the agency charged by Congress to
study and report on sexual harassment in the federal workforce, confirms
this point. Like the SHRM study, the MSPB study finds that "[b]y far the
most commonly experienced harassing behavior reported by our survey
respondents is unwanted sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, or questions." In
the MSPB report, "Nearly 37 percent of women and 14 percent of men
reported experiencing this sort of verbally harassing behavior."'0 3 A
comparison of the MSPB's 1994 survey with its earlier surveys shows that
the number of employees who say they define these and other behaviors as
sexual harassment has risen significantly over time. 1 4 "For example," the
101. Id. at 11.
102. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). The next most frequent category was "sexual touching," an
offense that was the primary type of harassment alleged in only 12% of all complaints. Id
103. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., supra note 96, at 14. In addition to these types of
harassment, the incidence of federal employees who reported other potentially "gray area" forms
of harassment was also high: 29% of women, and 9% of men, said they had experienced "[slexual
looks, gestures," and another 10% of women, and 4% of men, reported receiving "[s]uggestive
letters, calls, materials." Id. at 16.
104. Id. at 7.
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study reports, "the percentage of women who consider coworkers' sexual
remarks to be sexual harassment increased from 54 percent of respondents
in 1980, to 64 percent in 1987, to 77 percent in 1994." °l05 A similar increase
occurred among men, with the number who consider sexual remarks by
coworkers harassment rising from 42% in 1980, to 47% in 1987, to 64% in
1994.106 In all likelihood, employees' greater willingness to define these
forms of conduct as sexual harassment occurred at least partly in response
to their employers' initiatives to define them as such, as the MSPB
suggests. 0 7 The MSPB approves of these trends, stating:
There is no doubt that people today are interpreting what
happens in the workplace differently from the way they did in the
1980's. The offensive comment or offcolor story that might have
been tolerated in the 1980 workplace may in the 1995 environment
be reinterpreted as suggestive speech, and be categorized and
reported as an incidence of sexual harassment. 1
0 8
Although in some circumstances sexual remarks or jokes might
legitimately rise to the level of sexual harassment under Title VII-if, for
example, they were repeatedly used to intimidate employees because of
their sex, and were sufficiently harmful to undermine their ability to do
their jobs-this sort of conduct does not typically amount to actionable
harassment. In fact, the MSPB explicitly defends adopting a definition of
sexual harassment that is broader than the legal definition-and encourages
the federal agencies under its jurisdiction to adopt such a broader
definition-on the ground that doing so not only avoids legal liability, but
also eliminates "unpleasant" conditions that make the workplace
unproductive. It is worth quoting the report in full:
It's important to note, in considering the meaning of the term
"sexual harassment" in this report, that not all the behaviors that we
are calling harassment, and that Federal workers identify as sexual
harassment in our survey, would necessarily qualify as sex
discrimination in a legal sense. The behaviors described may
include instances of offensive conduct, not necessarily pervasive or
extreme, that Federal workers find unacceptable but that are not
necessarily cause for legal action.
But focusing exclusively on sexual harassment so extreme as to
meet a legal test was never the aim of the Government's
information and prevention programs. In confronting the issue of
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id. at 7.
107. Id. at vii.
108. Id. at 6.
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sexual harassment, the Federal Government is interested not only in
avoiding situations in which a court would find a violation of law,
but also in preventing the creation of an unpleasant, unproductive
work atmosphere. The sexually harassing behaviors reported by
survey respondents and discussed in this report-whether or not
they are cause for legal action-can most definitely create an
unproductive working environment and thus are an appropriate
focus of our attention. 1°
Just as the available empirical evidence suggests that leading
organizations (such as the SHRM and the MSPB), company policies, and
even many employees have adopted understandings of sexual harassment
that may exceed the legal definition, so too does a wealth of less systematic
research. My review of numerous sex harassment policies adopted by
companies or proposed by experts confirms that most prohibit a broad
range of sexual conduct that would not necessarily be legally actionable.
Most policies begin by citing the EEOC guidelines' definition, and then
expand upon it by listing various forms of covered conduct, including
sexual joking and banter, visual displays, and various forms of touching.
The Bureau of National Affairs book, Preventing Employment Lawsuits, for
example, includes a sample sexual harassment policy that begins by quoting
the definition from the EEOC guidelines."10 The policy elaborates on the
definition by stating that sexual harassment includes, but is not limited to,
"sexual innuendoes, sexual propositions, jokes of a sexual nature, sexually
suggestive cartoons, suggestive or insulting sounds, leers, sexually related
whistles, and obscene gestures. In addition, pinching, brushing against
another person's body, and subtle pressure for sexual favors is [sic]
considered harassment.""1 ' The discussion section notes that "different
people have different ideas as to what constitutes sexual harassment" and
warns that
the following acts may be considered harassment by some, even if
not considered harassment by others:
* A male manager habitually puts his hand on the shoulder of
a female employee while explaining something to her.
* An employee tells dirty jokes to co-workers.
* A supervisor or co-worker repeatedly asks an employee for
a date.
109. Id. at 2-3.
110. JAMES G. FRIERSON, PREVENTING EMPLOYMENT LAWSUITS: AN EMPLOYER'S GUIDE
TO HIRING, DISCIPLINE, AND DISCHARGE 350 (1994).
111. Id. at 352.
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a A co-worker constantly talks about his or her sexual
experiences or dreams.' 
12
The BNA's approach to defining sexual harassment is ubiquitous-so
common that it can be verified by pulling up almost any website posting a
sexual harassment policy. Though the inclusion of a broad range of sexual
conduct is standard, an examination of sex harassment policies suggests
that there are two slightly different approaches to prohibition. The first
approach is a "zero-tolerance" approach, in which all conduct with sexual
overtones is prohibited and punished, regardless of the context (including
the absence of any real complaint) and regardless of whether the conduct
would amount to sex harassment under Title VII. The second approach,
which I call the "cultural sensitivity" approach, requires employees to be
ever-vigilant in monitoring their own speech and conduct so as to avoid any
offense to another employee's sensibilities. The zero-tolerance approach
represents an individual-bad-actor model of harassment, in which
harassment is seen as a form of sexual predation that individual men
perpetrate on women. The cultural sensitivity approach represents a gender-
difference perspective, in which harassment is seen as a form of sexual
crudeness that men-who-are-from-Mars impose on women-who-are-from-
Venus. Despite these differences, the two approaches overlap more than
they diverge. By focusing on individual bad behavior or broader "cultural"
norms men allegedly bring with them to the workplace, both approaches
miss the context-specific nature of sex harassment and its link to larger
gender inequalities in the workplaces in which it occurs.
1. The Zero-Tolerance Approach
The "zero-tolerance" stance is illustrated in an interview with Laurie
Jones, a senior consultant with InterActive Training Solutions (ITS), a Fort
Worth, Texas, consulting firm that advises employers on sexual
harassment. 1 3 Jones said she defines sexual harassment as "unwelcome
112. Id.
113. Between July and September 1998, nine human resource specialists who are involved in
developing sexual harassment programs for their employers or clients were interviewed under my
supervision by Mr. Matthew Heimer, a journalist who received legal training under Yale Law
School's graduate program for journalists. I developed the questions, and Mr. Heimer conducted
the interviews. Telephone Interview by Matthew Heimer with Holly Culhane, Owner/Senior HR
Specialist, PAS Associates (Aug. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Culhane Interview]; Telephone Interview
by Matthew Heimer with Beverly R. Davis, Principal, Davis HR Consulting (July 22, 1998)
[hereinafter Davis Interview]; Telephone Interview by Matthew Heimer with Diane S. Gold, J.D.,
President, EEO Management Solutions (Aug. 25, 1998) [hereinafter Gold Interview]; Telephone
Interview by Matthew Heimer with Michelle Fantt Harris, Director, Human Resources,
Association of American Medical Colleges (Sept. 1, 1998); Telephone Interview by Matthew
Heimer with Laurie R. Jones, J.D., Senior Consultant, InterActive Training Solutions (ITS) (July
24, 1998) [hereinafter Jones Interview]; Telephone Interview by Matthew Heimer with Mel
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sexual conduct; it's that easy." 114 When asked if there are specific kinds of
conduct that she advises companies to discourage or even prohibit, she said
verbal harassment is the one she discusses most frequently: "dirty jokes,
derogatory name-calling, [and] anatomy."'1 15 She said her most frequent
problems involve "older men trying to clown around, or even to be
amorous, but failing to understand that mores have changed."'1 6 When
asked how she addresses "gray areas where activity with sexual content
might have no harassing intent," she replied, "If you hire ITS, what I'm
gonna tell you about is zero tolerance. It's my job to keep you out of
trouble. You will not use bad language, or discuss your private life-or
ideally, date your coworkers."' 1 7 Indeed, when asked how she advises
clients to deal with consensual romantic relationships, Jones replied bluntly,
"You don't date. There's a million other people out there who don't work
for your company."'] 18
This demonstrates that it is not only HR experts who are promoting this
view. Jones, an attorney with a J.D. from the University of Virginia and
several years of experience as a management-side labor lawyer, also
reduces the definition of harassment to conduct with sexual content, and
sees no need to inquire into whether such conduct conformed to the legal
definition under Title VII. In fact, when asked how her understanding of the
law's demands shapes her recommendations, Jones stated that her
understanding of sex harassment is "not really theory driven." 1 9 In reality,
it seems that Jones does have a theory of harassment: She subscribes to an
individual-bad-actor model of harassment, commenting that harassers are
"just jerks; they try to intimidate me and everybody they work with. 12°
Given this acontextual view of harassment as something individual bad
men bring with them into the workplace, it is not surprising that Jones said
she gives the same recommendations for how to deal with harassment
regardless of the gender composition of the job or firm. In fact, although
her firm does advise companies on discrimination and diversity issues as
well as harassment, Jones does not see sex harassment as related to larger
Lyons, Manager, Recruiting, EEO & Affirmative Action, American Management Association(Aug. 18, 1998); Telephone Interview by Matthew Heimer with Carol Merchasin, Director of
Training and Development, Day, Berry & Howard Human Resources Advisors (Aug. 26, 1998);
Telephone Interview by Matthew Heimer with Amy Oppenheimer, Administrative Law Judge and
HR Consultant (Aug. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Oppenheimer Interview]; Telephone Interview by
Matthew Heimer with Craig Pratt, Owner, Craig Pratt & Associates (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter
Pratt Interview]. Note that the interviews were conducted after the Supreme Court's three 1998
sexual harassment decisions had been handed down.
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issues of sex discrimination. When asked if there can be harassment that is
not sexual in nature, she acknowledged that it exists but insisted that it is
"different." "[T]hat's not sexual harassment; it doesn't fall under the same
rules, and companies aren't as worried about it, don't face the same
risks." 121 To Jones (and to most other experts), it is only sexual conduct that
must be addressed in a sex harassment policy-backed up by the threat of
"immediate disciplinary action" for violations, and reinforced through the
use of what Jones herself called "scare tactics" during training sessions.
22
Although we lack precise estimates of how many companies are
following such a zero-tolerance approach, it is being pushed heavily by HR
managers. Many experts advise companies "to go one step beyond the law"
and "be extra-prudent," to be "more conservative than the law [demands],"
to "be a little strict, since you never know when something may be taken
the wrong way"-as another one of the consultants in my interview base,
the American University Law School-trained Diane Gold, of EEO
Management Solutions of Arlington, Virginia, put it. 1
23
Holly Culhane, another interviewee and owner of PAS Associates, a
consulting firm in Bakersfield, California, agreed that "the best approach is
to be conservative: don't allow it," with respect to sexual innuendo and
jokes. 124 Culhane said even profanity was "dangerous," especially if it had
"sexual overtones." 125 She concurred with Jones that clients should also
regulate employee "fraternization" because "any type of dating relationship
is a potential sexual harassment situation."' 126 She said she recommends a
ban on all supervisor-subordinate relationships, as well as heavy monitoring
of coworker relationships for clients who don't wish to adopt an across-the-
board no-dating policy.'2 The result is a chilling caution when it comes to
employee sexuality, especially in the gray areas of sexual jokes and banter,
flirtation, and even dating.
2. The Cultural Sensitivity Approach
The major alternative to the draconian zero-tolerance stance, an
approach I call the "cultural sensitivity" approach, differs only in degree-
not in kind (nor often in result). In this approach, managers and employees
must constantly monitor their own sexual conduct and stop it the minute
they detect that someone else may be offended. Although this approach
may reflect a theoretical respect for Title VII's severity and pervasiveness
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Gold Interview, supra note 113.
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requirement, in practice HR professionals tend to forgo any attempt at
objective inquiry in favor of focusing on the subjective reaction of the
"victim." Throughout the literature, I encountered the idea that harassment
depends on "impact, not intent,"'128 meaning: It doesn't matter whether
anyone intended to discriminate, as it's all a question of whether someone
was offended. Tellingly, one commentator reports that in a training session
she attended, the trainer projected "a picture of a giant eye, to illustrate the
idea that sexual harassment is 'in the eye of the beholder.""' 2 9 Of course,
the eye also projects a piercing image of surveillance: a corporate Big
Brother who is watching you as you watch whether others are watching you
as a means of watching yourself.
Due to a desire to ensure that even fully consensual interactions not
directed at the complainant do not offend a third party, many adherents of
the sensitivity approach end up using the same broad bans on sexual
conduct as zero-tolerance advocates. Because "it is the [harassee's]
definition that determines whether the unwelcome behavior is sexual
harassment," warns an article by Rebecca Thacker in Business Horizons,
supervisors should intervene "[i]f they see social-sexual behavior of any
sort."'"3 Similarly, in a BNA course book aptly entitled Intent vs. Impact,
Stephen Anderson counsels that simply because a coworker has tolerated
the conduct does not mean she welcomes it.131 Indeed, Anderson suggests
that a woman who says that she does not object to her male coworker's
sexual joking may still be the victim of sexual harassment because she may
have "learned while growing up that she must expect and tolerate that type
of behavior from men, or that she doesn't have a right to not be treated that
way."' 3 2 Anderson goes so far as to cite as an example of possible sexual
harassment the behavior of a female warehouse worker who likes to hug her
colleagues, suggesting that the only way to be sure of a hug's welcomeness
is through "equal initiation.
'133
Most of the consultants we interviewed tilted in favor of this cultural
sensitivity approach. For example, Amy Oppenheimer, an administrative
law judge and HR consultant, disavowed zero tolerance because "it
overemphasizes things that are trivial," but she stressed that "something
doesn't have to be illegal to violate [a sexual harassment] policy" and said
she encourages clients to discourage harassing behavior that falls short of
128. For examples, see STEPHEN F. ANDERSON, INTENT VS. IMPACT: How To EFFECTIVELY
MANAGE SEXUAL HARASSMENT INVESTIGATIONS 37-38 (1989).
129. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 166-67.
130. Rebecca A. Thacker, Innovative Steps To Take in Sexual Harassment Prevention, BUS.
HORIZONS, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 29-3 1.
131. ANDERSON, supra note 128, at 37.
132. Id. at43.
133. Id. at 42.
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illegality.1 34 The key, she said, is "impact, not intent," stressing that
employees need to learn how to read even nonverbal cues that a coworker
objects to their behavior or talk. In a similar vein, Craig Pratt, the owner of
a consulting company in Alameda, California, counseled evaluating
bystander objections by "using an approach that... relies on sensitivity of
the employee to welcomeness."' 35 When asked for a hypothetical, Pratt
offered a scenario in which a visiting mailman frequently flirts with a
receptionist, and they exchange sexual jokes and cartoons, offending a
bookkeeper in an adjacent desk. "Most [people] think this [type of
behavior] is inappropriate," Pratt remarked, concluding on the basis of this
assumption that the behavior should be stopped. 1
36
Like Jones and Culhane, Pratt also disapproves of consensual employee
relationships (though he concedes that at a recent training session, most
participants disagreed with him).' 37 Although Pratt doesn't go so far as to
recommend an outright ban, his model employee handbook strongly
discourages supervisor-subordinate relationships, calling them "always
inadvisable and, possibly, inappropriate. ' 138 The handbook further wars
employees that "personal or romantic relationships with co-workers,
competitors, or suppliers may lead to perceived or actual conflicts of
interest," and requires them to disclose any such relationship to a
supervisor. 39 Thus, the allegedly softer cultural sensitivity approach
converges with the more severe zero-tolerance stance as the insistence on
avoiding offense to other employees' sexual sensibilities demands that
employees police their own sexual behavior closely.
D. Punishing Sexual Transgressors
Just as many sexual harassment policies have been crafted in an
overzealous spirit, many are being enforced in a similar spirit. When sexual
harassment is defined in terms of conduct of a sexual nature with no
understanding of how harassment is linked to larger forms of inequality
such as job segregation by sex, there is no incentive for companies to
engage in structural reforms that might reduce the incidence of harassment,
such as integrating their workforces. Instead, current law sets up incentives
for employers to punish individual employees for engaging in any sexual
conduct that might be seen as contributing to a hostile work environment-
134. Oppenheimer Interview, supra note 113.
135. Pratt Interview, supra note 113.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. CHELA FN. RES., INC., EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK 15 (1998).
139. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
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incentives that mesh well with many employers' preexisting inclinations to
view sexual conduct as disruptive and out of place in the workplace.
As we saw earlier, Title VII allows employers to escape liability by
taking prompt and effective action to prevent and correct harassment.
According to legal scholar Estelle Franklin, "Discharge, demotion or
removal of supervisory authority is usually enough to shield the employer
from liability even in cases of outrageous conduct.' 140 More troublingly,
employers also have an incentive to impose such stiff discipline even on
employees who engage in more ambiguous forms of sexual conduct:
[E]mployers seeking to avoid liability for sexual harassment are
under pressure to take severe disciplinary action against a suspected
harasser within days of learning of even questionable
misconduct.... Further, because a quick investigation with a
finding of no harassment may lead to the imposition of liability on
the basis that the investigation was a sham, the employer may have
an incentive to conduct a quick investigation and take some action,
even if the investigation is inconclusive....
Finally, the employer may be pressured to mete out stiff
discipline in lieu of other corrective actions. Although the
determination of the action's appropriateness turns on whether it is
reasonably calculated to end the harassment, courts evaluated this
requirement from a backward-looking point of view, evaluating the
actual effect of the action, not its reasonably foreseeable effect.
Moreover, while courts have held that discharge of the harasser is
not required, the employer that fails to do so risks liability for
further harassment because it is then on notice as to the employee's
propensity. 141
In line with these incentives, there is evidence that, in the name of
eliminating sexual harassment, many employees are being disciplined, and
even discharged, for engaging in sexual conduct. According to a large
national survey published in 1999 by the SHRM, fully 60% of all sexual
harassment complaints resulted in some form of disciplinary action against
the alleged harasser. 142 That the majority of accused harassers are subjected
to such discipline or training seems troubling, when we recall that in almost
half of complaints, sexual remarks, teasing, and joking are the primary
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
140. Franklin, supra note 66, at 1556.
141. Id. at 1557 (cmphasis added).
142. See SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 96, at 6 tbl.3 (reporting that 29% of
alleged harassers were given a warning, 6% were put on probation, 4% were suspended, 9% were
sent to training or counseling, and 12% were fired).
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types of harassment alleged. 43 Furthermore, the vast majority of all
harassment complaints are filed against coworkers, not supervisors.144
This systematic evidence of punishment finds confirmation in a wealth
of anecdotal accounts. In the wake of the Clinton scandals, the press has
reported countless stories of employees who have paid a high price for what
look like harmless interactions.1 45 In one story, a male social worker was
fired for imitating David Letterman and approaching a new female
coworker with the comment, "I'm gonna flirt with ya."' 146 In another, a
lesbian psychology professor's guest lecture on female masturbation
prompted a sexual harassment lawsuit by a married, male Christian student,
who claimed that he felt "raped and trapped" by the lecture. 14 7 In another
case, a male religion professor was reprimanded for "'engag[ing] in verbal
conduct of a sexual nature' that had the effect of 'creating an intimidating,
hostile or offensive' environment" when he recited a story from the
Talmud, the writings that make up Jewish law.1 48 The story involved a man
who fell off a roof, accidentally landed on a woman, and had intercourse
with her. The professor related that in the Talmud, the man is deemed
innocent of sin because his act was unintentional. A female student in the
class was offended by the story, and her sexual harassment complaint led
the university to reprimand the professor and to record all his lectures to
ensure that he did not say anything offensive in the future.
149
The critics of sex harassment law have amassed many more reports of
sexual policing. In her book, Ceasefire!, for example, commentator Cathy
Young recounts several stories, including the following:
In Seattle in 1996, county ombudsman David Krull asked soon-
to-be-wed assistant ombudsman Amy Calderwood if she wanted to
see a funny item from the Internet, warning that she might find it
offensive. He got a green light. But after reading the mildly off-
143. Id. at 5-6 (reporting that these were the primary types of harassment alleged in 48% of
all complaints); U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., supra note 96, at 14 (reporting similar results). Note,
however, that the SHRM survey did not correlate the type of harassment with the likelihood of
disciplinary action.
144. In the SHRM survey, 51% of all sexual harassment complaints involved employees
accusing coworkers, and 29% involved employees accusing supervisors or executive/senior
management. SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 96, at 6 tbl.2. Similarly, in the 1994
MSPB survey, 77% of women and 79% of men who reported being harassed said they were
harassed by a coworker or other employee, while only 28% of women and 14% of men reported
being harassed by supervisors. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., supra note 96, at 19 tbl.5.
145. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1793 (citing some examples).
146. Kirstin Downey Grimsley, In Combating Sexual Harassment, Companies Sometimes
Overreact, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1996, at Al.
147. Asra Q. Nomani, Was Profs Lecture Academic Freedom or Sex Harassment?, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 7, 1995, at Al.
148. Dirk Johnson, A Sexual Harassment Case To Test Academic Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 1994, at D23 (quoting a formal reprimand issued by the Chicago Theological Seminary).
149. Id.
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color piece, "Instruction and Advice for the Young Bride"-which
purports to be a Victorian text on how to avoid sex-Calderwood
made a complaint. Later she revealed another shocking detail: in
the nine months she had worked for Krull, he had made several
comments about her "great hair days." Krull's apology was not
enough: the county council voted ten to three to fire him. 15
In another incident, in which women, rather than men, were deemed the
sexual offenders, Young reports:
In 1994, several female tellers and managers at United Jersey
Bank shared some laughs over cutouts of male nudes from Playgirl
(half an hour before closing, with no customers in the bank). A
male teller took offense and complained. The women were ordered
to apologize to him and were suspended without pay for as long as
two weeks; some were demoted.'
If the connection with gender equality seems slim in these examples, in
other cases it is nonexistent. As Young suggests, "Sometimes action is
taken even when the 'victim' doesn't complain."' l52 In one widely
publicized case:
[A] corporate manager was reported for hugging a secretary in her
cubicle. As it turned out, he was comforting her after she had
learned of her mother's death, and the complainant had a grudge
against the boss for denying her a promotion. Nevertheless, the
review concluded that the manager may have violated company
policy prohibiting "sexual touching," and he was placed on
probation for a year.
153
From a review of the available underlying press accounts, Young does
not appear to be exaggerating. 54 Nor are these examples isolated. In
addition to the stories cited above, law professor Eugene Volokh and author
Walter Olson have catalogued scores of cases depicting incidents that they
regard as illustrations of how sex harassment law has operated to suppress
150. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 180.
151. Id. at 180-81.
152. Id. at 181.
153. Id.
154. See Alex Michelini, Male Teller Can't Bare Nudie Pix, DAILY NEWS (New York), Jan.
16, 1995, at http://www.tnom.com/htmUteller.htm (reporting the suspension and demotion of
bank tellers after a prank with Playgirl magazine); Margot Slade, Sexual Harassment: Stories
from the Field, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, § 4 (Week in Review), at I (recounting an incident of
a manager disciplined for hugging his secretary after her mother died); Primetime Live (ABC
television broadcast, July 21, 1994) (examining the same incident); Duff Wilson, Aide Goes
Public in Ombudsman Beef-Woman Says She Was Surprised, Offended by E-mail Try at Humor,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 10, 1996, at B 1 (describing the background to the firing of County
Ombudsman Krull).
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free speech and encourage "overlawyering" that breeds a "fear of
flirting."' 155 Even if the press and critics do tend to focus too heavily on
incidents in which companies go overboard in punishing sexual conduct, as
some analysts suspect, 156 the sheer volume of the reported incidents may
nonetheless tend to corroborate what the more systematic research suggests:
that many employees are being punished for sexual conduct that would not
amount to harassment under the law.
Libertarian commentators portray these incidents of sexual
overreaching as a manifestation of political correctness,15 7 and such an
attitude may account for some of what is happening. Some HR
professionals and managers do appear to have bought into the conventional
feminist line that workplace sexuality is inherently sexist, and have sought
to stamp out sexual expression with an intensity that bespeaks an
ideological commitment. Yet, for all their perceptiveness, the libertarian
critics have missed something crucial. They focus their wrath on the
government (mostly courts and government enforcement agencies) for
creating law that treads on self-expression, but it is management that is
firing employees for sexual transgressions. In many of the cases, it is
difficult to sort out PC-like purposes from more conventional managerial
motives.
My review of the literature and the decisional law suggests that
companies often rely on sexual harassment policies to justify punishing
men who have violated the norm of asexuality, regardless of whether sex
discrimination is involved. Sometimes management appears to seize on a
sexual harassment complaint as a subterfuge for less benign motives for
getting rid of an employee. Regardless of whether this is occurring, sexual
harassment often provides a progressive justification for firing employees
who have devoted their lives to the company. Managers weren't acting cold
heartedly, they can claim. To the contrary, they were acting heroically to rid
the workplace of outdated cretins who stood in the way of women's
progress.
In some cases, management has relied on this line of reasoning
explicitly to discipline older men who appear to have done nothing more
than telling sexual jokes or making sexual conversation. In Pierce v.
Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., a male manager, Tom Pierce, was
accused of sexual harassment after participating in an exchange of sexually
155. See supra note 73.
156. See Deborah Zalesne, Sexual Harassment Law: Has It Gone Too Far, or Has the
Media?, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 351, 356-68 (1999).
157. See Olson, supra note 7, at 54 (refcrring to the "speech police" who advocate zero-
tolerance policies); Cathy Young, Groping Toward Sanity: Why the Clinton Sex Scandals Are
Changing How We Talk About Sexual Harassment, REASON, Aug.-Sept., 1998, at 24, 31 (arguing
"for critics of 'sexual correctness' to ... push for legislative change" in the realm of sexual
harassment law), available at http://reason.com/9808/fe.young.shtml.
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explicit cards with a female office administrator, Debbie Kennedy. One of
the cards Pierce sent read, "Sex is a misdemeanor. De more I miss, de
meanor I get."'158 According to Pierce and other employees, Kennedy had
also sent Pierce cards with sexually explicit messages and had engaged in
off-color behavior around Pierce and others in the office. 159 Yet, when
Kennedy charged Pierce with sexual harassment, he was summarily
demoted, with a significant reduction in pay, and transferred to another
office. After spending thirty years with the company, Pierce was bid
farewell by having his personal belongings dumped off at a roadside
Hardee's. 
160
The company claimed that Pierce had already been counseled about
two sexual harassment complaints in the past ten years-a record that
Pierce denied. Perhaps, if Pierce had such a history, management felt
compelled to punish him or else risk a costly harassment suit. Still, the
reasoning the company actually gave for disciplining Pierce is unsound-
and dangerous. The company relied on the sexually oriented character of
the cards alone, without even bothering to examine whether Pierce harbored
any sexist motivation in sending them. Indeed, in an amazing bit of
reasoning that conflates all forms of sexual interaction-from rape to racy
talk-one of Pierce's superiors allegedly told him that he might as well
have been a "murderer, rapist, or child molester, that it wouldn't be any
worse."'
16 1
In a similar case, the Miller Brewing Company was assessed $26.6
million in damages when it fired an executive, Jerold Mackenzie, whom a
female employee, Patricia Best, had accused of sexual harassment.
1 62
Mackenzie, who had worked for Miller for nineteen years, had commented
to Best about an episode of Seinfeld that aired the night before. In the show,
Seinfeld cannot recall the name of the woman he's dating. He knows that
her name rhymes with a part of the female anatomy, however, and inaptly
guesses such names as "Mulva" and "Gipple." At the end of the show, as
the woman breaks up with him, Seinfeld remembers her name and calls out,
"Delores?" Mackenzie recounted this episode to Best, and when she did not
get the joke, he photocopied a dictionary page defining "clitoris" and
handed it to her. It is possible that the facts of this case bear more than one
interpretation. Perhaps Mackenzie was resorting to sexual joking as a way
158. Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 825 F. Supp. 783, 784 (E.D. Ky. 1993), aff'd, 40
F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1994).
159. Pierce, 40 F.3d at 799 & n.2.
160. Id. at 800.
161. Id. at 799.
162. See James L. Graft, It Was a Joke! An Alleged Sexual Harasser Is Deemed the Real
Victim, TIME, July 28, 1997, at 62; see also Gretchen Schuldt, Former Miller Executive
"'Shocked" by Seinfeld, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 27, 1997, at 3 (discussing the firing of
Mackenzie).
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to "get to" a woman he despised due to sexist motives. But after hearing
both sides of the story, a twelve-person jury that included ten women
decided that Mackenzie's conduct did not comport with their understanding
of sex harassment and that his firing was unfair.1 63 Indeed, some of the
press accounts suggest that Miller may not have fired Mackenzie out of a
genuine concern that his conduct left them vulnerable to liability for
harassment, but instead may have used the accusation of sex harassment as
a subterfuge for firing Mackenzie, when they really wanted to get rid of him
for other reasons.164
Some readers may have little sympathy for executives or supervisors
who engage in sexually oriented conduct, even when it is as apparently
benign as telling sexual jokes. These readers may worry that employees
under their supervision will experience subtle pressure to participate or at
least acquiesce in such behavior-whether they like it or not-when it's
coming from the boss. Yet, it isn't simply bosses who have been disciplined
for sexual behaviors; many employees have been disciplined as well.
Indeed, surveys indicate that lower-level employees are more likely than
supervisors and higher-level employees to be disciplined.165 In a number of
the reported decisions, relatively low-ranking male workers were fired or
suspended for sexual jokes or remarks that seem relatively innocuous.
In one 2001 dispute involving the Cook County Sheriff's department, a
correctional officer of thirteen years was temporarily suspended without
pay for telling a joke he had heard on the radio that morning to an
administrative assistant in the jail whom he had known for several years.' 66
According to the officer, the joke mentioned that the American Dental
Association was at the Taste of Chicago and had as a punch line, "if you
want a tongue massage, come down to the Taste of Chicago and get your
toothbrush.''67 The officer claimed that he approached the complaining
woman by explaining that the joke "sounds dirty, but it's not," and after
recounting the joke, suggested that she go home and give her boyfriend or
163. See Dave Daley, Women Jurors Seen as Key to Mackenzie's Court Victory,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 17, 1997, at 10; Fired Executive Awarded $26.6 Million over
Seinfeld Rhyme, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 17, 1997, at 4.
164. See, e.g., Erik Brooks, "Lighten Up " or "Shut Up"?: Racy "Seinfeld" Chat Not
Harassment, Jury Rules; Women's Groups Angered, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, July 17, 1997,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Chattanooga Times/Chattanooga Free Press File; Dave Daley, $26 Million
Awarded in Seinfeld Case; Miller Firing Improper, Jury Decides, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July
16, 1997, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel File.
165. See, e.g., U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., supra note 96, at 38 (reporting that respondents
complained that higher-level employees were least likely to receive appropriate punishment for
harassment, particularly if they were managers or supervisors).
166. In re County of Cook/Sheriff of Cook County, 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1346 (2001)
(Wolff, Arb.).
167. Id. at 1348.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 2109
The Yale Law Journal
husband a tongue massage-while brandishing a toothbrush in his hands. 1 68
The woman screamed at him to "get the fluck away from [her]," and filed a
sexual harassment complaint. 169
The county's sexual harassment policy included as examples of
"Unwanted Sexual Advances, Propositions, or Other Sexual Comments"
such things as "sexually-oriented gestures, noises, remarks, jokes, or
comments about a person's sexuality or sexual experience."' 7 ° In arguing
that the officer violated the policy, the County Attorney stressed the
allegedly sexual content of this somewhat unintelligible joke:
Now, we have this officer telling a dirty joke, which
he... admits to have sexual overtones ....
... This joke that he was telling had one purpose and one
purpose only, .. to bring forth the sexual overtones underlying the
joke.
His intent is irrelevant.... Whether he intended to offend or
not, it's the effect it had on those that he told it to, and
[Complainant] recognized it as being offensive.' 7'
To counter the union's argument that the county should have followed
the usual procedure of imposing progressive discipline (a warning, before
suspension), the county emphasized the severity of the offense:
When you look at the collective bargaining agreement, you will see
in certain cases that discipline doesn't have to be progressive when
the offense is more serious.
... [I]n our workplace, one of the most serious offenses
somebody can commit is sexual harassment. It is something that is
pervasive in our society ... and it's something that we as people
want to stop .... 172
168. Id. According to the arbitrator, the complainant's version of the facts was slightly
different.
Asked if grievant was carrying a toothbrush in his hand, [Complainant] replied, "Not
that I'm aware of' and she repeated that grievant had put his arm around her shoulder.
She denied that grievant had told her that he had heard a joke on the radio that morning
and that while it "sounded dirty," it wasn't, and that she could tell her husband.
Id. at 1347. Regardless of whose facts are accepted, my point still stands: The County Attorney
argued that the sexual undertones of the joke were what made it sexual harassment and provided
the basis for punishing the grievant in question.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1349.
171. Id. at 1350.
172. Id.
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Although the arbitrator overturned the suspension for violating the
principle of progressive discipline, his reasoning in no way disavowed, but
actually affirmed, the county's argument that a sexual joke would be
punishable as sexual harassment. The arbitrator went out of his way to find
that the joke was not "reasonably susceptible of 'sexual overtones,"' and
thus was not covered by the policy. 173 In addition, the arbitrator stressed,
this officer had no history of making sexual remarks. The arbitrator's
decision portrayed the grievant as someone who ordinarily conducted
himself as an officer and a gentleman, and who had slipped up on this one
occasion by telling a sophomoric joke. By contrast, the decision suggests,
the county would have been well within its rights to punish a sexual
harasser who had told a truly "dirty" joke, especially if he were a repeat
offender.
17 4
Similar reasoning emerges from a decision involving a challenge by a
night crew shelf-stocker at Safeway who was fired for creating a hostile
work environment. 75 The grievant had a long history of making crude
sexual comments on the job, which sometimes upset some of his female
coworkers. 17 6 On the occasion of his firing, the grievant overheard one of
the women on his crew saying to a male coworker, "Richard, I'm going to
smack you," and "[a]llegedly with a leer in his voice, Grievant ... said,
'Oooh, you're going to smack him."' 17 7 When his female colleague
responded, "I'm going to smack you first," the grievant responded, "Oooh,
you're going to smack me, I'm going to go to my truck and get my
handcuffs."' 78
The point here is not that the grievant was a sympathetic figure; he
probably was not. The point is that the arbitrator simply accepted, without
questioning, the idea that sexual remarks amount to sexual harassment.
Although the arbitrator held that the grievant should be given another
chance before being fired, the arbitrator admonished:
There is no question that the comments ... constituted sexual
harassment .... His comments regarding the handcuffs must be
viewed in light of his overall behavior in the workplace, which is
one of a leering, crude, ungentlemanly person, who unfortunately,
thinking that he is being "cute" or "colorful," harms, embarrasses,
and humiliates female employees.... The Grievant does not appear
to be a mean or a physically intimidating individual, but his
173. Id. at 351.
174. Id.
175. In re Safeway, Inc., 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 768 (1997) (DiFalco, Arb.).
176. Id. at 769.
177. Id. at 770.
178. Id.
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behavior is wrong, and cannot be tolerated in the modem work
environment.
The Grievant must understand that he is a dinosaur in the
modern workplace, and like a dinosaur (i.e., sexual harasser), he
will either change or be extinct in the near future .... The
Grievant needs to be punished severely, he needs to receive a
strong message, and he should receive "sensitivity" training, but he
is entitled to one final chance.17 9
Like the reasoning in the Cook County decision, this arbitrator's rhetoric
reflects a mindset that equates sexual offense with harassment, regardless of
context, and marks male employees who offend female sensibilities as
pariahs who must be reprogrammed (through sensitivity training) or perish.
In another case, American Mail-Well Envelope suspended a leadman
when he failed to stop some men under his supervision from viewing a
sexually explicit magazine. 18° When Tonya Harding, a local celebrity
whose escapades workers had been discussing for weeks, appeared in
Penthouse magazine, one of the men brought the magazine in and many of
his coworkers viewed it unobtrusively at the beginning of their shift.
Afterward, the owner of the magazine placed it, cover down, at his work
station. Someone told a woman coworker about it, and she told someone in
management about it. 18' Despite the fact that there were no allegations that
the magazine had prompted lewd remarks or bad behavior, no concern that
it had reduced efficiency, and no claim that it had been wielded as a
weapon against any of the women, the company said the grievant's failure
to stop others from looking at it or to report its presence to management
placed him in violation of the firm's sexual harassment policy.1 82
The company's policy gave supervisors and leadmen a responsibility to
help create "a work environment that is free from racial and sexual
discrimination," and required them to be "sensitive to situations which are,
or might be interpreted to be, racial or sexual in content."'183 The leadman
reasonably might have interpreted "sexual discrimination" to refer to
situations involving gender-biased or gender-based conduct, but the
arbitrator rejected this interpretation out of hand. The arbitrator also
rejected the union's attempt to raise free speech concerns as
"polemics... [that are not] directly related to the factual situation at
hand." ' 1 4 In the eyes of the arbitrator, the magazine was "beyond any
179. Id. at 773-74 (emphasis added).
180. In re Am. Mail-Well Envelope, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1209 (1995) (Paull, Arb.).
181. Id. at 1211.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1211-12 (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 1213.
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shadow of a doubt, sexual in content"' "-and anything with sexual content
was, by definition, a form of sexual harassment. Thus, the arbitrator upheld
management's right to discipline the leadman, who earned a mere twenty-
five cents an hour more than the workers he supervised, 186 for failing to turn
in his buddies for taking a nondisruptive peek at a dirty magazine.
Disturbingly, the specter of pretextual motives haunts many decisions
in which employees are fired for sex harassment. In some of the cases, the
accused's offense seems so small, its connection to any sexist motivation or
pattern so slight, and the managerial response so overblown, that it is hard
to resist the conclusion that management is using sexual harassment as a
justification for punishing an employee they want to punish for other
reasons. Many of the cases involve older men. Although it is possible that
older men are simply slower to adjust to "modem" workplace norms, it is
also possible that companies are seizing on their sexual misconduct to
railroad aging men out of their jobs (and out of their pensions or accrued
bonuses). There are a number of cases in which employees have alleged
age-related and other improper motivations explicitly.1 87 In Pilkington v.
CGU Insurance Co., for example, a manager was accused of sexually
harassing a female data analyst with whom he had been involved.'18 When
she went on short-term disability leave, he called or e-mailed her once or
twice a week, saying, during one phone conversation, "I love ya" and "I am
looking forward to you coming back."' 8 9 When he was fired for sexual
harassment, with no meaningful investigation, he claimed the company had
"knowingly used an unfounded charge of sexual harassment to discharge
him and evade its obligation to pay him... bonus money"19 he had
accrued under a program that promised contractual bonus payments to
employees for the express purpose of encouraging them to stay with the
company.
Gay men have also alleged that companies have used sexual harassment
charges as a subterfuge for firing them because they are homosexual. 91 For
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1210.
187. See, e.g., Galambos v. Fairbanks Scales, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (holding
that an employee of thirty years met the burden of proof for a claim of discriminatory discharge
on the basis of age and disability as a result of a recent heart attack, where the employee met and
surpassed most performance goals, and established as pretext the employer's claim of sexual
harassment arising just after the employee's return from medical leave); Ex parte Usrey, 777
So. 2d 66 (Ala. 2000) (holding that an employee established a prima facie case of pretextual and
retaliatory discharge, based on an accusation of relatively mild sexual harassment, after the
employee sought workers' compensation for an injury incurred during employment).
188. 143 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 59,244 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
189. Id. at 92,907.
190. Id. at 92,911. The court denied the company's motion to dismiss, in a passage that
suggests that these facts, if proven, would amount to breach of contract under Pennsylvania law.
191. Though rarer, there have been claims that employees have used sexual harassment
charges to attempt to have someone fired, when the real motive was bias on the grounds of sexual
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example, Michael White, a dispatcher at B&W Cartage Company, a
Michigan trucking firm, alleged that his employer used a sexual harassment
claim as a pretext to fire him because he is gay and was believed by his
employer to be HIV-positive.' 92 White, who had come out about being gay
only a few months before his termination, had been described by one
coworker as "queer as a three-dollar bill."' 93 "We feel the alleged sexual
harassment was a pretext for discharging Mr. White and most likely it was a
way of harassing him," asserted his attorney, Lissa Cinat. "[A]I1 of a
sudden, out of the blue, comes this alleged harassment and three weeks later
he is fired. No one at the company talked to him. They didn't counsel him.
The woman never indicated to him that his behavior was improper. She
never said anything to him."' 94
In another case, Kenneth Kendrick, an Astra USA heating and air-
conditioning specialist, claimed that his company used "several pretexts" to
suspend him from his job because he is gay. 195 "I was charged with sexual
harassment because I made a remark of sexual nature to an employee who
worked in a different unit," read his Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination complaint. "This employee had previously accused a
heterosexual of a more grave instance of sexual harassment, which did not
result in any reprimand to the individual. However, because I am a
homosexual, the remark I made resulted in suspension. '" 196 After Kendrick
hired a lawyer, Astra's associate counsel for human resources offered him a
severance package, later stating that "[f]urther information confirmed some,
but not all, of Mr. Kendrick's allegations.' 97 The media has reported
numerous other complaints that managers have used sexual harassment
claims as a pretext for firing gay employees because of their sexual
orientation, without bothering to conduct a proper sexual harassment
investigation.'98 Some employees have won these claims. 199
orientation. See, e.g., Three Say Lesbian Boss Harassed Them, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale),
Feb. 25, 1994, at 9A.
192. See Cheryl Zupan, Gay Michigan Man Sues Employer, GFN.COM: THE GAY FINANCIAL
NETWORK, Aug. 10, 1998, at http://www.gfn.comlarchives/story.phtml?sid=201.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See George B. Griffin, Worker Alleges Gay Bias, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE,
July 16, 1997, at El.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. For example, in Manchester, England, a gay man named Vincent Monks was fired from
his job as a cleaning-firm site manager after he made a lighthearted comment to a female security
guard in a staff bar. See John Mahoney, 1 Never Harassed Girl... Coz I'm Gay, DAILY STAR
(London), Mar. 27, 2002, at 25. Over coffee, he said to her jokingly, "Ooh, I could take you home
and make passionate love to you!" Id. According to him, she responded with a joke about his
being gay, and "[i]t all seemed fun. That was the end of it." Id. Two weeks later, Monks was
called before the chiefs of the company, who told him about the complaint and fired him on the
spot. id. Monks claimed that he couldn't have harassed a woman because he is gay and has no
sexual interest in women, while the company responded that "Mr. Monks admitted making
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There are other cases in which juries and arbitrators have explicitly
found that companies used accusations of sexual harassment to cover up
other suspect motivations for firing their employees. In union or civil
service settings, in which employees are protected from firings that lack
cause, arbitrators sometimes overturn such management decisions. In a case
involving the City of Hollywood, Florida, for example, a man who had
been employed as a police officer for ten years was terminated for wearing
an "inappropriate" T-shirt to a sexual harassment training session that all
the officers had been ordered to attend when the department lost a sex
harassment suit.200 The grievant claimed that he did not know the purpose
of the meeting beforehand, and wore a T-shirt bearing the words "Booby
trap" in the front, and a picture of a bikini-clad woman on the back. During
the training session, the instructor encouraged the participants to speak
freely about what could be done to improve the department. The officer
made negative comments about the Chief. The next day, he was fired.20 '
The arbitrator overturned the discharge, finding that the reasons given
were pretextual. 20 2 The rule requiring appropriate attire applied only when
officers were on-duty: Officers had always been allowed to wear T-shirts,
shorts, and zori to in-service training sessions without complaint. Nor did
the T-shirt violate a rule requiring officers to show civility and respect to
others, or deliberately flaunt the judges' order in the harassment suit. No
one had complained about the T-shirt, and no one was offended; the woman
who conducted the training session hadn't even noticed it. Instead, the
Chief had seized upon the T-shirt incident as an excuse to fire the grievant
for his outspoken criticisms of the Chief himself. "The result was an
Internal Affairs report sustaining violations only to justify the Chief s
preordained decision to discipline," concluded the arbitrator.0 3
comments of a very blunt sexual nature. It is quite possible for an openly gay man to sexually
harass a woman." Id. While Monks's defense that he is gay is not dispositive--clearly, gay men
can also have sexist motivations nd can act on them to harass women-it is hard to believe that
the coworker would feel sufficiently threatened by such a comment to justify the company's swift
and harsh reaction. See also Bill Roundy, Man Alleges Firing for Orientation, GFN.COM: THE
GAY FINANCIAL NETWORK, May 3, 1999, at http://www.gff.com/archives/story.phtml?sid=l 177
(reporting the allegations of a Fairfax, Virginia, man who claimed that he was fired after his
company discovered his sexual orientation while conducting an investigation for sexual
harassment, and who believed that the company took into account the fact that he was gay and
terminated his contract without ever determining whether the harassment claims were true).
199. For an example of a successful pretext claim related to sexual orientation, see MA $1.2M
Discrimination Award, PLANETOUT.COM, Jan. 6, 1997, at http://www.planetout.com/pno/news/
article.html?1997/01/06/3 (reporting that a jury awarded $1.2 million to a hospital housekeeping
manager after finding that a sexual harassment claim was used as a pretext to terminate him
because he was perceived to be gay).
200. In re City ofHollywood, 112 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 88 (1999) (Miller, Arb.).
201. Id. at 89-90.
202. Id. at 92.
203. Id. at 93.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 2115
The Yale Law Journal
In another case involving the Monterey, California, Office of
Education, an arbitrator overturned the discharge of a man who had worked
for the school district for twenty-three years, and was transferred to the
district's Head Start program to work as a financial secretary late in his
career. 20 4 The man's troubles began when the program hired a new director,
Ricardo Tellez, who treated him shoddily. Although he was supposed to
give every employee a performance evaluation once a year, for example,
Tellez never did this for the grievant. Eventually, Tellez fired him, saying
that he had violated the sexual harassment policy. On one occasion, the
grievant had brought cookies to a female kitchen employee, Anita Colinga,
blown kisses at her, and said, "Hi Sweetie. ' 2 0 5 Although the lead cook had
complained, Colinga said the grievant's behavior was not a problem. On
another occasion, the grievant held up a copy of Maxim magazine to display
the cover photo of a popular actress to a different female coworker. When
she told him she felt uncomfortable with it, he put the magazine away, and,
according to her own account, he never did anything like that again.2 °6
In defense of firing the man, Tellez testified that his main "concerns
were with the behavior of [the grievant] toward female employees and the
frequent complaints of female employees.... [H]e [simply] could not allow
female employees to be subjected to that kind of behavior. 2 7 But the
arbitrator found that, to the contrary, "there was nothing in the evidence
record showing that any female employee filed a personal complaint
regarding any inappropriate personal or verbal conduct towards them., 20 8 In
this case, aided by the testimony of two former Head Start coordinators
who testified that the grievant was extremely competent and efficient at his
job, and spoke of their "empath[y] with [Grievant] regarding the
frustrations he was subjected to by Mr. Tellez in the performance of his
duties, '20 9 the arbitrator saw through Tellez's false concern for the grievant
having allegedly made female employees feel uncomfortable and rejected
the sexual harassment allegation as pretextual.
Just as some companies use accusations of sexual harassment to cover
up darker motives for firing employees, other firms seem to find that a
charge of sexual harassment provides a more publicly acceptable
explanation for firing an employee than allegations of poor performance. In
Moore v. Arthur Andersen,210 for example, a Texas appellate court affirmed
204. In re Monterey County Office of Educ., 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 909 (2001) (Pool,
Arb.).
205. Jd. at 914.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Jd. (emphasis added).
209. id. at 915.
210. Moore v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., No. 13-00-389-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 5834
(Aug. 23, 2001).
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a grant of summary judgment against an accountant, David (Barry) Moore,
who was fired. His project manager, Laura Mawhinney, had written a
memorandum to the file complaining that Moore flirted too much at work.
"Throughout the week," she wrote, "I observed Barry engaged in multiple
conversations with multiple female employees, sometimes lasting 20-30
minutes at a time." 21  She admonished Moore for spending "too much time
'chatting' with multiple female client personnel at the client site," and
"emphasized the importance of [his] maintaining professional relationships
with client personnel. 212 Shortly thereafter, Moore complained to Human
Services that Mawhinney was directing antagonistic behavior toward him
and alleged that she was creating a hostile work environment. Yet, no one
investigated his complaint, or even read his detailed rebuttal of the charges
in Mawhinney's memo. Instead, the Director of Human Resources, Scott
Wilson, called Moore in to his office, said it "appears you are a flirt," and
fired him for sexual harassment.
213
Although the accounting firm told the Texas Workforce Commission
that Moore had been fired for sexual harassment, according to the court,
Human Resource Director Wilson later said that Moore should have been
fired for "unprofessional conduct., 214 As for substance, the firm's
investigation into Moore's misconduct turned up only vague allegations
that some of the women at the client site felt "uncomfortable" when Moore
asked if they were dating anyone.215
It is difficult to discern Arthur Andersen's true reasons for firing
Moore. Perhaps the "sexual harassment" reason was real: The firm may
have worried that the client company would dislike his behavior, or perhaps
Mawhinney herself was offended by it. Yet, the company had already
backed off from the sexual harassment explanation before trial. The record
also suggests that Mawhinney may have been angry that Moore's
extracurricular activities were taking time away from his work; she
complained that he spent so much time flirting that she suspected him of
working only six hours in an eight-hour day. 216 But if a concern for his
productivity were the reason, why fire him for sex harassment (or even
inappropriate conduct)? After all, in an employment-at-will state like
Texas, Andersen could have fired Moore for not working hard enough, or,
indeed, fired him for no reason at all. So, even if Mawhinney simply
211. Id. at *6.
212. Id. at *5.
213. Id. at *7.
214. Id.
215. Id. at *8.
216. Id. at *6.
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wanted him fired because she didn't like him, why resort to his sexual
conduct as a justification?217
A clue to the company's motivation in stating that it fired Moore for
sex harassment may be found in the court's easy acceptance of that
rationale. Despite the fact that Moore's actions did not come close to
constituting sexual harassment under Title VII, and that Andersen had
distanced itself from the sexual harassment explanation before trial, the
court had no trouble relying on it as a justification for Moore's firing:
"Although Andersen chose to characterize the reason for Moore's
termination as unprofessional conduct rather than sexual harassment, the
nature of conduct for which it terminated Moore would, if sufficiently
severe, constitute sexual harassment', 21 8 After all, said the court, Moore
never denied that he had engaged in flirtatious conduct-conduct that
"made women uncomfortable" and "w[as] inappropriate in a business
setting. '21 9 Perhaps, even in employment-at-will settings, employers feel
they have a need to protect their reputational capital: Better to be known as
a firm that doesn't fire people unfairly. If so, it is one of the dubious
triumphs of sexual harassment law that companies feel righteous about
telling the world they have fired an employee for inappropriate sexual
behavior, instead of relying on more business-like concerns about the
employee's productivity. °
Whether management is using sexual harassment to cover up less
benign motives, or is simply defining harassment so broadly that it provides
justification for punishing almost any form of conduct with sexual content,
the results are similar. In the name of protecting women, companies are
firing or punishing employees for sexual transgressions even when no sex
discrimination is involved. Although in some of the cases discussed above
arbitrators overturned management's punishment, there is evidence that this
217. The evidence does not preclude a darker motivation. Mawhinney had put her criticisms
of Moore in a memo to the file, and it was not clear that Andersen was going to do anything more
than give Moore a warning until he went to human resources to complain about her. On this
theory, Andersen may have used the accusation of sexual harassment to cover up a less benign,
retaliatory motive for firing Moore. Whatever the real motive, it is clear that firms consider sexual
harassment to be a more publicly acceptable justification for firing their employees.
218. Moore, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 5834, at *18.
219. Id. at* 15.
220. In the HR literature, I came across articles warning companies not to overuse sexual
harassment, which suggests that the HR experts fear that some employers may be tempted to do so
(or are doing so already). "Make the punishment fit the crime," warned one article, which
continued:
If your evidence shows that the alleged harasser was having an affair with his accuser,
deal with him (and her) under the company anti-nepotism policy, but not under the
sexual harassment policy. If your evidence shows him guilty of horseplay (nonsexual,
of course) but not sexual harassment, discipline him for horseplay but not sexual
harassment. In other words, don't use an atomic bomb to kill a gnat. If you do, the
sheer injustice of it may make the employee want to sue you.
Rolnick, supra note 68, at 95.
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is not the norm. In Franklin's systematic study of reported arbitration
decisions concerning employees who were disciplined for sexual
harassment, arbitrators reversed management's decisions only 13% of the
time.221 In 52% of the cases, arbitrators upheld the precise form of
discipline management imposed, and in another 34% of the cases, some sort
of penalty was imposed.222 Furthermore, Franklin found that arbitrators
have become increasingly likely to uphold the employer's choice of
discipline in recent years. 223 Although the type of harassment that was
alleged mattered, arbitrators nonetheless upheld management's imposed
discipline in 50% of the cases alleging only verbal harassment, and in 45%
of the cases alleging such low-level conduct as gawking or staring.224
Indeed, she found that when arbitrators did reverse or reduce the
punishment management imposed, they tended to do so by invoking
traditional principles of progressive discipline or fairness; in only a handful
(14 out of 225, or 6%) of cases did arbitrators rule that the alleged conduct
did not amount to sexual harassment.2 25 It is striking that in the absence of
managerial abuses, even arbitrators seem to accept the notion that
companies may impose broad bans on sexual conduct that exceed Title
VII's mandates.
Furthermore, most employees who are accused of sexual harassment do
not have the benefit of arbitration. Although many union and government
employees are covered by collective bargaining agreements or civil service
provisions that protect them from arbitrary forms of discipline, most people
have no such protection. When employees who are protected by just-cause
provisions are being disciplined in such troubling circumstances, there is
cause for even more concern about what is happening to the majority of
American workers. Over time, it seems, sexual harassment law has taken on
a life of its own, uprooted from the larger project of achieving gender
equality that animates Title VII.
E. Policing Sexual Relationships
Sexual harassment law has also provided new momentum for policing
consensual intimate relationships between employees. In the name of
preventing harassment, employers are not simply prohibiting employees'
sexual misconduct on the job: They are also policing employees' sexual
relationships off the job. Not only has workplace flirting become suspect,
so too has falling in love (and lust).
221. See Franklin, supra note 66, at 1565.
222. Id. at 1565 & n.225.
223. Id. at 1568.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1567, 1569.
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Although there are a number of reasons why companies might have
concerns about workplace romance, 226 a growing literature pinpoints fear of
sexual harassment liability as the reason companies must take action. Recall
the interview stances of consultants Laurie Jones (who advocated telling
employees, "You don't date! There's a million other people out there!"),
227
Holly Culhane (who argued that "any type of dating relationship is a
potential sexual harassment situation"),228 and Craig Pratt (whose model
handbook strongly discourages even fully consensual employee
relationships). 229 The "how-to-avoid-liability" literature generally confirms
the view that employee relationships are dangerous--even explosive-
because they can land companies in trouble for sexual harassment.
"[O]ffice romances... [may] lead to sexual harassment, which is illegal
and for which employers can be held liable to the tune of millions of dollars
in legal fees, settlements, and penalties--enough to cripple or bankrupt
most companies, ' 210 warned one business journal. Another HR specialist
agreed:
[A] company without definitive strategies for intracompany
romances is one waiting to support an army of lawyers.
There is a temptation to think that consensual relationships are
not harmful, that the only situations to be wary of are those of the
chauvinistic, loathsome, stalking harassment kind.
But the former, those workplace romantic liaisons, are by
231far more frequent and can turn just as nasty.
Even some scholars have joined the bandwagon. Charles Pierce and
Herman Aguinis, two organizational psychologists who have written widely
on the subject, encourage researchers to stop treating sexual harassment and
workplace romance as unrelated issues.232 In this new view, workplace
romance-defined as a "mutually desired romantic relationships between
two people at work in which some element of sexuality or physical
226. Organizational psychologists have discussed the potential effects on job productivity,
worker morale, worker motivation, job satisfaction, job involvement, and management
decisionmaking, for example. See, e.g., Charles A. Pierce et al., Attraction in Organizations: A
Model of Workplace Romance, 17 J. ORG. BEHAV. 5, 18-26 (1996). There is no consensus that
workplace romance or other forms of workplace sexual interaction have more negative than
positive effects. See infra notes 476-482 and accompanying text.
227. Supra note 118 and accompanying text.
228. Supra note 126 and accompanying text.
229. Supra note 138 and accompanying text.
230. Piantek, supra note 78.
231. John Farr, Dangerous Liaisons, CHAIN STORE AGE, Feb. 1998, at 35, 36.
232. Charles A. Pierce & Herman Aguinis, Bridging the Gap Between Romantic
Relationships and Sexual Harassment in Organizations, 18 J. ORG. BEHAV. 197 (1997).
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intimacy exists" 233 -must be carefully managed in order to stave off costly
harassment suits.
In the eyes of most HR experts, relationships between supervisors and
subordinates-or other employees who occupy "power-differentiated" work
roles 34 _place employers most at risk for harassment claims. "A supervisor
risks more than quid pro quo sexual harassment allegations when dating (or
attempting to date) a subordinate," experts advise. 235 "The supervisor also
runs the risk of discrimination and harassment complaints from other
employees who are aware of or affected by the relationship. The other
employees may allege that the subordinate who is dating the boss receives
favored treatment, promotions, or other work-related perks."236 "The
overriding, No. 1 problem is the perception of other employees of
favoritism," which can lead to charges of hostile work environment,
according to a California-based employee-relations consultant. 37 Even if no
favoritism is present, other employees may perceive a boss-employee
relationship as a subtle form or indication of sexual harassment that makes
them uncomfortable. 238 "Sexual relationships with subordinates can be
career suicide for supervisors," agrees Paul Siegel of the national labor and
employment law firm of Jackson Lewis LLP. "Both the object of the
supervisor's affections and disgruntled coworkers may have claims. 239
If the relationship "goes south," the experts warn, even more problems
can arise. According to organizational psychologists, dissolved hierarchical
relationships often lead to sexual harassment claims because the negative
feelings that people who break up often have for each other are intensified
when they are forced into frequent contact with each other. "I can't tell you
how many cases we get daily that [stem from soured supervisor-subordinate
romances]," said a senior partner at Littler Mendelson, P.C., the nation's
largest labor- and employment-law defense firm.240 In the wake of such
233. Sharon Foley & Gary N. Powell, Not All Is Fair in Love and Work: Coworkers'
Preferences for and Responses to Managerial Interventions Regarding Workplace Romances, 20
J. ORG. BEHAV. 1043, 1043 (1999); see also Robert J. Paul & James B. Townsend, Managing the
Workplace Romance: Protecting Employee and Employer Rights, 19 REV. Bus. 25, 25 (1998)
(defining workplace romance as "relationships between people working together which are
characterized by sexual attraction"); Pierce & Aguinis, supra note 232, at 197 (adopting a similar
definition); Robert E. Quinn, Coping with Cupid. The Formation, Impact, and Management of
Romantic Relationships in Organizations, in SEXUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS 38, 38 (D.A.
Neugarten & J.M. Shafritz eds., 1980) (defining organizational romance as "a relationship
between two members of the same organization that is perceived by a third party to be
characterized by sexual attraction").
234. See Kramer, supra note 78, at 79.
235. Piantek, supra note 78.
236. Id.
237. Judy Greenwald, Office Romances May Court Trouble, BUS. INS., Feb. 14, 2000, at 3, 4.
238. See Kramer, supra note 78, at 82.
239. Piantek, supra note 78.
240. James Lardner et al., Cupid's Cubicles: Office Romance Is Alive and Well, Despite a
Barrage of Corporate Countermeasures, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 14, 1998, at 44, 47.
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breakups, supervisors may be accused of quid pro quo sexual harassment-
and more-as the following passage warns:
First, out of revenge, a subordinate might accuse his or her
supervisor of sexual harassment if the supervisor terminates the
romance, especially if the subordinate entered the romance because
of a job-related motive such as seeking lighter workloads, a
promotion or pay raise, an increase in power, or more vacation
time. Second, if a subordinate terminates the romance against the
supervisor's wishes, the supervisor may be bitter and attempt to
rekindle the romance. The supervisor's coercive attempts to reunite
the dyad may be undesired and, hence, considered sexually
harassing. Third, a supervisor might try to manage the romantic
dissolution by relocating or terminating the subordinate in order to
avoid negative feelings from the disengagement.... [A] male
supervisor's relocation or termination decision rendered in response
to his romantic dissolution could be considered discrimination
based on his female subordinate's gender, and such discrimination
might be construed as harassment.
As a result of these fears, there is now widespread agreement among
HR managers and management-side labor lawyers that supervisor-
subordinate relationships should be prohibited or at least strongly
discouraged. The experts cite feminist arguments about the power dynamics
inherent in the male supervisor/female subordinate relationships, 242 and
point to evidence that many employees disapprove of such unions.243 As
two HR experts put it, "Nearly all employees and employers agree on one
aspect of the organizational romance issue. They fervently disapprove of
the dicey supervisor-subordinate romantic relationship."
244
Many experts advise outright bans, called "no-fraternization policies,"
on romantic liaisons between employees in supervisor-subordinate
relationships, even when they are fully consensual. A growing number of
companies seem to be following their advice. Staples made headlines in
1997 when its policy prohibiting managers from having intimate
relationships with subordinates led to the resignation of its president,
Martin Hanaka, and the termination of his secretary, Cheryl Gordon. In
1991, Arthur Andersen reportedly declared in its Personnel Reference
241. Pierce & Aguinis, supra note 232, at 199. For confirmation that legal scholars perceive
these same risks, see Kramer, supra note 78, at 86-97 (warning of sexual harassment complaints
by "the jilted lover," "unwelcome (previously welcome) sexual advances by a supervisor," "third-
party discrimination claims," and "other retaliation complaints").
242. See, e.g., 1 ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 12-13 (3d ed.
2000).
243. See Pierce & Aguinis, supra note 232, at 198; see also Kramer, supra note 78, at 82-83;
Pierce et al., supra note 226, at 20.
244. Schaefer & Tudor, supra note 78, at 6.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2122 [Vol. 112:2061
The Sanitized Workplace
Binder that "it is inappropriate... for someone with supervisory
responsibility to 'date' an employee who is subject to that supervision," and
stated that "appropriate disciplinary action [for] poor judgment in personal
relationships" can include discharge.245 Intel also explicitly forbids
managers from dating any employee they supervise and warns violators that
they may face termination. 6 IBM's sexual harassment policy states, "A
manager may not date or have a romantic relationship with an employee
who reports through his or her management chain, even when the
relationship is voluntary and welcome." 247 Wal-Mart's "Improper Work
Place Conduct" policy forbids "[a] supervisor or salaried associate [from]
becom[ing] romantically involved with someone s/he supervises, or
someone whose terms and conditions of employment s/he may have the
ability to influence., 24 8 Even Apple Computer, located in the notoriously
"loose" Silicon Valley, forbids direct-reporting or contractual relationships
between employees "who have a significant personal relationship.
249
The stricter no-fraternization policies require one or both employees to
be terminated, while the "softer" ones require only that one participant be
reassigned when they become involved.2 50 This softer approach to no-
fraternization coincides with what some experts call a "date-and-tell"
strategy, in which the firm doesn't explicitly prohibit, but still strongly
discourages and regulates, supervisor-subordinate relationships. Under this
approach, employees who become involved with each other must disclose
their relationship to management, who can then monitor the situation and
transfer or discipline the lovers as necessary.
To ward off Title VII liability, experts advise companies to incorporate
language discouraging fraternization directly into the company's sexual
harassment policy:
Since sexual harassment litigation risk management primarily
justifies an employer's fraternization policy, the policy should be
directly incorporated as a component of any existing sexual
harassment policy.... A statement discouraging supervisor-
subordinate romances, explained in terms of potential claims of
unwelcome conduct when the relationship ends, will clearly
articulate the employer's concerns and explicitly encourage
employees to utilize the reporting mechanism, thus heading off
claims before they arise.... [A]n employer that specifically
245. Mark Muro, Corporate Mergers, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1991, at 69.
246. William C. Symonds et al., The Lewinsky Effect: Business Takes a Closer Look al
Executive Affairs, BUS. WK., Feb. 16, 1998, at 30, 31.
247. Terry Morehead Dworkin, It's My Life-Leave Me Alone: Off-the-Job Employee
Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 47, 63-64 n. 105 (1997).
248. Id.
249. Ellen Rapp, Dangerous Liaisons, WORKING WOMAN, Feb. 1992, at 56, 61.
250. Schaefer & Tudor, supra note 78, at 6.
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discusses and discourages power-differentiated relationships in its
sexual harassment policy will be more successful in its argument
that it adequately discharged its duty to prevent [harassment].5
Even though most experts believe supervisor-subordinate relationships
present the greatest risk, others warn against even romances between peers.
According to Jim Kuns, a consultant with a Los Angeles-based HR
organization, "There's a presumption that sexual harassment will arise out
of these [peer] relationships if permitted by the employer, and that's not an
unfounded presumption .... When relationships go sour, people's
emotions take over and they start to do things."252 Another consultant,
Ethan Winning, cited an incident involving one of his clients in which a
woman began to stalk her ex-boyfriend and coworker, lingering outside his
apartment in the early morning hours. The ex-boyfriend obtained a
restraining order against the woman, but when the employer was unwilling
to fire her, he sued the company and eventually walked away with a
$500,000 settlement.2 53
In the face of these perceived threats, and the knowledge that
workplace romance is very common, 54 some HR consultants and lawyers
251. Kramer, supra note 78, at 121-22 (emphasis added); see also Farr, supra note 231, at 36
(advising corporations to discourage supervisor/subordinate relationships).
252. Greenwald, supra note 237, at 4.
253. Id.
254. Most studies suggest that between 24% and 37% of all employees have participated in
an office romance at some time. See, e.g., SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RFs. MGMT., WORKPLACE
ROMANCE SURVEY 12 (2001) (finding that 37% of 645 respondents reported that they have been
involved in a workplace romance); Claire J. Anderson & Caroline Fisher, Male-Female
Relationships in the Workplace: Perceived Motivations in Office Romance, 25 SEx ROLES 163,
171 (1991) (indicating that 30% of 168 employees admitted to involvement in an "intimate affair"
at some time with someone at the same firm); Am. Mgmt. Ass'n, Office Romance: Summary of
Findings (1994) (on file with author) (finding that 24% of 485 respondents had a "romantic
relationship with an office colleague"). One study places the figure much higher. In a 1998
Internet survey of nearly 7000 subscribers of America Online, called "Love@Work," 71% of the
respondents said they had dated someone at work, and 50% of the managers said they had dated a
subordinate. See Charlene Marmer Solomon, The Secret's out, WORKFORCE, July 1998, at 42, 44.
Perhaps not surprisingly, survey results suggest that office romances occur more frequently
among younger employees. In an American Management Association study, 38% of those under
35 reported at least one romance with a peer or a subordinate, compared to only 22% of those 35
or older. See Carol Hymowitz & Ellen Joan Pollock, Corporate Affairs: The One Clear Line in
Interoffice Romance Has Become Blurred, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1998, at Al. Of course, even
many employees who have not actually participated in a workplace romance have observed them.
Studies report that as many as 80% of American employees have observed some type of romantic
relationship at their workplace. See Schaefer & Tudor, supra note 78, at 4; Carolyn I. Anderson &
Phillip L. Hunsaker, Why There's Romancing at the Office and Why It's Everybody's Problem,
PERSONNEL, Feb. 1985, at 57, 59 (reporting that among a small sample of white-collar employees
with a mean age of 30, 86% had been exposed to one or more organizational romances); see also
J.P. Dillard & K.I. Miller, Intimate Relationships in Task Environments, in HANDBOOK OF
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 449, 453 (S.W. Duck ed., 1988) (reporting that 71% of respondents in
combined samples of five prior studies had observed at least one romantic relationship at work,
and 31% of respondents in combined samples of three prior studies had themselves been involved
in such a relationship).
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now advise companies to take steps to manage all their employees'
relationships, including ones between coworkers who do not have
decisionmaking power over each other. Because the threat of incurring
sexual harassment liability is perceived to be weaker and the risk of
incurring countervailing liability to the employee if they're punished is
perceived to be stronger in the context of these coworker relationships,
255
and because traditional feminist arguments about male/female sexual power
dynamics do not resonate as strongly,25 6 most HR managers lean against
imposing on coworkers the express bans on "fraternization" that they
recommend for supervisors and subordinates." 7
For these horizontal relationships, most experts advise the softer date-
and-tell approach, which, while not as stringent as an outright ban, still
invites management to involve itself heavy-handedly in the affairs of
company employees:
"If I hear rumors of a romance, I'll call up a line manager who's
involved in the romance and ask him if it's true, and if it is, I'll take
him, his manager and the employee and talk to them," says C.
Anthony Ladt, the vice president for human resources of a large
leasing company based in Louisiana. "I'll tell them we want to
make sure that all parties understand it's consensual.... And I'll
say we frown on it."
258
Behind even this velvet-glove approach lies a powerful punch. Although
some employers have devised innovative penalties for employees who fail
255. See Kramer, supra note 78, at 97 (arguing that "a narrowly-tailored employer policy,
addressing only the problem of supervisor-subordinate romances, will normally withstand judicial
scrutiny under almost every common-law, statutory, and constitutional attack"); Douglas
Massengill & Donald J. Petersen, Legal Challenges to No Fraternization Rules, 46 LAB. L.J. 429,
435 (1995) (concluding that "employers have essentially free rein to impose prohibitions against
fraternization between employees even when those employees are away from the workplace").
For a different analysis, which argues that courts are more likely to reject employees' claims for
protection when their intimate relationships are "seen as a reflection of the moral degradation of
the fiber of society," as opposed to those who are "living a conventional, or 'family values'
lifestyle," see Dworkin, supra note 247, at 48-49.
256. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Hallinan, Invasion of Privacy or Protection Against Sexual
Harassment: Co-Employee Dating and Employer Liability, 26 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 435,
463 (1993). Although Hallinan cites Susan Estrich's work to argue in favor of banning sexual
relationships between supervisors and subordinates, she rejects such an approach to coworker
relationships, arguing that employees' privacy interests in dating outweigh employers' interest in
preventing workplace inequality.
257. For example, see the conclusion of a Los Angeles attorney, based upon her review of
legal pressures favoring and cutting against no-fraternization rules. Nicole C. Rivas, Love
Contracts, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 7, 2000, at 16 ("Generally, policies that prohibit intra-office dating
entirely are unrealistic and difficult to enforce. More practical is to prohibit dating between
management and non-management personnel and to discourage, but not completely prohibit,
romantic relationships between coworkers.").
258. Philip Weiss, Don't Even Think About It. (The Cupid Cops Are Watching.), N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 43, 45.
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to register their relationships, 25 9 many firms resort to discipline to provide
the proper incentive. For example, one large Texas energy firm fired two
employees for engaging in undisclosed relationships-prompting a dozen
more supervisor-subordinate couples to come forward with word of their
sex lives to avoid being discharged.260
In addition to policies that prohibit or discourage dating, many lawyers
now recommend the use of a "love contract"-a legal form invented when
the general counsel for a major company contacted the Littler Mendelson
firm to say that the company president was planning to have an affair with
one of his employees, but before he did so, he wanted a written agreement
stating that the affair was voluntary to reduce the likelihood that the woman
would file a sexual harassment suit if the couple later broke up.26'
Companies around the country now ask or require top managers to send
letters to their lovers with language like the following:
I very much value our relationship and I certainly view it as
voluntary, consensual, and welcome. And I have always felt that
you feel the same. However, I know that sometimes an individual
may feel compelled to engage in or continue a relationship against
their will out of concern that it may affect the job or working
relationships.
It is very important to me that our relationship be on an equal
footing and that you be fully comfortable that our relationship is at
all times voluntary and welcome. I want to assure you that under no
circumstances will I allow our relationship or, should it happen, the
end of our relationship, to impact on your job or our working
relationship.
262
The letter is intended to be accompanied by a copy of the firm's sexual
harassment policy, and ends with a signature block for the recipient, under a
paragraph that reads:
I have read this letter and the accompanying sexual harassment
policy and I understand and agree with what is stated in both this
letter and the sexual harassment policy. My relationship with
(name) has been (and is) voluntary, consensual and welcome. I also
259. Kramer, supra note 78, at 135-36 (reporting that some companies threaten that they will
not pay for the defense of any sexual harassment claim arising out of unreported relationships).
260. Lardner et al., supra note 240, at 47.
261. Symonds et al., supra note 246, at 30.
262. Kramer, supra note 78, at 140.
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understand that I am free to end this relationship at any time and, in. . ... 263
doing so, it will not adversely impact on my job.
Love contracts aren't written only for executives and their underlings:
They can be written for coworker couples, too. "To prevent harassment,
some employers prohibit employees from dating, or entering into
consensual social relationships with employees," reads one policy
recommended by a management-side, labor-and-employment law firm in
southern California, which then continues:
The XYZ Company does not feel that such extreme measures are
necessary, so long as other parties mutually and voluntarily consent
to the social relationship, and the social relationship does not affect
the performance of their duties or negatively impact the Company's
business.
To ensure that social relationships do not violate the sexual
harassment policy, employees who enter into such relationships
must comply with the following:
* Notify the Human Resource Director of the Relationship;
* Review the Company's Policy prohibiting Sexual
Harassment;
" Sign the Company's Consensual Relationship Contract;
" Agree to possible reassignment if the social relationship
involves a subordinate employee;
* Avoid indiscreet behavior while at the workplace; and
" Notify the Human Resource [Director] should the social
relationship terminate. 26
263. Id. Kramer notes that this letter is "obviously somewhat informal," and suggests that
companies consider "some additional important ingredients," such as:
(a) a statement that the subordinate is in no way obligated to accept the agreement, i.e.,
signature is not required, but signifies the absence of any coercion, duress, fraud, or
improper inducement; (b) an expression advising and indicating an opportunity to
consult with counsel before signing; (c) provisions for express revocation of the
agreement, including a requirement for immediate notification of management and
other procedures; (d) the superior's permanent relinquishment of any decision-making
authority over the subordinate... ; (e) an agreement to refrain from engaging in any
sexual or amorous conduct in the workplace or other places when on official business;
and (f) the subordinate's waiver of rights to pursue a claim of sexual harassment or
other legal action against the employer based on any and all events up to the date of the
agreement, but not waiving any prospective rights or claims.
Id. at 140-41 (citations omitted).
264. HRZone, Office Romance ... Is the Company Helpless? Three Tools That Will Help
(1998), at http://www.hrzone.com/articles/officeromance.html (quoting a policy provided by
Gutierrez, Preciado & House, LLP).
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For those who question the validity of love contracts2 65 or see them as
"'overkill,' 266 HR professionals have devised another, "perhaps less
restrictive" approach of monitoring all their employees' personal
communications. 267 Under this strategy,
companies.., introduce e-mail and voice mail policies under
which all employees sign waivers that clearly say employers are
entitled to access these communications .... This way, employers
may be able to catch any problems that develop in their beginning
stages "and nip that type of harassment in the bud" as well as limit
damages stemming from potential sexual harassment claims ...."'
Whether corporations require employees to curtail their sexual
relationships altogether, to reveal them to management and subject
themselves to invasive forms of managerial intervention, or to risk having
their personal behavior and communications monitored on an ongoing
basis, these are far-reaching strategies that will profoundly affect the
individual behaviors and personalities-and the collective psyche-of
American workers. Indeed, that is precisely the effect they are intended to
have. In addition to monitoring one's e-mail and other personal
communications for any hint of sexual content or romantic intent,
employees are now being advised to take the following precautions:
1. Watch what you say. Sexual or suggestive comments should be
avoided.
2. Remember that women and men interpret remarks differently.
3. Watch your body language. Be aware of the signals you send
and how they may be interpreted. Terminate sexual vibes
immediately.
4. Keep intensity in check. Workers who cooperate in team
activities share an intimacy, and people may get different types
of intimacy confused.
265. Some lawyers are skeptical of the legal validity of love contracts, questioning whether
courts will uphold a waiver of liability for future claims of sexual harassment. See, e.g., Terms of
Engagement: Love Contracts, TRArNING, Aug. 1999, at 19; Let's Do the Love Contract? (2000),
at http://www.hrhero.com/topicsharassmentromance-harassment.shtml.
266. Greenwald, supra note 237, at 4 (quoting Joseph Gibbons, Senior Consultant, Towers
Perrin, New York, NY). Some experts doubt the practical wisdom of such contracts, seeing them
as a form of legal overregulation that risks destroying employee morale. See, e.g., Stuart
Silverstein, Employers Use Consent Form To Regulate Office Romances: Date-and-Tell Rules
May Limit Liability if an Office Fling Triggers Lawsuit, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Sept. 28,
1998, at D6. Others disagree, urging cheerfully that "employees who wish to continue their
romantic relationship and retain their current position might be delighted to sign this document.
The employer has offered a solution to their dilemma, so job satisfaction and morale increase."
Schaefer & Tudor, supra note 78, at 7.
267. Greenwald, supra note 237, at 4.
268. Id. (quoting Peter Foster, Senior Vice-President, Marsh, Inc., Boston, Mass.).
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5. Know the risks involved. An office romance can ruin a career,
cost a job and wreck a marriage.
6. Do not cross the line. The standard the courts use is whether a
reasonable person would consider the behavior abusive or
hostile.269
Although there has been too little research examining the extent to
which companies have actually adopted policies to regulate employee
dating, there is evidence that the phenomenon is fairly widespread. The
available research suggests that between 22% and 39% of companies have
written or verbal policies or clear organizational norms on workplace
romance, and that the overwhelming majority of these companies prohibit
or discourage such romance.270 The data also suggest that employees are
sensing a company disapproval of workplace relationships that goes beyond
what is expressed in organizational policies. In the 2001 SHRM survey,
21% of employees said their organizations ban workplace romance, while
only 8% of HR professionals report that their employers do so.271 Similarly,
almost half of all employees (49%) said workplace romance "should be
hidden by the parties involved," while only a third (35%) of HR
professionals said so. 27 2 The data also show that the consequences for
engaging in workplace romance can be severe: Among HR professionals
who were asked what would happen to employees who disregarded
workplace romance policies, 35% said they would be terminated, 13% cited
suspension, 7% cited demotion, 32% cited formal reprimand, 55% cited an
internal transfer, and 30% said the employees would be sent to counseling.
It is telling that only 22% said there would be no consequences
whatsoever.
273
269. Paul & Townsend, supra note 233, at 7.
270- The most widely cited estimates come from the Society for Human Resource
Management's 2001 survey. Among the 558 human resource managers who responded, 22% said
their organizations had policies on workplace romance (15% had a written policy, 5% had a
verbal policy, and 2% were in the process of drafting them). SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT.,
supra note 254, at 2, 4 chart 1. These professionals reported that, among companies with policies,
64% discouraged workplace romances and another 8% prohibited them altogether. Id. at 4. These
figures are similar to the results of the Society's 1998 survey, in which, of the 617 human resource
professionals surveyed, 27% said their organizations had policies on workplace romance (13%
had a written policy, while 14% had clear unwritten understandings). SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES.
MGMT., WORKPLACE ROMANCE SURVEY 3 (1998). In the 1998 survey, the share of company
policies that HR professionals said discouraged or prohibited romance was lower: 55%
discouraged workplace romances while another 7% prohibited them, for a total of 62%, id.,
compared to the 72% figure the professionals reported in the 2001 survey. In another widely cited
study of 175 white-collar employees, employees reported that 39% of their organizations had
policies or understandings about employee relationships-with the overwhelming majority (82%)
of those 39% banning or discouraging them. Anderson & Hunsaker, supra note 254, at 59, 61.
271. SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 254, at 4.
272. Id. at 3 tbl.1.
273. id. at 7.
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Anecdotal evidence suggests, and the available quantitative data seem
to confirm, that the number of companies with formal written policies has
risen in the last decade.274 In addition, the SHRM surveys show that,
between 1998 and 2001, training for HR professionals on how to manage
workplace romance increased by ten percent.2 75 HR professionals believe
that the numbers remain too low, arguing that "[a]ll too frequently,
organizations have tried to ignore the office romance, despite evidence of a
potentially substantial negative impact.' 276 They strongly advocate that
companies adopt express written policies to manage workplace romance.
As one legal commentator put it:
[I]n the last several years, a growing number of organizations,
including large corporations, public employers, and even law firms,
have adopted express written policies concerning office romance,
especially between supervisors and those employees whom they
supervise. An emerging consensus among business academics,
labor and employment law attorneys, human resource management
specialists, training consultants, and other personnel professionals
encourages and recommends these policies.
Moreover, the potential for claims of sexual harassment is the primary
reason that HR professionals cite for banning or discouraging workplace
romance.
278
Although it may still be a minority of companies that ban workplace
romance, it is clear that the momentum lies in this direction. In today's
legal and cultural climate, "[m]odern lovers have to be documented.
Modem lovers have to have their job assignments separated. Modem lovers
have to visit what one human resource manager referred to, with only a
274. Both a 1987 study, see Andrea Warfield et al., Co-Worker Romances: Impact on the
Work Group and on Career-Oriented Women, PERSONNEL, May 1987, at 22, 28, and a 1994
study, see Am. Mgmt. Ass'n, supra note 254, indicated that only 6% of companies surveyed had
formal written policies on employee dating. More recent surveys put the number higher, see
SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 270, at 3 (finding that 13% of workplaces surveyed
in 1998 had formal written policies on employee dating), and suggest that it may be rising, see
SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 254, at 4 (finding that 15% of workplaces surveyed
in 2001 had formal written policies on employee dating).
275. SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 254, at 9 (reporting that, in 2001, 22% of
HR professionals reported that their organizations conducted training, while in 1998, only 12%
did so).
276. Anderson & Hunsaker, supra note 254, at 63; see also Kramer, supra note 78, at 78;
Brett Chase, Risk Management: Dating Subordinates Is Widely Prohibited, AM. BANKER, June
17, 1997, at 5.
277. Kramer, supra note 78, at 78 (emphasis added).
278. In the 2001 SHRM survey, 95% of HR professionals cited a "[p]otential for claims of
sexual harassment" as a reason to ban or discourage workplace romances. In comparison, the
second most widely cited rationale, "concerns about lowered productivity by those involved in the
romance," was cited by only 46% of HR professionals. SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra
note 254, at 5.
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little irony, as the Cupid Cops. 2 79 Many companies are coming down
especially hard on what are called "power-differentiated" relationships, just
at the time when in many workplaces, hierarchies have become flatter and
more fluid, "where today's boss may be next month's co-worker, or vice
versa.
, 28°
Years ago, as we have seen, feminists called for such regulatory
measures, arguing that the only way to allow women "to work on an equal
basis with men"281 was to cleanse the workplace of sexual interactions. In
the name of eliminating sexual harassment, "frightened corporate boards
have teamed up with feminists dedicated to sexual equality and human
resource managers dedicated to harmonious office life to regulate these
affairs. As never before, your business is their business, for 40, 50, 60 or
more hours a week., 282 As one business commentator put it: "While the
purpose of... Title VII is to level the playing field and make sure that
women have equal access to a chance for success, the effect [of sexual
harassment law] has been to control significantly the visual, conversational,
and associational behaviors of employees."
283
F. Disregarding Discrimination
Underneath this avalanche of no-dating policies and love contracts,
zero-tolerance policies, self-policing, and discipline for conduct with sexual
overtones, the most fundamental goal of employment discrimination law
has been lost. Title VII should not be used to police sexuality; it was meant
to guarantee women and men equal work roles. The drive to eliminate
sexuality from the workplace has detracted from this important goal-and
may even encourage organizations to act in ways that undermine genuine
workplace equality.
At the level of the individual complaint, companies do not attempt to
determine whether the alleged sexual harassment was linked to sex
discrimination. They simply assume that any sexual conduct covered by
their policies is discriminatory or harmful. Yet, in many of the cases in
which men have been fired or disciplined for violating sexual harassment
policies, the women who were the alleged targets of the harassment did not
even object (or voiced only vague objections) to the conduct for which the
offenders were punished. In the Monterey County arbitration, for instance,
the female kitchen helper to whom the suspended financial officer brought
cookies and blew kisses testified emphatically that his behavior was "not a
279. Weiss, supra note 258, at 45.
280. Id.
281. Mead, supra note 43, at 31.
282. Weiss, supra note 258, at 45.
283. Dworkin, supra note 247, at 63.
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problem"; it was others who were allegedly offended by his actions. 284 In
the case involving Arthur Andersen, it was the woman who supervised the
flirtatious accountant-rather than the women he attempted to woo-who
seemed most uncomfortable with his conduct.285 Similarly, in American
Mail-Well Envelope, the leadman was suspended because he failed to
discipline some men for viewing a sexually explicit magazine, despite the
fact that no women were even exposed to it.286 In these and other cases,
companies simply equated sexual content with sex discrimination-without
bothering even to inquire into whether the offending conduct was intended
or used to exclude women or otherwise interfere with their work
opportunities on the basis of their sex.
At the organizational level, sexual harassment policies have taken on a
life of their own, divorced from the larger goal of dismantling sex
discrimination. 287 As I have emphasized above and discuss more fully
below, 288 sex harassment is integrally linked to such sex segregation in
employment. Sex segregation structures work environments in which
harassment flourishes because numerical dominance encourages male job
incumbents to associate their work with masculinity and to police their jobs
by treating women and gender-nonconforming men as "different" and out
of place. By the same token, sex harassment preserves segregation by
driving away or denigrating the newcomers who would integrate the job.289
As a tool of segregation, sex harassment assumes many forms-not all of
which can be easily or even best characterized as "sexual" in content or
design.29 °
Despite this linkage between sex harassment and sex segregation, few
companies are taking steps to incorporate their sex harassment policies into
more comprehensive plans to integrate women equally into all levels of the
organization. Indeed, most experts do not even see harassment as a problem
that might be alleviated by taking steps to achieve gender integration.
Among consultants, the typical approach is represented by Beverly R.
Davis, a consultant in San Diego, who regards sex harassment as unrelated
to the larger structural forms of discrimination that result in segregation.
When asked if she advises clients about how to prevent such forms of
discrimination (in hiring, promotion, assignment, training, evaluation, pay,
and the like), she replied, "Every company should have an EEOC policy.
Just a short one-pager." 29 1 In response to a follow-up question about
284. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 20.
288. See infra notes 317-329 and accompanying text.
289. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1755-68.
290. See id. at 1762-74.
291. Davis Interview, supra note 113.
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whether she advises companies about how to implement valid affirmative
action programs or otherwise achieve diversity in their workplaces, she
stated, "I haven't gotten into that., 292  Not surprisingly, her
recommendations for how to prevent harassment do not include
recommendations for how to prevent other forms of sex discrimination
(such as discrimination in hiring, promotion, training, and evaluation).
Indeed, when asked if she believes sex harassment is linked to any of these
other structural forms of discrimination, she said, "No.,
2 93
Instead, like a number of other consultants interviewed, Davis saw
harassment as a "power issue" that afflicts individual men. "It's usually a
coworker, male against female thing.... [I]t's a way to pick on that
employee," a way of saying, "'I'm better than you, I have power over
you.' 294 Davis did believe harassment was more prevalent in the
manufacturing sector, even when the jobs were "woman-dominated," but
she attributed this to the education level and "locker-room" mentality of the
men who work there, rather than to the sex composition or sexist structure
295
of manufacturing job settings. Indeed, when asked explicitly whether she
thought the degree of sex segregation in the job or work setting makes any
difference to the prevalence of harassment or the type of harassment that
occurs, she said, "No., 2 9 6 And, when asked whether her recommendations
for how to prevent harassment ever vary with the sex composition of the
job or work setting, she said, "No," they are "the same, always.,
297
Once harassment is attributed to the psychosexual proclivities of
individual male workers or the external cultural insensitivities of the men as
a group, rather than linked to larger organizational structures, it makes
sense to deal with it through stand-alone policies that regulate sexual
conduct through the threat (and reality) of employer discipline. Throughout
America, as we have seen, companies seek to prevent harassment by
prohibiting various forms of sexual conduct, conducting training sessions to
"sensitize" supervisors and workers, and warning employees of the





295. This attribution of harassment in the manufacturing sector to the education level or
mentality of the men who worked there may reflect an unconscious class bias. See, e.g., Nancy S.
Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1201-04, 1209 (1990) (arguing that judicial decisions
reflect an implicit assumption that working-class men are less civilized and more sexist); see also
Christine L. Williams & Dana M. Britton, Sexuality and Work, in INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL
PROBLEMS I, 13 (Craig Calhoun & George Ritzer eds., 1995) (discussing the role of sexual banter
in the work cultures of working-class men).
296. Davis Interview, supra note 113.
297. Id.
298. See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable
Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE
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Companies seek to remedy harassment by setting up machinery to process
individual complaints and by undertaking investigations to identify and
punish the harassers, one by one.
Thus, regardless of whether one adopts an individual-bad-actor,
sexualized understanding of harassment or a group-based cultural
difference approach, there is no need to inquire whether the harassment
serves or is served by larger patterns of sex discrimination: The presence of
sex in the workplace is simply deemed discriminatory. Indeed, to the extent
that segregation comes into the picture at all, it is not seen as a potential
cause of the harassment, but instead as a potential solution. If the presence
of sex is the problem, then one way to deal with it is to separate "the sexes."
In the wake of sexual harassment at the army-training facility at Aberdeen,
for example, an advisory committee appointed by the Secretary of Defense
and headed by former senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker responded with a
recommendation to sex-segregate basic training in the services.299
Ironically, the committee recommended this strategy as a substitute for
another simplistic segregationist measure-the "no talk, no touch rule"--
that Army trainers had seized upon in an effort to eliminate sexual
misconduct among male-female recruits. 300 At a more individual level,
sociologists have shown that men sometimes use the fear of women falsely
accusing them of sexual harassment as an excuse for excluding women
altogether.30 '
Although Title VII forbids employers subject to its command from
using such segregationist strategies formally, there are signs that some
employers may resort to them informally in an effort to stave off sexual
harassment liability. In New Haven, Connecticut, for example, one
construction company reportedly instructs its (all-male) employees to
adhere to a "five-second rule," which prohibits the men from even looking
at a woman for more than the allotted time.3 °2 According to other sources,
ROCK L. REV. 147, 161-62 (2001) [hereinafter Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches] (observing that
"sexual harassment training is more ubiquitous than ever," and showing how the courts rely on it
in assessing employer liability and as a strategy for remedying proven harassment); Susan Bisom-
Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the
Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3 nn.6-7 (2001) (citing a survey that shows that 55% of
organizations provide employee training to help avoid litigation, and that consultants' revenue
from sexual harassment training is about $10 billion a year); Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 58, at 2
(reporting that in a sample of 389 employers contacted in 1997, 95% had grievance procedures,
and 70% had training programs).
299. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENDER-INTEGRATED TRAINING
AND RELATED ISSUES TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 5 (1997), at http://www.defenselink.mil/
pubs/git/report.html.
300. Id. at 14.
301. See Beth A. Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor, and Harassment in the
Everyday Work World, 25 LAW& SOC. INQUIRY 1151, 1177-78 (2000) (citing examples).
302. Conversation with Amy Cuneo, in Woodbridge, Conn. (Jan. 1998) (reporting on a
policy of a construction firm at which her relative worked).
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companies who send delegates to business conventions are now advised to
place their male and female employees in rooms on different floors and to
not allow staff meetings to take place in employees' hotel rooms.30 3 In
addition, the human resources literature counsels supervisors that, in order
to prevent accusations or even the appearance of sexual harassment, they
should avoid meeting with their subordinates of a different sex alone behind
closed doors.3 °4 This last piece of advice is now so ubiquitous that it has
become known as the "open door policy"-in an ironic twist on the old
meaning of the term, which referred to a policy of allowing employees
complete access to higher-ups. 305
In the name of preventing sexual harassment, these segregationist
policies turn Title VII on its head. If male supervisors cannot meet with
their female subordinates in private settings, how will women ever gain
access to the training and mentoring needed to succeed? If female workers
cannot travel and do business with their male coworkers as equals, how will
women ever become valued organizational players? If women can't be
trained and treated equally for jobs requiring close proximity and trust, who
will want to hire or promote them for those positions?
In a world in which companies fear the large damage awards and
adverse publicity they associate with sexual harassment more than they fear
liability for more traditional forms of discrimination, and in which
managers have traditionally associated sexuality with disruption even in the
absence of legal liability, it is not surprising that corporate America is
303. See, e.g., Walter Olson, Who'd Be a Boss in the USA?, INDEP. BUS. WKLY. (Auckland),
Dec. 2, 1998, 1998 WL 28591743.
304. For example, the University of Illinois informs its instructors they can "help eliminate
sexual harassment or an appearance of sexual harassment in several ways":
Strictly avoid personal relationships with any of your students....
During student conferences, it is a good idea to leave the door open. Keep your
office area free from pictures, cartoons and other artifacts with predominately sexual
themes. Respect a student's personal space. Do not put your arm around a student or
otherwise touch a student in a manner that might be considered even slightly offensive.
OFF. OF INSTRUCTIONAL RES., HANDBOOK FOR TEACHING ASSISTANTS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS 13-14, at http://www.oir.uiuc.edu/Did/docs/pdf files/handbook.pdf (last visited Mar. 20,
2003); see also Univ. Ombudsman, Sexual Harassment at Binghamton University: Definition,
Policy, Response and Prevention: A Guide for Students, Faculty, and Staff at Binghamton
University, at http://ombudsman.binghamton.edu/sexualharassment.htm (last visited Mar. 20,
2003). There are even signs that, in foreign settings, sexual harassment has been boiled down to
this open-door policy. See, e.g., Taken for a Ride, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS INT'L, Aug. 1, 2000,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Magazine Stories, Combined File (reporting that, as part of the process of
merging Daimler-Benz and Chrysler, "[tihe Germans took a course on the meaning of sexual
harassment in the U.S. work environment," namely, "[a] German male should always keep the
door open when meeting with an American female").
305. As a British female journalist complained in connection with the sex-segregated
character of Washington officialdom, "Try inviting a married man for lunch or a drink, and as
often as not he brings an 'alibi' in the shape of his secretary or his wife. What you may have heard
about office doors being kept open during one-on-one male-female meetings is true." Mary
Dcjevsky, In Foreign Parts: Man 's Town, USA, Stirs the Bra-Burner in Me, INDEPENDENT
(London), July 28, 2001, at 16.
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dealing with sexual harassment in ways that do not take into account (and
may sometimes even intensify) larger patterns of sex discrimination and
segregation on the job.30 6 But divorcing sexuality from the larger
organizational context-including the gender context-is a mistake, as the
next Part demonstrates.
IV. THE TROUBLE WITH THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
A. Essentializing Sexuality
In the current approach to sex harassment, as we have seen, companies
adopt policies that describe and prohibit certain forms of sexual conduct,
and threaten to punish those who fail to comply. Throughout the country,
these policies look remarkably similar, regardless of the history, structure,
or culture of the firm. Within each company, managers are encouraged to
treat incidents of sexual conduct with disapproval, without regard to the
context in which it occurs; only the subjective offense of the victim is to be
taken into account. This approach to sexual harassment assumes that there
is a stable body of "sexual" conduct that can be identified and proscribed in
advance, regardless of the context, and that its presence in the workplace
creates organizational disorder and gender disadvantage regardless of the
larger structure and culture of the organization.3 °7 Those assumptions are
linked to a larger theoretical perspective about sexuality that many
organizational theorists, mainstream feminists, and modem managers have
all taken for granted-a perspective that recent theoretical and empirical
research calls into question.
In classical organizational theory, sexuality is seen as an irrational force
that disrupts the smooth functioning of the organization. In radical feminist
thought, sexuality is defined as an eroticized desire to dominate women that
subverts the achievement of gender equality. In modem organizational
theory and practice, sexuality is depicted as an erotic attraction that can
disrupt productivity, corrupt the professionalism of the workplace, and
306. Cf Edelman et al., supra note 74 (documenting the parallel transition from a justice-
oriented demand for affirmative action to a productivity-oriented emphasis on functional diversity
within organizations).
307. It is not only legal feminists and managers who have taken this acontextual, individual-
bad-actor, sexualized view of harassment: Many social scientists have also. Much of the empirical
research on sexual harassment has been conducted from this perspective. See Schultz, supra note
5, at 1688 n.13 (listing sources); Christine L. Williams, Sexual Harassment in Organizations: A
Critique of Current Research and Policy, 1 SEXUALITY & CULTURE 19 (1997). This is not
surprising, since most of the research has been conducted by psychologists, who see individuals
rather than organizations as the primary unit of analysis. From within sociology and
organizational theory, a new literature is emerging that challenges this view. See generally
Schultz, supra note 5 (urging attention to the larger organizational context in evaluating sexual
conduct); Williams, supra, at 27-32 (same).
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create costly liability. Yet, regardless of whether sexuality is perceived as
leading to organizational disorder, gender disadvantage, or the disruption of
productivity, all three theories assume that there is something called "the
sexual" that preexists and can be separated from the organizations from
which it is to be banished. It is this reified understanding of sexuality that
enables feminists and managers to believe that sexual harassment-or even
"sexual" conduct-can be pinned down and prohibited in advance, in a
uniform way, across all organizational contexts. It is this essentialist
understanding of sexuality as a preexisting "property" of individuals that
allows managers to believe they can purge the workplace of sexuality by
disciplining-or ultimately ejecting-the individual men or clusters of men
who carry it with them in their hearts (and loins).
Even the libertarian critics of sexual harassment law subscribe to this
essentialist view of sexuality. The difference is that they believe that we
must carve out and protect a "private" realm in which individuals can be
free to express their own individual sexuality. In this body of work,
sexuality is treated as a private property of individuals that commands
respect in the law. In the work of law professor Kingsley Browne, for
example, the First Amendment stands as a shield for private sexual
expression, even when it is expressed in the quintessentially public realm of
the workplace.30 8 Similarly, law professor Mark Hager argues that
antidiscrimination law should not be allowed to place blanket constraints on
male employees' sexuality; instead, abuses of individual women's sexuality
should be dealt with through private tort law.309 This perspective perhaps
finds its most thoughtful expression in the work of legal scholar and
commentator Jeffrey Rosen, who argues explicitly that sexuality is a private
matter that individuals deserve to have shielded from public scrutiny;310
from this perspective, he proposes privacy protections for both harassers
and harassees whose sexual selves are exposed to the glaring scrutiny of
what he calls the unwanted gaze.1
Today, among sophisticated theorists of sexuality, this essentialist view
is largely discredited. Most adopt a Foucauldian view of sexuality, treating
308. See Browne, supra note 7, at 491-96; see also YOUNG, supra note 7, at 174 ("Life isn't
fair, but must the law be unfair as well, allowing the women who reject [an undesirable man] to
make his attempts at courtship illegal?").
309. Hager, supra note 66, at 376-77.
310. See ROSEN, supra note 7, at 11, 24.
311. See, e.g., id. at 115 ("In my view, . the indignity of hostile environment harassment
can often be defined more precisely, as an invasion of privacy."). Rosen also notes:
It is unfortunate, in a liberal society, that sexual expression without tangible
employment consequences ... must be monitored by employers and punished by the
state.... [T]he courts could help to rebuild enclaves of privacy in public spaces for
people to relax, to reveal different sides of themselves in different contexts, to misjudge
each other-in short, to be human.
Id. at 127.
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it as a socially constructed force that circulates complexly across and within
human psyches and institutions, and operates as a resource that people
simultaneously wield, and yield to, as a form of discipline. 3 12 Building on
such Foucauldian views, organizational sociologists have added a nuanced
understanding of work and workplaces to develop a new understanding of
organizational sexuality." 3 Scholarship in this new tradition insists that
sexuality is not a static "something" that individuals bring with them into
the workplace, but instead is better understood as a complexly created,
constantly renegotiated process or "achievement" of organizational life.314
At the simplest level, theorists caution, sexuality is not a biological essence
that resides in an individual's body, but is instead a relational phenomenon
that is created within social networks. Since work is not simply a means of
production, but also an intensely social activity, it is difficult to separate
sexuality from work. Put simply, work can be sexy. Yet, at a more complex
level, sexuality cannot even be understood to be embodied in a specific
activity or set of practices, but is instead a "diverse and diffuse process"
that managers and employees actively construct within the larger
constraints of organizational structure.31 5  To quote two leading
organizational theorists, Gibson Burrell and Jeff Hearn, sexuality is "an
ordinary and frequent public process rather than an extraordinary feature of
private life."
'3 16
From this perspective it becomes clear that, contrary to the approach
taken in most policies, sexual harassment cannot be understood as a list of
specific "sexual" behaviors that can be defined and forbidden in advance,
regardless of the circumstances. The meanings most employees attach to
sexual behaviors in the workplace-indeed, even whether those behaviors
are viewed as "sexual"-vary in systematic ways depending on the
organizational context. Sexuality assumes form and meaning only in
particular work cultures-cultures that help determine such things as
312. For the master source, see 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN
INTRODUCTION 103-07 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1978) (1976). For others in this
tradition, see, for example, MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS,
AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 178-79 (1999); JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY 25 (1986); and
Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW (Catharine A.
MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds., forthcoming 2004).
313. For examples of work in this tradition, see SILVIA GHERARD1, GENDER, SYMBOLISM
AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES 57-66 (1995); JEFF HEARN & WENDY PARKIN, SEX AT WORK:
THE POWER AND PARADOX OF ORGANIZATION SEXUALITY (1987); ROSEMARY PRINGLE,
SECRETARIES TALK (1988); Burrell, supra note 17; Gibson Burrell & Jeff Heam, The Sexuality of
Organization, in THE SEXUALITY OF ORGANIZATION I (Jeff Heam et at. eds., 1989); and
Christine L. Williams et al., Sexuality in the Workplace: Organizational Control, Sexual
Harassment, and the Pursuit of Pleasure, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 73 (1999).
314. See, e.g., Linda Van Leuven, "I Need a Screw ": Workplace Sexualization as an
lnteractional Achievement, in EVERYDAY INEQUALITIES: CRITICAL INQUIRIES 73, 75 (Jodi
O'Brien & Judith A. Howard eds., 1998).
315. See Burrell & Heam, supra note 313, at 13.
316. Id.
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whether people are outgoing or guarded with each other, or whether they
relate to each other out of a spirit of competition or cooperation. Employees
have some role in creating those cultures. Yet, work cultures are always
shaped within the context of larger organizational structures-structures
that determine such things as the way jobs are defined and organized, their
pay and working conditions, the demographics of those who do the jobs,
and the authority granted to those who supervise them. These structures are
established largely by management. As a result, employees can help shape
the existence and meaning of sexual conduct, but this process occurs in the
context of larger structures not of their own choosing. In fact, employees
often create sexualized work cultures to respond to some set of needs that
are established by the nature of their work or the way it has been structured
by management. Contrary to conventional understandings, then, the
"sexual" does not always signify desire for an erotic liaison. Nor does the
presence of sexuality necessarily signal sexism. Sometimes employees
resort to sexuality to serve more banal (though equally important) purposes,
such as creating solidarity, relieving stress, or enlivening a deadening job.
To understand how sexuality operates in the workplace, we must bring
larger work structures-including gender-back into view.
B. Abstracting Sexuality from the Larger
Organizational Context
For purposes of understanding sex harassment, gender is a crucial
component of the workplace structure that creates the cultures in which
sexuality is formed and understood. It turns out that the very same sexual
behaviors can be-and are-understood by employees very differently
depending on whether they occur in a work setting in which women have
significant responsibility and influence, or whether they occur in a less
egalitarian setting. Thus, contrary to feminist orthodoxy and the new
management line, sex in the workplace is not always experienced by
women as discriminatory or disadvantageous. A lot depends on the extent
to which women have been integrated into equal positions of responsibility
and authority in the job and the firm.
By now, we know what is likely to happen when women have not been
integrated into equal positions of responsibility and authority. Twenty-five
years of social science research has documented the hostility and abuse that
frequently await the first women to enter male-dominated domains. 31 7 In
317. A large body of research shows that women who work in male-dominated job settings
are more likely than other women to report hostility and harassment at work. See, e.g., U.S. MERIT
SYS. PROT. RD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 20 (1988); U.S. MERIT
SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 51-52
(1981); Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Sexual Harassment in
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these highly imbalanced settings, the dominant group closes ranks to
protect its own resources and status by exaggerating its own commonality
and stereotyping the newcomers as different and out of place.318 Thus, in
sex-segregated settings, it is foreseeable that some male workers will seek
to shore up the masculine content and image of their jobs (and their own
threatened sense of identity) by taking actions to drive women away or
brand them as inferior." 9 In many (though not all) such job settings, the
dominant men will resort to forms of harassment that are sexualized in
content. They will create sexist work cultures in which they wield sexuality
as a weapon to drive away or disenfranchise women and gender-
nonconforming men.
320
Organizations: A Test of an Integrated Model, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 578, 584 (1997); Barbara
A. Gutek & Bruce Morasch, Sex Ratios, Sex-Role Spillover, and Sexual Harassment of Women at
Work, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES 67-68 (1982); Susan Ehrlich Martin, Sexual Harassment: The Link
Joining Gender Stratification, Sexuality, and Women's Economic Status, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVE 22, 61 (Jo Freeman ed., 5th ed. 1995); Sandy Welsh, Gender and Sexual
Harassment, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 169, 178-80 (1999). Note that with the exception of Fitzgerald's,
none of these studies attempts to capture nonsexual forms of sex-based harassment.
318. There is a voluminous social science literature showing the link between a group's
numerical representation (or "token" status) in an occupation or job setting and the incidence of
stereotyping, discrimination, and harassment that the group experiences from the dominant group.
This research began with sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kanter's work theorizing the importance of
skewed sex ratios in her classic book, Men and Women of the Corporation. See KANTER, supra
note 13, at 206-42. Kanter hypothesized that, when a group is severely underrepresented in a job
setting, "[t]hc numerically dominant types also control the group and its culture in enough ways to
be labeled 'dominants.' The few of another type in a skewed group can appropriately be called
'tokens,' for.., they are often treated as representatives of their category, as symbols rather than
individuals." Id. at 208.
Since Kanter's work, a large body of literature has confirmed the link between numerical
scarcity and discriminatory treatment and explored its ramifications. For summaries of the
literature, see Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of
Respondent, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167) (summarizing
psychological research and finding that women who work in settings in which they comprise less
than fifteen percent of the population are more likely than others to experience sex discrimination,
that the discrimination is more intense, and that such "women are likely to be penalized");
Elizabeth Chambliss & Christopher Uggen, Men and Women of Elite Law Firms: Reevaluating
Kanter's Legacy, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 41, 43-48, 61-63 (2000) (reviewing literature testing
Kanter's thesis and finding that it applies in elite law firms); Susan Fiske & Peter Glick,
Ambivalence and Stereotypes Cause Sexual Harassment: A Theory with Implications for
Organizational Change, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 97, 103-10 (1995) (discussing how sex stereotyping
operates in employment settings that are sex-segregated); and Welsh, supra note 317, at 179-80
(summarizing sociological literature). But cf Janice D. Yoder, Rethinking Tokenism: Looking
Beyond Numbers, 5 GENDER & SOC'Y 178, 180-83 (1991) (suggesting that this literature does not
necessarily imply, in gender-neutral fashion, that men who occupy token status in female-
dominated jobs will experience comparable levels of harassment and discrimination because
asymmetrical incentives apply).
319. See Fiske & Glick, supra note 318, at 105 ("Successful performance by women in these
jobs undermines ... sources of male gender-related self-esteem. If a woman can do the job, the
male sense of superiority is effectively punctured."); Schultz, supra note 5, at 1756-69 (providing
a detailed analysis and numerous examples of this phenomenon).
320. See Quinn, supra note 301, at 1159 (finding that in a case study of how women respond
to hostile work environment harassment, including sexual forms of humor, "the specific
organizational context did not prove as salient to an understanding of the particular tactics
analyzed as the gender composition of the workplace context"); Schultz, supra note 5, at 1766
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Just as horizontal sex-segregation encourages the use of sexuality as a
tool of hostility and exclusion in male-dominated settings, research
suggests that vertical segregation-or the tendency of women to be
concentrated in low-level positions that are supervised by men-may be
especially salient in contributing to the use of sexuality against women
in female-dominated jobs,32 1 who also experience a great deal of
harassment.32 2 Whereas women in male-dominated jobs are viewed as
being "out of place" in a man's job, women in female-dominated jobs are
viewed as having stepped out of their proper place as women if they refuse
to comply with the stereotypically feminine behavior expected of those who
hold their jobs.323 In such settings, male bosses sometimes subject women
to demands for sexual favors 32 4 and other non-job-related services (such as
serving food and cleaning up), to demeaning and abusive comments linked
to their womanhood, and to paternalistic forms of control and authority that
(discussing the use of sexual overtures, sexual taunting, and mockery as forms of harassment that
are used to mark women as different and less competent); see also Nancy DiTomaso, Sexuality in
the Workplace: Discrimination and Harassment, in THE SEXUALITY OF ORGANIZATION, supra
note 313, at 71, 89 (speculating that many men may resort to nonconforming sexuality as a means
of harassment because, for women, in our culture, sexuality is supposed to remain a private
matter, so by calling attention to a woman's sexuality or threatening to make it public, men can
powerfully restrain women's ability to fight back).
For a vivid example of how sexuality can be used to denigrate and drive away women who
work in a male-dominated field, see Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486
(M.D. Fla. 1991); and infra text accompanying notes 372-377 (discussing Robinson). For another
example, see Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 755 F.2d
913 (2d Cir. 1985). Judge Sifion's opinion describes in detail how the female plaintiffs, recently
admitted to the Fire Department after a discrimination lawsuit, "were subjected.., to extensive
sexual abuse in the form of unimpeded hazing." Id. Judge Sifton recognized that these acts of
sexual assault and ridicule were part of a larger campaign of hostility and discrimination designed
to negatively affect the women's training and evaluation, stemming from the men's desire to
preserve firefighting as an all-male preserve. Id.
321. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 39, at 9 (observing that "[v]ertical stratification
means that women tend to be in low-ranking positions, dependent upon the approval and good
will of male superordinates for hiring, retention and advancement" and that "[b]eing at the mercy
of male supervisors adds direct economic clout to male sexual demands"); Peggy Cmll, Searching
for the Causes of Sexual Harassment: An Examination of Two Prototypes, in HIDDEN ASPECTS OF
WOMEN'S WORK 225, 232-35 (Christine Bose et al. eds., 1987).
322. Some studies suggest that women in female-dominated jobs experience high levels of
harassment, with some forms approximating those experienced by women in male-dominated
jobs, at least where the women have frequent interaction with men in their larger work
environments. See GUTEK, supra note 47, at 140-45, 141 tbl.1, 143 tbl.2; James E. Gruber, The
Impact of Male Work Environments and Organizational Policies on Women's Experiences of
Sexual Harassment, 12 GENDER & SOC'Y 301, 311 (1998).
323. See Crull, supra note 321, at 235.
324, See Suzanne C. Carothers & Peggy Crull, Contrasting Sexual Harassment in Female-
and Male-Dominated Occupations, in MY TROUBLES ARE GOING TO HAVE TROUBLE WITH ME:
EVERYDAY TRIALS AND TRIUMPHS OF WOMAEN WORKERS 219, 222 (Karen Brodkin Sacks &
Dorothy Remy eds., 1984) (observing that women in female-dominated occupations often
experience "subtle compliments and hints for dates that turned into work sabotage and sometimes
job loss when turned down"). For an example of such retaliation, see Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.
Supp. 654, 656, 662 (D.D.C. 1976) (involving a male boss who harassed, criticized, belittled, and
finally terminated a female employee after she declined his sexual advances).
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would not be imposed on men.3 25 In addition, employers often exploit
women's sexuality by making it an instrument of managerial control or by
building sexualized requirements directly into the job.326
In addition to these clear-cut male/female problems, sex-segregated
structures can foster other, cross-cutting forms of sexual harassment.
Evidence shows that, in traditionally male-dominated settings, men who do
not conform to the job's idealized image of masculinity often threaten the
self-image of dominant male workers, just as women do, and are subjected
to virulent sex-based harassment in which their sexuality is often
highlighted.327 Furthermore, research suggests that in these male-dominated
325. For examples of such phenomena, see Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1495 (1 1th Cir.
1995) (involving male supervisor at a medical facility who acted professionally with male
workers, but would yell, throw objects, and insult the female employees, including telling them
that "women belonged barefoot and pregnant" and that they "must prove to him that they were not
incompetent"); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1507-08 (9th Cir. 1989) (involving hotel
housekeepers who were subjected to demeaning treatment, including comments that the
supervisor did not like "stupid women who have kids"); and Cline v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto
Lease, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 923, 925-26 (N.D. I11. 1991) (involving female collections agents whose
boss belittled their dress and appearance, slapped and hit them, and confiscated their personal
credit cards).
326. For an analysis and review of some of the relevant literature, see Williams & Britton,
supra note 295, at 6-9. See also Peta Tancred-Sheriff, Gender, Sexuality and the Labour Process,
in THE SEXUALITY OF ORGANIZATION, supra note 313, at 45, 54 (showing that "[t]he frequent
gender contrast between those occupying managerial positions and those in adjunct control
positions facilitates the use of sexuality in order to maintain control"). For some examples, see
Meika Loe, Working for Men-at the Intersection of Power, Gender, and Sexuality, 66 Soc.
INQUIRY 399 (1996) (analyzing a restaurant like Hooters, in which young women's sexuality is
explicitly exploited in order to attract customers); and Leslie Salzinger, Manufacturing Sexual
Subjects: "Harassment, " Desire and Discipline on a Macquiladora Shopfloor, I ETHNOGRAPHY
67 (2000) (analyzing a Mexican export-processing plant in which sexuality is mobilized as a
means of controlling women workers).
327. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1774-79. The evidence is more mixed about the experience
of men who work in female-dominated jobs. Although some women may seek to protect the
perceived femininity of their work from incursion by men, such a reaction is unlikely to be
widespread-not because women are more virtuous than men, but because men's and women's
structural incentives with respect to their work are not symmetrical. Whereas men in male-
dominated jobs may worry that an influx of women will lead to a decrease in pay or status,
women in female-dominated jobs have reason to believe that an influx of men will lead to an
increase. Thus, it is not surprising that some studies have found that men who occupy token status
in female-dominated work settings do not experience hostile work environment harassment
comparable to that encountered by their female counterparts working in male-dominated settings.
For examples of such work, see Yoder, supra note 318, and studies cited therein. See also
PRINGLE, supra note 313, at 78-82 (discussing the experience of male secretaries working for
female supervisors); CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK: WOMEN AND
MEN IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS 88-130 (1989) (discussing the experience of male
nurses). Some exceptions no doubt exist. See, e.g., Jane Gross, Now Look Who's Taunting, Now
Look Who's Suing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1995, § 4 (Week in Review), at I (describing a hostile
work environment case brought by male employees of a Jenny Craig weight-loss center, who
claimed that their female supervisor forced them to perform traditionally male activities, like
changing tires, as part of a general campaign of gender harassment). There is ample evidence that
men who work in certain traditionally female-dominated jobs are typically presumed to be gay or
sexually predatory; they may be harassed on the basis of such presumptions about their sexuality.
See CHRISTINE L. WILLIAMS, STILL A MAN'S WORLD 101 (1995) (showing that men who work in
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settings, the dynamics of tokenism can cause women colleagues to disavow
and undercut each other in an attempt to gain the approval of their male
superiors.328 Even where women work in fairly well-integrated jobs, the
existence of a male-dominated supervisory structure can lead women to see
each other in more negative, sex-stereotyped terms and to behave
seductively in order to curry favor with senior men.3 29 Other research has
shown the importance of paying attention to race in sex-segregated
settings.330 Racial stereotypes about women of color's sexual
permissiveness, combined with their isolation and structural vulnerability in
their jobs, may make them particularly likely to be subjected to sexualized
forms of hostility and abuse.
33
'
As disheartening as this research is, it does have a hopeful implication:
If highly segregated environments foster the use of sexuality as a weapon of
gender-based intimidation and exclusion, it stands to reason that more
integrated, egalitarian workplaces hold promise for creating less
threatening-and perhaps even pleasurable--deployments of sexuality. In
fact, this is a logical corollary to the theory of tokenism; thus, many major
scholars who have contributed to the literature agree that one of the most
effective ways to minimize sex harassment and abuse, including hostile
uses of sexuality, and to create better climates for women is to integrate
nursing, librarianship, social work, and elementary school teaching are often subject to such
biases).
328. See KANTER, supra note 13, at 228-29, 237-38 (explaining how, in male-dominated
settings, gender dynamics work to defeat potential alliances among women).
329. Harvard Business School Professor Robin Ely studied law firms in which women were
40% of the associates. She compared peer relationships among women associates who worked in
firms with highly male-dominated partnerships (those with less than 5% women) to peer
relationships among those who worked in firms with somewhat more-integrated partnerships
(15% women). She found that the women who worked in the more-segregated firms were more
likely to see other women in negative, sex-stereotyped terms and to experience their relationships
with each other as competitive in ways that inhibited their ability to work together. See Robin J.
Ely, The Effects of Organizational Demographics and Social Identity on Relationships Among
Professional Women, 39 ADMIN. Sc. Q. 203 (1994); see also C.L. Ridgeway, Gender Differences
in Task Groups: A Status and Legitimacy Account, in STATUS GENERALIZATION: NEW THEORY
AND RESEARCH 188 (Murray Webster & Martha Foschi eds., 1988). The women in more-
integrated firms were less likely to hold rigid gender stereotypes about themselves and other
women, and were more confident that expressing their individuality would contribute to their
success. In addition, they felt less need to behave seductively in order to curry favor with senior
men and less pressure to highlight their sexuality generally. See Robin J. Ely, The Power in
Demography: Women's Social Constructions of Gender Identity at Work, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J.
589, 617-18 (1995) [hereinafter Ely, The Power of Demography].
330. See Tanya Kateri Hernndez, Sexual Harassment and Racial Disparity: The Mutual
Construction of Gender and Race, 4 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 183, 189-94 (2001) (reviewing the
relevant data and literature showing that women of color report and may experience higher
instances of sexual harassment than white women); see also James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Blue-
Collar Blues: The Sexual Harassment of Women Autoworkers, 9 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 271,
284-85 (1982) (reporting in a study of women who work on the auto assembly line that Black
women were more severely and more frequently harassed).
331. See, e.g., Hemrrndez, supra note 330, at 194-96, 212-16 (discussing this phenomenon
and analyzing relevant literature).
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them fully and equally into all levels of the organization.332 Where women
are present in sufficient numbers, they should have the numbers, and
therefore the power, to dispel stereotypes, resist harassment, and help shape
their workplaces' cultures and norms about sexuality along more
empowering lines.
There is some empirical evidence that supports this view.333 For
example, Barbara Gutek's path-breaking book, Sex and the Workplace,
reports that women who work in integrated occupations and jobs are less
likely than other women to report harmful forms of sexual conduct
(including insulting comments, looks or gestures, sexual touching, or
required dating or sex in their jobs), even where the larger work group with
whom they interacted was mostly men.334 Frequent sexual talk and joking
occurs as often as it does in male-dominated occupations and jobs,335 but
women do not experience it as harassment. In these sex-integrated
occupations and jobs, sex harassment virtually ceases to be a problem. 336
Similarly, research by organizational behavior scholar Robin Ely shows
that, even where women already work in relatively integrated fields,
increasing the numbers of women in supervisory positions leads to less sex
stereotyping and leaves junior women feeling less pressured to cater to
332. See KANTER, supra note 13, at 242 (arguing that "there is also a strong case that can be
made for number-balancing as a worthwhile goal in itself, because, inside the organization,
relative numbers can play a large part in [organizational] outcomes"); Fiske & Glick, supra note
318, at 111 ("Clearly, the long-term remedy is to increase the numbers of the underrepresented
sex."); see also GUTEK, supra note 47, at 171-72 (recommending "sexual integration ofjobs at all
levels [to] eventually reduce the amount of sex role spillover in sexually skewed work units and
the amount of sexual harassment"). For a different explanation of why integration will reduce
harassment, see John Markert, It Ain't Going Away: The New Face of Sexual Harassment, Paper
Presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Ill., Aug. 2002, at
5-6 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing from a communications perspective
that sex-integrated work settings have fewer sex harassment problems because "the sexes in these
environments have learned how to relate to one another," and therefore "the risk of
misunderstanding or misinterpreting an off-hand sexual remark is greatly reduced").
333. It is worth noting that none of the systematic empirical studies I cite here involve
perfectly sex-integrated work settings, probably because there are few, if any, such environments
to study. Cf. Ely, The Power of Demography, supra note 329, at 597 (explaining that she could
not increase the ratio of women among partners in law firms to more than 15%, because that
figure "marked the upper portion of the distribution of firms on this dimension"). Instead, they
compare women in highly sex-segregated work settings to those in relatively more integrated
ones.
334. See GUTEK, supra note 47, at 141 tbl. 1.
335. See id. at 143 tbl.2 (reporting that 28.4% of women in male-dominated occupations andjobs say their workplaces are characterized by "frequent sexual talk and joking," and a virtually
identical 28.2% of women in integrated employment do also). Interestingly, Gutek also reports
that women in integrated occupations and jobs were far more likely to report that their
organizations accepted dating among employees. See id. (reporting a 67.9% level for integrated
occupations and jobs, but only 51.2% for male-dominated ones and 52.2% for female-dominated
ones).
336. Id. (reporting that 9.0% of the women in male-dominated occupations and jobs say
sexual harassment is a major problem at work, and 5. 1% of the women in female-dominated
occupations and jobs whose larger work group was mostly male do, but 0% of those in integrated
occupations and jobs do).
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senior men's sexual needs and more free to express their sexuality as they
see fit.
337
In addition to the empirical studies, a growing body of qualitative
research suggests that in more gender-integrated or egalitarian work
settings, women have the capacity to help forge the shape and meaning of
sexual interaction-perhaps because their numerical strength gives them the
power to contribute to setting limits on what is considered acceptable
behavior. As a result, they are often able to participate and take pleasure in
sexual interactions.
Consider sociologists Kirsten Dellinger and Christine Williams's vivid
account of sexual norms in the editorial departments of a pornographic
magazine aimed at men, which the authors refer to as Gentleman's
Sophisticate (GS), and a feminist magazine aimed at women, which they
call Womyn. 338 At Womyn, all of the eighteen members of the editorial staff,
including top management, are women, and at Gentleman's Sophisticate,
six of the twelve editors (although none of the top managers) are women.339
Womyn is a female-only magazine explicitly devoted to advancing a
feminist agenda, while Gentleman's Sophisticate is a gender-integrated,
though male-headed, publication devoted to mainstream masculine
heterosexual pleasure.
In the "dorm room" culture of Womyn, management encourages the
staff to feel they are doing more than "just a job"; they have joined a
"sisterhood., 340 Being an editor requires people to think and talk openly
about sex, because editors are expected to draw on their own personal
experiences to work on the magazine's wide range of sexual topics, "from
date rape to sexual harassment to the nature of sexual pleasure and
desire." 341 In addition, because of the widely shared commitment to the
feminist philosophy, "the personal is political," sexual conversations and
interactions are an integral part of the informal work culture as well. 342 At
Womyn, the editors, "both straight and lesbians," spoke graphically about
their own sex lives and what they did and did not like to do in bed, and they
also talked seriously about their own sexual relationships and identities.
343
The staff socialized together frequently in intimate, sometimes raucous
settings. According to one editor, "[We were] always having parties just
[us] together without our partners. And... always dancing together and
337. See supra note 329 (describing Ely's research).
338. See Kirsten Dellinger & Christine Williams, The Locker Room and the Dorm Room:
Workplace Norms and the Boundaries of Sexual Harassment in Magazine Editing, 49 SOC.
PROBS. 242 (2000).
339. Id. at 244.
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having sleep overs and stuff."3" One editor summed up the atmosphere as
follows: "I think this is a very sexual place in a lot of ways., 345 The staff
appreciated, even cherished, this aspect of the magazine's culture. As Vera,
a former editor, explained, "For the most part, conversations about our
emotional and sexual lives are wonderful and liberating and one of the best
parts of being at Womyn." 346 The staff overwhelmingly agreed, arguing that
the all-female composition of the organization made the sexualized
interactions "safe" and "non-threatening"--even though some of the
women conceded that if the same conversations involved men, they might
consider them sexual harassment.347
Yet, even in this highly sexualized culture, the staff drew lines between
acceptable and unacceptable behavior-despite the absence of a sexual
harassment policy. As the editor-in-chief explained, "We don't have any
formal policy here at Womyn except we clearly, as feminists, know where
we stand on the issue., 348 A feminist commitment to nonhierarchical
relations led Womyn to deny any status differences between the editors and
interns; everyone was a part of the "sisterhood." Yet, the same feminist
ethos sensitized editors to the need to avoid exploiting unacknowledged
power differentials. Thus, when a concern about sexual harassment
emerged, it came from an editor who herself had been propositioned one
night by a half-drunken intern. After a party at a coworker's house, a few
staffers and interns had decided to go dancing, and at the end of the night,
the editor and intern went to a strip show at a lesbian bar. Rather than
accusing the intern of reverse sexual harassment,3 49 the editor castigated
herself for her own lack of judgment in accompanying the intern to a strip
bar, lamenting, "I would never have done that in another workplace.
NEVER!! After it happened, I was like, 'How could you not see that this
was completely inappropriate behavior?'-
350
344. Id.
345. Id. at 252.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 251-52.
348. Id. at 251.
349. Unwelcome sexual overtures made by a person occupying the formally less powerful
role toward a person occupying the formally more powerful role (i.e., subordinate to supervisor,
student to teacher) are known in the sexual harassment literature as "contrapower harassment."
See Rachel Mead Zweighaft, What's the Harm? The Legal Accommodation of Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 434, 437 n.12 (1997) (citing Kathleen
McKinney & Nick Maroules, Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL COERCION: A SOURCEBOOK ON ITS
NATURE, CAUSES, AND PREVENTION 29, 34 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary A. Koralewski eds.,
1991)). Similarly, Nicole Guron has coined the term "bottom-up harassment" to refer to
situations in which male workers who resent having a female boss resort to acts of work sabotage
or other competence-undermining behavior in order to drive her away from the job or make her
look bad. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1767 n.444 (citing Nicole L. Gudron, Strengthening "The
Weakest Case of All": Expanding Title VII Sexual Harassment Doctrine To Include "Bottom-Up"
Harassment (May 16, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)).
350. Dellinger & Williams, supra note 338, at 253.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2146 [Vol. 1 12: 2061
The Sanitized Workplace
Almost certainly, the denial of any editor-intern hierarchy at Womyn
gave the intern a sense of permission to make a pass at the editor. But the
countervailing feminist taboo on sex between work-role unequals led the
editor to hold herself accountable (and to decline the intern's offer). At
Womyn, sex was supposed to stay "safe" and role-egalitarian.
At GS, different norms emerged. Here, too, the job itself was sexualized
in content. Editors had to work on sexual advice columns, write and
copyedit captions for the nude "pictorials" or "artwork," and edit and screen
graphic reader mail for potential publication.35' As a result, much of the
everyday work conversation was sexually explicit. Just as at Womyn, the
sexual content of the job spilled over into the informal atmosphere, which
included a great deal of sexual banter and joking. At GS, a culture of
"locker room" joking diffused the sexual tension.35 2 "Most of the sexual
joking. . . is about the content of the magazine itself. People joke about
breast implants, ads for penis enlargements, and the impossibility of certain
sexual acts that are described in letters from readers. 353 The women editors
actively participated in this sexual conversation, although some said they
had to get used to it. Over time, they learned to see their work as funny. As
one female editor put it, "[Y]ou really have to have a sense of humor, that's
the one requirement to work here.... You gotta have a really open
mind. ,
354
In contrast to Womyn, however, where the staff s sex talk frequently
linked the sexual themes in the magazine to their own sexual experiences
and identities (and vice versa), at GS, both male and female employees
insisted on a strict boundary between sex talk "in the abstract" versus sex
talk about someone's personal life.355 Strikingly, some of the editors didn't
even consider their "locker room" banter about the magazine to be talk
about "sex," as the researchers' interview with one of the male editors, Bill,
reveals:
When Bill is asked if he ever talks about sex at work, he doesn't
think to mention sexual joking about the magazine. He says, "No,
not at all. I just don't want to talk about sex ... especially with
women because everything could be misconstrued, especially in
these times when people are so sensitive." But when asked if he
talks about sex in regard to the magazine, he clarifies that "that"
kind of joking happens "all the time." 356
351. Id. at 246.
352. Id. at 247.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 246.
355. Id. at 247.
356. Id. (alteration in original).
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To Bill, the line between work-related sex talk and personal sex talk is
clear:
"Oh, yeah, we laugh a lot at that stuff.... We laugh at the
pictorials. We laugh at the color. We laugh at the choice of
girls.... But to me that's in the abstract.... If I met you outside of
this environment and I brought a Gentleman's Sophisticate
magazine with me... and started talking to you about it, that
would be like approaching you, hitting on you. For us, it's like an
'in' thing.... [W]e work here." 357
In another example, Margaret, the managing editor, described a situation in
which a production worker held open an issue of a competing magazine
and, exposing the centerfold, said to a female coworker, "Can you imagine
what our relationship would be like if you looked like this?" To Margaret,
this comment was "totally inappropriate."
358
Although, as this example reveals, some of the men did violate the
norm against personalization, their behavior didn't threaten the women,
because the women had the numbers and power within the organization to
marginalize these men. As one of the editors explained:
There's very little sexual harassment that does go on.... I mean,
that's not to say, I don't observe like "Troglodytes speaking
coarsely with their women." But the strange thing is that other men
will speak up and say, "Hey, knock it offl" or "Gentlemen, stop
this!" I mean, for the most part, people cool it.... There's a couple
of guys that roam around the office that are real sort of pigs, and
classic male chauvinists, but because the company is so upwardly
mobile, it's just sort of like, "Ahh, he's just a retrograde. 35
In the locker-room ethos of GS, it is okay to talk about sex in the abstract,
but when the joking shades into personal innuendo directed at an individual,
it is considered "sexual" and inappropriate. Those who violate the norms
are not considered "gentlemen," but are ostracized as "troglodytes" by male
and female editors alike.36 °
Thus, despite the different organizational missions of Womyn and GS,
women editors at each magazine had significant responsibility and
influence. And, despite the different cultures of the two organizations, both
of them were highly sexualized. Neither organization was a model of
integration or equality: GS retained a male-dominated authority structure,
357. Id. at 247-48 (third and fourth alterations in original).
358. Id. at 248.
359. Id. at 250 (second alteration in original).
360. Id. at 248-50.
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and Womyn involved an integrated occupation (editor) located in an all-
female job and organizational setting that may have unfairly excluded men.
Yet, at each magazine, because the women editors had the numbers to give
them meaningful power and influence, they did not feel threatened by
sexually charged interactions, but participated in them actively and
willingly and helped generate norms about where to draw the line.
In both settings, it seems clear, the editors created sexualized work
cultures in response to deep needs created by the structure or content of
their work. At Womyn, sexual sharing was the fabric for weaving together
the political solidarity and personal intimacy the magazine's leadership
believed its feminist philosophy required. At GS, sexual bantering was the
medium for relieving the sexual and social tension that arose from dealing
with graphic (and potentially embarrassing and stimulating) material that
was the stuff of the job, day in and day out. In both organizations, the
editors' resort to the "sexual" was not always, or always only, about desire.
In creating their day-to-day cultures, the editors put sex to some very
basic--even banal-uses to work out human issues that arose out of the
demands of their jobs. It was safe, even pleasurable, for the women to
deploy the sexual, because the background structure of relative gender
equality in the organization made it so.
Additional sociological studies show that even in less-than-perfectly-
integrated occupations where women have achieved some measure of
respect and influence, women as well as men often feel that they benefit
from certain uses of sexuality in their workplaces. In sociologist Patti
Giuffre's study of health-care professionals in a teaching hospital,361 for
example, women doctors inhabited a sexualized work culture that included
a lot of flirting, sexual bantering, and even physical touching. But just as at
Womyn and at GS, many of them did not consider such conduct to be sexual
harassment. Indeed, it wasn't always even considered "sexual," if that term
is used to refer to a desire for an actual sexual liaison. Instead, Giuffre's
doctors used sexuality as a way to help them meet the demands of their
jobs, which included a great deal of stress and anxiety due to the risk of
losing or seriously harming a patient. As one male anesthesiologist
explained:
You can go into a typical heart operation. We joke all the time
about sex. It's a coping mechanism for people in an operating room
for stressful situations. People come up to me and hug me, or
massage my back, and that's all it's meant to be. Outsiders might
361. Patti A. Giuffre, Labeling Sexual Harassment in Hospitals: A Case Study of Doctors and
Nurses (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 2149
The Yale Law Journal
think, "Gee, is she coming on to him?" But they don't know that
you might have been doing that for six years. Everybody does it.
362
In these situations, the women as well as the men appreciated the
frequent sexual banter and touching that helped them cope with the stressful
nature of their work. Indeed, as Williams, Giuffre, and Dellinger noted,
"The pleasure that many [men and women] derive from sexual interactions
leads some to be wary of efforts to rid their workplaces of sexual
harassment., 363 As a female urologist put it:
Sexual banter happens partly because of the high stress situations.
In the operating room, it's even more stressful... you all go in and
put on these scrubs... It removes social... and sexual
boundaries.... [There's] [t]easing and joking and pinching and
elbowing. It's fun. That's one reason people like being in that
arena... That's part of the camaraderie .... I think it's been
limited somewhat by all of the sexual harassment cases.... [I]t's
sad that if someone who I'm working with nudges up to me and
elbows me, and I say, "I'm glad I wore my metal bra today to
protect myself from your elbow," it's sad that you can't say that in
peace anymore... It's a way that men and women interact. It's a
form of flirtation.364
It is important to note that in this example, even though they remained
in an occupation that wasn't yet integrated, women doctors were at the top
of the authority structure in the hospital and in the larger health-care
profession, and this positioning may have allowed them greater scope for
participating in and enjoying sexual conduct with their peers in the hospital
setting. In addition, simply because these health-care professionals enjoyed
sexual interactions with each other on the job did not mean they believed
"anything goes." Just as the editors at Womyn and GS had done, the
physicians established their own norms about appropriate uses of sexuality.
In Giuffre's study, both "doctors and nurses.., were very circumspect
about engaging in sexual interactions with their patients., 365 Even in the
midst of their highly sexualized work cultures, health-care professionals
had been thoroughly socialized to "desexualize" their relations with
patients, who lay outside the community of professionals who alleviated
their anxiety by flirting in the face of death.
Participant observation work by sociologist Leslie Salzinger confirms
that in more sex-integrated work settings, women have greater capacity to
362. Williams et al., supra note 313, at 86 (citing Giuffre).
363. Id.
364. Giuffre, supra note 361, at 6 (fifth, seventh, and ninth alterations added).
365. Williams et al., supra note 313, at 86.
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shape the terms and meaning of sexuality along more empowering lines.3 66
Salzinger studied three Mexican export-processing factories owned by well-
known transnational companies. She found that, in stark contrast to the
firms that hired sex-segregated workforces and used highly sexualized or
punitive modes of controlling workers, in the firm that hired equal numbers
of male and female production workers, emphasized skill, and paid people
based on productivity, life in the factory was not governed by any
controlling set of gender stereotypes or prescribed sexualities. Instead,
according to Salzinger's description:
Gendered rhetorics abound, but there are as many opinions about
women, men, and work as there are managers, supervisors, and
workers to have them, and there is no consistent correspondence
between position in production and perspective on gender. As a
result, unconnected to the fundamental axes of struggle over control
in the factory, gendered categories do not disappear, but they
subside into insignificance in daily interaction on the shop floor.
36 7
In such a context, neither women's nor men's sexuality was prescribed by
management nor by any dominant group of workers. But this does not mean
that it was abolished or was not part of factory life. To the contrary,
Salzinger reports:
Music blasts through the factory. At intervals, loud whoops emerge
from the floor in response to a particularly favored selection. If the
music is especially inspiring, the commotion may develop into an
impromptu salsa-a couple of paired blue smocks dancing in the
aisle-sometimes a woman and man, sometimes two women,
sometimes two men.... Always these outbursts delight and
enliven, contributing, for the casual observer, to the sense of
disorganization and play at work.36 8
Salzinger's study shows that, although the larger organizational gender
structure inevitably affects how sexuality is experienced and expressed, the
achievement of greater gender balance will not necessarily result in work
cultures that appear more, or less, sexualized to an outside observer. The
relevant question is not whether the cultures are sexualized, but how
sexuality is organized in them and who has had a role in shaping it. Taken
together, the studies suggest that more integrated, egalitarian employment
settings give both women and men more power to resist stereotypes and, in
366. Leslie Salzinger, From High Heels to Swathed Bodies: Gendered Meanings Under
Production in Mexico 's Export-Processing Industry, 23 FEMINIST STUD. 549 (1997).
367. Id. at 563-64.
368. Id. at 564.
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so doing, to remake the culture of sexuality on their own terms. Whether
the end result will be more or less open sexual expression, and what form
the expression will take, we cannot predict in advance. In fact, what may
seem like a less sexualized culture from the outside may well be one alive
with sexual energy, but one in which diverse sexual identities and
expressions proliferate rather than being established by management or by a
dominant group of workers whose gender (along with their race and sexual
orientation) gives them control.
C. Sexualizing Workplace Harm
Not only does the current approach to sexual harassment neglect the
affirmative potential gender integration has to give women the power to
experience workplace sexuality in positive (or at least equal) terms; it also
creates a negative dynamic that encourages women (and sometimes men) to
frame their complaints in terms of sexual offense, even when much more-
or much less-may be at stake. The fact that employers recognize and
punish sexual misconduct encourages workers to resort to the language and
machinery of sexual harassment, while at the same time obscuring the
larger structural features of the organization (such as gender, class, and race
hierarchies) that create the cultural contexts that give the complained-of
conduct meaning and punch.
First, consider the relationship between sexual harassment and larger
forms of sex discrimination that give rise to segregation on the job. The fact
that companies regard and treat sexual harassment as a more serious-and
more threatening-claim than these other forms of discrimination
encourages women to frame their complaints in sexualized terms. Women
often complain about sexual offense, when it seems clear that their real
problems concern more -overarching forms of discrimination and hierarchy
that cannot be articulated within the idiom of "sexual harassment." Recall,
for example, the Pierce case, 369 in which Debbie Kennedy, a female office
administrator, accused her boss, Tom Pierce, of sexual harassment, after the
two of them engaged in an exchange of joking, sexually oriented cards. The
truth is that Kennedy's complaint against Pierce referred to much more than
just the cards: She also protested her most recent job evaluation.3 7 ° Yet, the
company apparently only investigated the allegation that Pierce had sent
Kennedy the "sexual" cards, ignoring the more conventional (and more
serious) charges Kennedy had made. Under the company's reasoning,
sending the cards alone pegged Pierce as a sex abuser-regardless of
369. Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 825 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Ky. 1993), affid, 40 F.3d
796 (6th Cir. 1994); see also text accompanying notes 158-161.
370. Pierce, 825 F. Supp. at 784-85.
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whether other signs of sexism or managerial abuse were present. Little
wonder, then, that Kennedy complained about the cards. Whether she saw
them as part of a larger pattern of sex discrimination in which Pierce failed
to treat her as a competent professional, or whether she saw them as
completely harmless but simply used them to get the company's attention,
her strategy made sense. In a world in which companies can feel virtuous
about firing employees for sexual harassment, it should not be surprising
that women feel they can get more mileage out of characterizing old-
fashioned sexist supervisors as newly stigmatized sexual harassers.
Consider also the myriad complaints about pornography. Contrary to
the popular libertarian perception, these complaints are not always launched
by prudish women who can't stand the sight of naked bodies, regardless of
the context. Instead, in many of the published Title VII cases involving
pornography, there is very real evidence that male employees are creating
gender-based hostile work environments designed to drive women away
from the job or denigrate their work competence.37' In these cases, the
women who are being harassed may focus their outrage on the pornography
because they believe such protests will command attention; in the watchful
eyes of human resource managers, feminist litigators, or conservative
judges, the presence of pornography in the workplace stands out as a crude
violation because of its sexual content. Yet, in the eyes of the women
themselves, the pornography itself isn't the problem; it's merely a symbol of
the real problem, which is a deliberate campaign of sex discrimination and
harassment involving a host of sexual and nonsexual actions designed to
put women back in their place. Over the years, I have received countless
phone calls from women complaining about sex harassment, and, not
infrequently, one of the first things they will mention is that there is
pornography in their workplaces. Perhaps they expect me to jump in and
castigate pornography-and those who use it-as inherently sexist. When
instead I pause for a moment, and ask, "What else is going on at work?", I
inevitably hear detailed stories about much larger patterns of sex
discrimination and mistreatment that are painful to confront.
In the Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards case, for example, the men
hadn't simply posted pornography in their private workspaces or even in
the common areas of the workplace. Instead, some had brandished
personalized pornographic images of their female colleagues as instruments
of intimidation,372 in the same way that men have been known to brandish
plumbing snakes, used tampons, fists, file cabinets, and accusations of
incompetence. The male coworkers searched for pornographic pictures that
371. See, e.g., Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref.
Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486
(M.D. Fla. 1991).
372. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1495-501.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
215320031
2154 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 112:2061
looked like Robinson,373 put them on her toolbox, and laughed at her
reaction.374 The pornography was only one among many tools used to
exclude Robinson and communicate the message that she was unwelcome:
Following one of her complaints, a "Men Only" sign was painted on the
door of a trailer 37 5 and abusive language was written across the walls.376
Robinson was also bullied by her coworkers, both in a sexual manner and
with comments such as "women are only fit company for something that
howls" and "there's nothing worse than having to work around women."
377
Women's complaints about sexual jokes may also be understood from
378this perspective, as a recent study by sociologist Beth Quinn shows. In
traditionally male-dominated jobs, Quinn's interviews with women
revealed, men often use sexual and sexist jokes as a form of "insider
humor" that serves to build masculine identities and solidarity by casting
women as outsiders.379 The problem with the jokes is not their content, but
the fact that they are used to exclude and isolate women. As Quinn puts it:
Most researchers and legal scholars have assumed that the harm of
sexual harassment lies in its content, that jokes and pranks and talk
of sexuality are inherently demeaning. In the case of insider humor,
however, that the humor is sexist or overtly sexual [is] of secondary
concern. The main harm lies in the continual reassertion of a
woman's outsider status.38
Quinn cites several examples, including the story of Judy, a
construction worker, who "was not offended per se by the male employees'
crude remarks or the pornography in the construction trailer"; she was
harmed, instead, because she "understood how these things functioned to
separate her from the group. 38' Such actions put the women in a double
bind because if they object, they reveal their own weakness and risk being
completely ostracized from their work group; but if they don't object, they
are participating in the creation of a work culture built on their own
exclusion. 382 Most of the time, in Quinn's study, the women "explained
away men's sexist comments and sexual banter simply as an effect of 'the
way guys are,"' 383 and refused to take it personally-a strategy that allowed
373. Id. at 1496.
374. Id. at 1497.
375. Id. at 1498.
376. Id. at 1499.
377. Id.
378. Quinn, supra note 301.
379. See id. at 1175.
380. Id. at 1176-77.
381. Id. at 1177.
382. Id. at 1163.
383. Id. at 1169.
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them to maintain some sort of relationship with the harassers by
normalizing their own mistreatment. But when the harassment became
particularly egregious or prolonged and the pretense of normality could no
longer be maintained, some women began to attribute it to the pathologies
of individual men in the same way that HR managers often describe sexual
harassment under the individual-bad-actor model. 384 By remaining silent in
the face of their own exclusion or attributing sexual harassing behavior to
"a power-hungry, aggressive personality rather than organizational
location... or social structure," however, the women undercut their own
ability to demand organizational change, as Quinn points out. 385 They
reduce larger patterns of sexism to narratives about offensive jokes or
domineering sexual harassers.
Thus, behind women's angry complaints about pornography and sexual
joking there are often anguished pleas for inclusion, and belonging, in a
workworld dominated by men. But many of the same dynamics that have
led companies to focus on driving out sexual misconduct, at the expense of
dealing with more subtle forms of discriminatory exclusion, lead women to
frame their complaints in terms of sexual offense. Every time this happens,
the system misses an opportunity to glimpse the larger problem of gender
and gets imprinted with one more story of sexualized harm.
As the arbitration cases reveal, it isn't only sex discrimination that gets
occluded when employees articulate their workplace grievances in terms of
sexual harassment. Sexual harassment has become the category through
which employees articulate-and may actually experience-a broad variety
of complaints about managerial mistreatment. In one striking example, a
teenager who worked in an Albertsons grocery store in Portland, Oregon,
accused her supervisor of sexual harassment when he ordered her to stick
out her tongue to see if she was wearing a tongue ring.3 86 The arbitrator
held that the supervisor's order did not constitute sexual harassment, even
though the young woman said she felt "violated" and "embarrassed ' 387 by
his attempt to look into the "private space" of her mouth.388 The arbitrator
also held that the no-tongue-ring rule was reasonable because some
customers would likely be offended if they saw tongue rings flashing in the
mouths of supermarket employees. 389 Nonetheless, the arbitrator sided with
the teenager, concluding that the manager had no reasonable suspicion to
384. For example, one woman said, "I think a lot of sexual harassment.., is part of a
personality trait of chauvinism, of power, of aggression. You know, a lot of that comes from that,
no matter what position a person's in." Id. at 1170. Other women described men as "creep[s],"
"goofqs]," "ball-buster[s]," and "chauvinist[s]." Id.
385. See id. at 1170-71.
386. In re Albertson's, Inc., 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 886 (2000) (Gangle, Arb.).
387. Id. at 889.
388. Id. at 892.
389. Id. at 891.
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believe she wasn't telling the truth when she said she had removed the
tongue ring since neither the manager nor the director had seen anything
metallic flashing in her mouth when she spoke. The arbitrator also found
that the penalty for failing to comply with the order-firing-was
exceedingly harsh and not clearly explained. For these reasons, he
overturned the discharge.390
This case provides a fascinating example of the extent to which sexual
harassment has become the master discourse through which workers protest
managerial violation (even though the arbitrator wisely refused the label). A
teenager feels that a manager who has no reason to doubt her word
shouldn't be able to order her to stick her tongue out to prove she isn't
lying. It is humiliating, as a worker, to have to comply with such a
dictatorial directive. But in our employment-at-will culture, there is little or
no language in which to complain about this kind of managerial
overreaching, so she calls it sexual harassment-a move that her mother,
who also works in the grocery store, urges her to make. Perhaps this isn't
simply a strategic move; she may really feel the order to stick out her
tongue was a form of sexual violation. In a culture in which there is no
broad political/cultural discourse on general forms of managerial abuse-no
matter how degrading-the language of sexual harassment has come to
supply the medium through which complaints about managerial abuse are
communicated and perhaps even experienced.
While many women and men articulate broader complaints about
managerial abuses through sexual harassment complaints in good faith
(meaning that they believe they have experienced a sexual violation), in
other cases their motivation is murkier. Employees can manipulate charges
of sexual harassment as a way to protect their jobs or to get back at bosses
who they feel have treated them unfairly, just as the HR types,
professionals, and lawyers warn. In Jacobus v. Krambo Corp., the chief
financial officer and treasurer of a six-person investment banking firm was
personally sued for sexual harassment (along with his firm) when a
secretary whose job performance he criticized, Rosie Vera-Aviles, decided
she was offended by some earlier sexualized encounters. 391 From all
appearances, Jacobus and Vera-Aviles had been friends. They socialized
together outside work, having dinner together, playing softball, and
shooting pool.3 92 They also had a friendly relationship inside the office, one
which the court found was marked by "frequent sexual bantering": "They
discussed their personal lives with each other, including their sexual
encounters. Vera-Aviles also had frequent conversations with other workers
390. Id. at 893-94.
391. 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d425 (Ct. App. 2000).
392. ld. at 428.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2156 [Vol. 112:2061
The Sanitized Workplace
in the office involving sexual matters."393 At one point, Jacobus had some
erotic stories written by his sister-in-law in the office, and when Vera-
Aviles asked to see them, he showed them to her. He also composed a
sexually explicit story at his computer, which he shared with her upon her
request.
Their relationship ended one day when Jacobus, who was not her
supervisor, conveyed to the firm's vice president a coworker's complaint
that Vera-Aviles spent too much time on the telephone. When the vice
president and Jacobus met with her to discuss the issue, she got upset that
her job performance was being criticized. Later that same day, she met with
the vice president and asserted, for the first time, that Jacobus had been
sexually harassing her and claimed that the complaint about her spending
time on the telephone was a continuation of the harassment. Jacobus was
encouraged to "accelerate his already-formed plan to leave the firm," and
he resigned that day.394 Four days later, Vera-Aviles quit her job and filed
her sexual harassment suit. A jury exonerated Jacobus of sexual
harassment, finding that Vera-Aviles had participated willingly in the
encounters of which she later complained.
In a subsequent lawsuit, a California court held that the firm was
responsible for Jacobus's legal expenses because his interactions with Vera-
Aviles had occurred within the scope of his employment. Although
acknowledging that "sexual misconduct falls outside the scope of
employment" and is usually deemed to be "motivated [by] strictly personal
reasons," the court rejected the argument that "the interactions between
Jacobus and Vera-Aviles were motivated by Jacobus's own [personal]
desire for sexual gratification." 395 Instead, in an opinion that is remarkable
for its realism and sexual openness, the judge recognized that "social
interactions among employees, including the sharing of private or personal
information, are broadly incidental to the enterprise of an employer.... We
conclude that Jacobus's consensual sharing of sexual materials with Vera-
Aviles was no more unusual or startling than other forms of everyday
conversation among coworkers. 396 If anyone was trying to take advantage
here, said the court, it was Vera-Aviles: "The facts suggest that Vera-Aviles
developed her sexual harassment claim to gain advantage in her
employment." 397 Rather than villainizing her, however, the court
acknowledged the ordinariness of her attempt to exploit the sexual
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 430.
396. Id. at 431.
397. Id.
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harassment claim in a world in which workers must constantly struggle to
survive on the job.398
It is possible, of course, that Vera-Aviles's motivations were more
complex than the court recognized. Perhaps, as she reflected back on her
experiences with Jacobus, she came to believe that he had been exploiting
her sexually, rather than relating to her out of the kind of true friendship in
which he would try to protect her from an adverse performance review
rather than participating in it. But even if that is true, it would not
undermine the larger observation about the way sexual harassment
discourse is functioning. Whether employees seek to strategically exploit
sexual harassment claims in order to protest other perceived workplace
harms, or whether they learn to subjectively understand ambiguous sexual
interactions as instances of sexual harassment (or both), the point remains
that the widespread legal and cultural recognition of sexual harassment as a
legitimate form of injury makes it a preferred idiom in which to frame
perceived workplace harms. The comparative lack of recognition for many
forms of workplace abuse-particularly managerial overreaching-
encourages employees to conceptualize and characterize their experiences
in terms of sexual misconduct. In this way, sexual harassment becomes a
band-aid that may mask a larger malady of gender segregation or
managerial abuse. At the same time, the availability of the band-aid may
make minor scratches seem like deeper wounds.
D. Legitimating Bias
Not only does the priority given to sexual harassment claims encourage
employees to frame perceived harms in sexual terms, it also legitimates
expressions of sexual offense and bigotry that can arise when workers from
stigmatized groups engage in conduct that others regard as overly "sexual"
or familiar.
In earlier work, I expressed concern that sex harassment law's focus on
sexual misconduct would permit or even encourage companies to punish
employees who are regarded as sexually deviant. 399 Recent research adds
fuel to these fears and suggests that, for many employees, the determination
of whether certain sexual behaviors are offensive (or perhaps even
"sexual") turns on who is engaging in it. Such findings are not surprising,
for they confirm the general insight that workplace sexuality is given
meaning within organizational context. As a result, the same sexual conduct
398. Id. ("In our view, the risk that one worker may accuse another of sexual harassment to
deflect an adverse performance review is a risk inherent in employment, analogous to the
risk... that one worker may assault another in a job-related dispute.").
399. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1729, 1784-85, 1789 n.540; see also Schultz, supra note
71, at 428.
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that would be tolerated-or even welcomed-from coworkers of a similar
status may well be labeled sexual harassment if it is engaged in by
coworkers of a different status, particularly if they are perceived as part of a
social group culturally marked as "sexual."
In a recent study of waiters in restaurants that employ equal numbers of
men and women, for example, the researchers found that, as in many
restaurants, their subjects worked in cultures that were highly sexualized.4 °°
In the restaurants where they worked:
[S]exual joking, touching, and fondling were common, everyday
occurrences .... For example, when asked if he and other
waitpeople ever joke about sex, one waiter replied, "about 90%
percent of [the jokes] are about sex." According to a waitress, "at
work... [we're] used to patting and touching and hugging."
Another waiter said, "I do not go through a shift without
someone... pinching my nipples or poking me in the butt or
grabbing my crotch.... It's just what we do at work." 40 1
True to our earlier observations, in these gender-integrated workplaces,
the women as well as the men said they enjoyed the sexualized interactions;
they actively participated in the ritualized displays of heterosexuality with
their male coworkers, and did not consider their sexual advances improper.
Yet, when some of the Mexican men, who were concentrated in positions as
kitchen cooks and busing staff, made identical sexual overtures, the white
waitresses were quick to take offense and to label the conduct sexual
harassment. When asked if she had ever experienced sexual harassment, for
example, one of the waitresses, Beth, said:
Yes, but it was not with the people ... that I work with in the front
of the house. It was with the kitchen .... In the kitchen, the lines
are quite different. Plus, it's a Mexican staff. It's a very different
attitude....
... One guy, like, patted me on the butt and... I went off on
him. I said, "No. Bad. Wrong. I can't speak Spanish to you, but,
you know, this is it.
' 40 2
Other white waitresses had similar reactions. Ann conceded that the
Mexican men in the kitchen "would see the waiters hugging on us, kissing
us and pinching our rears and stuff," but that she considered their attempt to
400. Patti A. Giuffre & Christine L. Williams, Boundary Lines: Labeling Sexual Harassment
in Restaurants, 8 GENDER & SOC'Y 378, 380-87 (1994).
401. Id. at 382.
402. Id. at 388.
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take the same liberties a form of sexual harassment. 403 Brenda complained
that "[t]he kitchen can be kind of sexist.... They're not as bad as they used
to be because they got warned. They're mostly Mexican, not even Mexican-
American., 40 4 She criticized relatively harmless interactions that fell far
short of sexual touching; for instance, "sometimes, they will take a relleno
in their hands like it's a penis"-an action she berated as "Sick!" 405 Several
of the white waitresses admitted that they felt comfortable engaging in
sexual banter and touching with the other waitpeople (who were
predominantly white), but not with the Mexican workers. In the racial and
occupational hierarchy of the restaurant culture, the white women closed
ranks against the Mexican men as sexual harassers, whom they perceived as
too beneath them to be assuming sexual familiarities.4 °6
In addition to these racial/status differences, the researchers found that
sexual orientation mattered to how sexual conduct was perceived. Male
waiters who saw themselves as heterosexual characterized sexual horseplay
and conversation as "sexual harassment" when it came from openly gay
men, even though the waiters welcomed similar interactions with other
straight men. One of the straight men objected to a gay coworker touching
him on the rear end, for example, and another expressed discomfort about a
gay baker talking about his sexual experiences and desires. Yet, these same
men conceded that similar sexual conversation and horseplay from straight
men didn't bother them, and bragged that they themselves initiated such
interactions. 7 In the eyes of many of the straight men, the gay men were
marked as potential sexual harassers from the beginning. Thus, any
expression of sexuality by gay men became a self-fulfilling prophecy-a
confirmation of the misplaced sexual desire they were expected to embody
and enact.
As James Woods and Jay Lucas point out, gay men and lesbians are
often reduced by others to nothing more than the walking embodiments of
their sexuality:
403. Id. at 389.
404. id.
405. Id.
406. Although in this example the white women's reactions to the advances by the kitchen
staff may confound racial difference and lower occupational status, a second study by Patti
Giuffre provides examples of situations in which white nurses reacted negatively to the race or
ethnicity of men of color who were doctors and occupied a higher occupational status. See
Giuffre, supra note 361, at 13. One of the nurses stopped the touching by "walk[ing] off," but the
other began to find the doctor's touches (back rubbing) less offensive, over time, when she got to
know the doctor and realized that he "really likes the nurses and believes in the nurses."Id.
407. Giuffre & Williams, supra note 400, at 393; cf Giuffre, supra note 361, at 15 (reporting
an interview with a heterosexual male nurse who said he had felt threatened when a gay male
nurse asked him out, but who felt flattered when female nurses blew kisses at him and came on to
him, even though he didn't want to go out with them).
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Gay men.., attract a particular kind of attention. Because it is
sexuality that distinguishes a gay man from his heterosexual peers,
it is his sexuality that attracts their notice.
... Prevailing stereotypes about gay men (that they are
hypersexual, promiscuous, indiscriminate) further emphasize the
sexual aspects of their lives. The result is a tendency to
hypersexualize gay men, to allow their sexuality to eclipse all else
about them, even to see sexual motives or intentions where there
are none.
408
To illustrate this phenomenon, in Gay Cops, Stephen Leinen quotes a
police officer who describes how another lesbian officer was treated by her
female peers: "Some thought because she was a lesbian she would
automatically proposition all other women.'4°9  Yet, even when
heterosexuals do not feel personally propositioned, gays may be accused of
sexual harassment for merely revealing their sexual identity because, as
Woods and Lucas observe, "[s]tatements about a [gay] man's sexual
orientation, about who he is, are misread as statements about what he does
during actual sexual encounters. ' 0 For example, one lawyer interviewed
by Woods and Lucas feared that if he came out to his coworkers directly, he
would be accused of "talking about sex." 4 1' A publishing vice president
whose homosexuality was known to his colleagues similarly refrained from
alluding to his sexuality "unnecessarily" at work because he felt that it
would make his heterosexual colleagues uncomfortable, despite their
openness in discussing their own personal lives. 412 Such fears on the part of
gay people are not unfounded; heterosexuals have accused gay men and
lesbians of sexual harassment for merely talking about homosexuality. 4 3 In
one lawsuit, a jury agreed with a woman's claims that her coworker, a gay
California Department of Corrections artist trainer, had sexually harassed
her by simply "telling her details of his homosexual lifestyle and, on one
occasion, drawing a sexually explicit picture of her."'4 4 Indeed, with a fear
of such consequences, it is not surprising that studies suggest that the vast
408. WOODS & LUCAS, supra note 16, at 65.
409. STEPHEN LEINEN, GAY COPS 116 (1993).
410. WOODS & LUCAS, supra note 16, at 66; see also Karcn Nugent, School Chairman
Rejects Gay-Notice Complaint, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Mar. 20, 1998, at BI
(discussing a Massachusetts school investigation of a complaint by a male chemistry teacher who
alleged that the reading of notices about the school's Gay-Straight Alliance, and the very word
"gay," amounted to sexual harassment).
411. WOODS & LUCAS, supra note 16, at 66-67.
412. Id. at 63.
413. See, e.g., Fair v. Guiding Eyes for the Blind, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
414. See Homosexual Liable for Harassing Heterosexual, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 2002, at B2
(reporting on Brown v. California Department of Corrections, No. BC 217 520 (Cal. Super. Ct.
2001)).
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majority of gay men and women remain closeted at work, believing that
their employers and coworkers do not know or suspect that they are gay.
415
These results are disheartening, but they are not surprising. As Woods
and Lucas point out, "The situation is familiar to anyone whose gender,
race, or background has placed them in the minority; the 'few' will always
stand out against the background of the 'many. ' 4 16 Within many sectors of
American society, members of stigmatized minority groups are stereotyped
as overly-even pathologically-"sexual." African-American men have
learned not to participate in the sexual banter and horseplay of
predominantly white organizations, or else risk threatening organizational
power relations.4 17 Black women, too, must downplay their sexuality-and
even their sexual attractiveness-or else risk bringing unwanted attention to
themselves. Gay men and lesbians often feel pressure to suppress
information about their personal lives in the workplace to protect
themselves from stigma,418 and other sexual minorities occupy an even
lower place on the hierarchy of sexual propriety.41 9 Working-class men of
all races are seen as crude and vulgar, especially when they engage in
sexual displays toward their female "betters." Even white working-class
women are often considered bad girls whose bawdy sexuality places them
outside the bounds of respectability and protection.42 °
These observations raise the uncomfortable specter that sexual
harassment policies will not be enforced evenhandedly, but instead will be
used to mete out excessive discipline and punishment to people who are
regarded as overly sexual. Indeed, the possibility of evenhanded
enforcement seems remote, for, as we have seen, sexuality has no inherent
meaning apart from organizational contexts. Because stereotypes about
low-status groups' sexuality are so often incorporated into the formal
structures and informal status hierarchies of work organizations, these
forms of bias become embedded into the very fabric of organizational life
through which sexuality is expressed and understood. In the end, no
415. See WOODS & LUCAS, supra note 16, at 8 (stating that 76% of gay men and 81% of
lesbians remain closeted at work (citing Larry Gross & Steven K. Aurand, Discrimination and
Violence Among Lesbian Women and Gay Men in Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania: A Study by the Philadelphia Lesbian and Gay Task Force (1992))).
416. Id. at 62.
417. See David A. Thomas, Mentoring and Irrationality: The Role of Racial Taboos, 28
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 279, 283 (1989).
418. See generally LEINEN, supra note 409, at 32-71 (discussing dominant police reaction to
gay police officers and the gay community, and how gay police officers often feel forced to
remain closeted about their sexuality); WOODS & LUCAS, supra note 16 (exploring the variety of
ways in which gay men hide and manage their sexual identities in the workplace).
419. See generally Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of
Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY, supra note 48, at 267
(showing how sexual minorities occupy a hierarchy of social acceptability with lesbians who are
involved in "vanilla sex" occupying the highest status).
420. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1729-32.
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workplace is ever really desexualized: Rules or norms that aim to suppress
sexuality just end up privileging the forms of sexuality and sexual
expression that are taken for granted by the dominant group. In a workplace
committed to an ethic of asexuality, we can count on prejudice against
those who are viewed as the embodiments of sex.
We should ask ourselves: Is this really the world we want to inhabit?
Has feminism really nothing better to offer than an impoverished vision of a
workplace sanitized of all sexuality and passion, in the name of protecting
women? Can't employment discrimination law be read to embody other
goals and values, ones that will help enrich people's experiences in the
workplace, rather than reducing them to a desexualized-and ultimately
dehumanized-conception of what a worker is supposed to be?
V. TOWARD A NEW VISION
To find alternative visions, we don't have to look that far. Early in the
twentieth century, a group of feminists and freethinkers who congregated in
Greenwich Village championed women's right to participate equally in
work, sexuality, and talk. They believed that women's ability to stand
alongside men in the same paid work, to control their own sexuality, and to
engage in free expression-including frank talk about sexuality-were the
pillars upon which a good and egalitarian society rested.42' In the
intervening decades, of course, it has become clear that these aspirations
must be framed more broadly and that inequalities other than gender must
be addressed. But the project of achieving a world in which all people have
the capacity to participate meaningfully in work (both paid and unpaid), to
pursue sexuality and intimacy on their own terms (both within and outside
traditional family settings), and to practice free expression (both in politics
and in more private realms) remains as powerful and as relevant as ever.
Unfortunately, the direction in which we are moving neglects the first
goal (work equality) and threatens the second and third (sexual autonomy
and free expression). We are not doing enough to promote gender equality
in work roles, and what we are doing in the name of preventing sexual
harassment threatens people's right to talk about-and even to participate
in-many forms of sexual conduct that do not subordinate women.
Although legal reform is an important part of what is needed, law alone is
not enough. To change things for the better, we will have to alter our
aspirations, as well as revise our legal and organizational approaches to
workplace sexuality.
421. See generally NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMrNISM (1987);
CHRISTINE STANSELL, AMERICAN MODERNS: BOHEMIAN NEW YORK AND THE CREATION OF A
NEW CENTURY 73-144,225-46 (2000).
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A. Aspiring to New Ideals
As we have seen, social movement politics has played a role in bringing
about the sanitization process, and a new set of politics and ideals is needed
to disrupt that process. It is time to reject the sanitizing impulse and strive,
instead, for a world in which people are able to be more fully human while
they are at work. This means countering the trend toward universal, across-
the-board strictures on sexual interaction and creating ways for
organizations to offer more sexually open, and more gender-egalitarian,
environments. There are many good reasons for taking such a stance.
Today, work's passions pull at women and men alike. We work
because we must, but also because most of us can't choose not to. Work
isn't just a way to make a living; it's a way to create something of value, to
struggle with our capacities and limits, to make friends and form intimate
relationships, to contribute to our communities, to leave our imprint on the
world, and to know ourselves and others in the way that humans can only
be known through struggle and (sometimes) Success. 422 It isn't just that
work is a stage where we as individuals can try to realize our dreams (and
confront our demons); it's also one of the few arenas in which diverse
groups of people can come together to find sustenance, solidarity, and
shared meaning. Thanks to the partial success of forty years of social
movements and legal reforms, our society has come to hold as an ideal the
image-though not yet the reality-of the workplace as an arena of
potential citizenship, a place where more and more groups have some claim
to be included on equal terms. 423 In the wake of this transformation, as
sociologist Arlie Hochschild has chronicled, the workplace has become a
central locus for many people's dreams and desires.424 Even for those who
aren't fortunate enough to hold jobs that can foster self-realization, work
remains vitally important to how they understand life. Like it or not, most
people's lives are shaped profoundly-for better or worse-by their
experiences in relation to the world of work.
In a world in which many relationships have become transitory and
superficial, work can offer deep and meaningful connections. As
sociologists are beginning to recognize, the workplace is a sphere
characterized by extraordinarily intimate relations.425 For many people,
422. Schultz, supra note 10, at 1888-92, 1928.
423. See id. at 1930-37; see also Estlund, supra note 9, at 73.
424. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME,
AND HOME BECOMES WORK (1998).
425. See David R. Eyler & Andrea P. Baridon, Far More than Friendship: The New Rules for
Reckoning with Sexual Attraction in the Workplace, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May-June 1992, at 58, 59
("Work is becoming a major source of intimate attraction between [people] as they daily share the
physical proximity of working side by side, the stimulation of professional challenge, and the
powerful passions of accomplishment and failure."); Gary Alan Fine, Friendships in the Work
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work fosters exciting, erotically charged relationships. There is an
electricity and a sense of connection that comes from working together
closely, day in and day out, to achieve common goals.426 For other people,
work offers close, not necessarily erotic, friendships that occur primarily at
work but extend beyond workplace issues. Scores of people are involved in
what researchers have called "non-sexual love relationships" with their
coworkers, bosses, or subordinates. 427 Whether they are sexual or
nonsexual, the ties that emerge at work may be as intense as those that exist
at home because, in both realms, the constant contact, coupled with the
mutual recognition that can arise out of working on common projects,
fosters close, self-disclosing relationships.4 2 ' As one important researcher
put it, "With individuals increasingly oriented to their work as an extension
of their core selves... we are where we work. To use a worn metaphor,
those who labor beside us become our kith and kin.
429
Of course, as this account suggests, intimacy is not synonymous with
sexuality. Not all close ties create sexual energy, and not everyone in a
sexually charged relationship consummates it physically. As a result, some
readers may ask: Why should we care about whether employers prohibit
sexual conduct? What would be wrong with preserving only workplace
intimacy of the nonsexual variety?
One answer is that we may have to allow people to engage in sexual
liaisons at work in order to find potential mates. In today's economy, many
people work extremely long hours and have little time for social lives
Place, in FRIENDSHIP & SOCIAL INTERACTION 185, 202-03 (Valerian J. Derlega & Barbara A.
Winstead eds., 1986); Stephen R. Marks, Intimacy in the Public Realm: The Case of Co-Workers,
72 Soc. FORCES 843, 853 (1994) (concluding, on the basis of both theory and empirical surveys,
that "[a]t workplaces, intimacy appears to be a rather pervasive phenomenon").
426. As a special report by the Bureau of National Affairs put it:
A number of experts noted that when men and women work well together on
interesting projects, spend large amounts of time together at the office, and travel
together on business, it is easy to become sexually attracted to one another. [One]
management consultant who has written extensively on the subject noted: "The most
powerful aphrodisiac is common interests."
BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 1.
427. See Sharon A. Lobel et al., Love Without Sex: The Impact of Psychological Intimacy
Between Men and Women at Work, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Summer 1994, at 5, 6-9
(reporting that in a large random sample of people who had attended an executive education
program at a Midwestern business school, 37% had such intimate relationships with their peers,
37% had them with subordinates, and 20% had them with supervisors); see also Eyler & Baridon,
supra note 425, at 59-60 (making a similar point).
428. Marks, supra note 425, at 846. In one large contemporary study, for example, fully 60%
of the people surveyed said they talk to coworkers about personal matters or get together with
them socially. Among the married people who said they discuss important matters with at least
one other person, 34% said they do so with both their spouse and coworkers-a figure not that far
below the 41% who said they do with their spouses and not with their coworkers-and 10% said
they did so with coworkers but not with their spouses. Id. at 849-50, 853.
429. Fine, supra note 425, at 203; see also Marks, supra note 425, at 853; cf. Lobel et al.,
supra note 427, at 9.
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outside work.430 As a practical matter, these people may have to find
potential partners through their employment. If prohibitions against
workplace dating become universal, many people may find it difficult if not
impossible to find marriage partners or to secure other long-term or short-
term sexual relationships.43
Yet, the problem isn't simply that rules against sexual conduct might
pose a barrier to people forming traditional sexual relationships that would
extend outside the workplace. The bigger problem is that such rules may
pose barriers to people forming erotic and other close connections that
would occur primarily inside the workplace. For, although intimacy and
sexuality may be possible to separate as a theoretical matter, they are not so
easy to disentangle at the level of experience or policy. For many people,
the line between a platonic relationship and a sexual one is often porous,
and friends may cross it once or even on occasion without becoming full-
time partners or lovers. Furthermore, simply because intimacy doesn't
require sexual relations does not mean it can thrive in the presence of the
prohibitory sexual harassment measures many companies are adopting.
Many employers' policies extend beyond prohibiting sexual relations to
limit a broader set of personal interactions, such as sexual remarks and
joking, and even looks and gestures, that can be interpreted as "sexual"
(such as hugs). When people have to fear that they can be accused of sexual
harassment on the basis of something minor they may say or do, no matter
how harmless (or even affectionate) their intentions, working relationships
can become mistrustful rather than intimate-just as some survey research
suggests may be occurring.432 The sense of connection that work inspires
can wither under the threat of sexual accusation.
Even if we could somehow separate out nonsexual intimacy from the
more sexual variety, we should still be deeply concerned about across-the-
board prohibitions on specifically sexual conduct. Workplace sexuality isn't
solely a source of danger and disruption-it's also a source of vitality,
creativity, and power. For many people, the sexual energy that work
generates will be one of the most valued aspects of their work lives-one
we should not sacrifice lightly. If sexuality were valued as it should be, we
would celebrate, rather than seeking to snuff out, the erotic charge that
430. See JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN (1992).
431. Recall earlier figures showing that between 24% and 37% of all employees have
engaged in some sort of workplace romance, and that these figures may be much higher among
younger people. See supra note 254.
432. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., supra note 96, at 9. In the 1994 Merit Systems Protection
Board survey of federal employees, 63% of the men and half of the women respondents stated that
some people are too quick to take offense when someone expresses a personal interest in them
through looks or remarks. Fully one-third of the respondents said they believe that normal
attraction between people is, to a moderate or great extent, misinterpreted as sexual harassment.
Id.
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often accompanies working. Sexuality is, to a large extent, what makes us
alive. So, in the move to suppress workplace sexuality, what is at stake is
the very idea of whether work can be a sphere of human energy, vitality,
and connection. The very existence of work as a humanist enterprise is on
the line, as is the value of sexuality to human experience.
Just as we are coming to realize the importance of workplace intimacy
in people's lives, we are also beginning to recognize-however reluctantly
and painfully-how desperately our society needs to embrace a new ethics
of sexuality. As a new generation of queer theorists and feminists has
eloquently shown, our society all too often induces sexual shame and
creates moral panics about sexuality.433 Not only does the politics of shame
harm some groups at the expense of others; it also induces social stigma
and enforces sexual conformity in a way that impoverishes life for
everyone. Viewed in this light, the contemporary campaign to drive sex out
of the workplace becomes visible as a larger politics of sexuality. It is a
politics that, in the name of protecting women from sexual discrimination
and danger, privileges some people's notion of acceptable sexuality over
others'; in the name of protecting firms from disorder and legal demise,
gives management the power to punish sexual transgressors upon pain of
losing their jobs; and in the name of progress, enforces standardized, often
stifling codes of appropriate sexual conduct that deprive employees of the
capacity to create workplace cultures that reflect their own sexual norms.
This last realization raises an important point. Not only is the drive
toward sexual sanitization part of a larger politics of sexuality; it is also part
of a larger practice of managerial control. Firms are adopting sexual
harassment policies in response to advice from lawyers and HR
professionals, but without significant input from their own employees. In
most cases, employees have little or no role in defining sex-based
harassment, identifying its causes, or devising appropriate solutions.4 34
Managers sometimes even use accusations of sexual harassment as a pretext
for firing workers whom they want to get rid of for other reasons. But even
when no ulterior motives are present, sexual harassment law has given
firms a newly progressive justification for punishing and even firing
433. See, e.g., WARNER, supra note 312, at 1-33 (discussing the powerful role of sexual
shame in American society); Rubin, supra note 419, at 267-75.
434. For a look at the positive impact of employee participation in designing internal
processes for legal compliance, see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 508-09 (2001) (examining
three companies that solicited employee feedback and participation in gender-related
policymaking, and finding that where a company created a new "open door" policy that actively
solicited and analyzed feedback from each employee and manager about its fairness and
effectiveness, reported usage and satisfaction increased, and EEOC sexual harassment and
discrimination complaints and lawsuits became disproportionately low).
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employees whose conduct can be said to interfere with productivity and
order.
From a workers' rights perspective, there is cause for concern. These
draconian practices put workers, as individuals, at risk of losing their jobs,
their livelihoods, and a significant source of meaning and connection to
others. But more is at stake, for such policies also put employees, as a
group, at risk of losing the ability to forge their own workplace cultures and
sexual norms---cultures and norms that may be mobilized, at least at times,
as a source of solidarity, pleasure, and even resistance to managerial abuse
of authority on the job.435
Wittingly or unwittingly, over the past two decades, many feminists
and sympathetic reformers have become complicit in this neo-Taylorist
project. Many have bought into a logic that says, "Sex has no place in the
workplace, because when people are at work, they should be working." But
this logic has no stopping point. In the name of productivity and order, it
grants organizations the power to control not only sexuality, but all the
other emotional drives and dramas of human life that managers believe
interfere with the smooth functioning of the workplace: reproduction and
care, birth and death, accident and aging, disease and disability, sex and
solidarity, and, yes, even love and marriage.436 Yet, these are the things that
make us human. In a world in which work has become such a critical
component of our lives, we should not cede to management such massive
censorial power over our lives. Just as feminism and other social
movements have demanded workplace recognition of other important life
interests (such as the current movement to get employers to accommodate
parenting and other caring responsibilities4 37), so too should we insist on the
recognition that people who work are fundamentally sexual beings. Rather
than trying to drive out sexuality, we should strive to create workplaces in
which women as well as men, sexual minorities as well as sexual
conformists-people of all races and classes and from all walks of life-
can be perceived as competent workers and sexual subjects at the same
time.
At a minimum, we should question the idea that workplace sexual
conduct always constitutes harassment, and become more open-minded
435. See generally Burrell, supra note 17, at 107-10.
436. See, e.g., Timothy D. Chandler et al., Spouses Need Not Apply: The Legality of
Antinepotism and No-Spouse Rules, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 31 (2002) (chronicling the continued
popularity of no-spouse rules, which earlier reformers sought to eliminate because of their
disparate impact on women).
437. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1403,
1437-39 (2001) (arguing that "[w]orkplaces must be restructured so that the burdens for
dependency can also be redistributed in a more just manner as between family and market-so
that caretakers have a meaningful 'right to work'); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 54-
113 (2000) (arguing for workplace accommodation of parenting responsibilities).
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about the presence and uses of sexuality at work. As I have argued above,
and as a number of feminists across the generations have begun to
recognize, sexuality is not always dangerous or disadvantageous to women,
even in the workplace. 438 Younger women are particularly likely to take
such a position, finding a disconnect between themselves and the older
generation of feminists who considered sexuality the primary axis of gender
oppression. 439 Instead, many younger feminists have adopted a spirited
stance that seeks to put women fully in charge of their own sexuality-both
its pleasures and risks. 440 Many of these younger women have been turned
off by the sexual conformism-and lack of realism-that they believe
permeates the orthodox campaign to eliminate sexual harassment.44'
"Feminists concerned with sexual harassment reproduce their own version
of [a utopia] based on the absence of messy sexual desire," writes Katie
Roiphe; she continues, "Although it takes some imaginative leaps to get
438. See, e.g., NAOMI WOLF, FIRE WITH FIRE 191 (1994) (arguing that "we must be wary of
new definitions of harassment that leave no mental space to imagine girls and women as sexual
explorers and renegades"); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49
STAN. L. REV. 691, 746 (1997) (arguing that "[s]hutting down all sexual behavior seems like an
overreaction to the problem of sexual harassment, and requires some very disturbing assumptions
about the possibility of female sexual agency"); Amelia Richards & Jennifer Baumgardner, In
Defense of Monica, NATION, Dec. 21, 1998, at 6, 7 (arguing that "[fleminists should support
Monica Lewinsky not as a victim of a rapacious man but as a young woman with a libido of her
own").
439. See, e.g., RENE DENFIELD, THE NEW VICTORIANS: A YOUNG WOMAN'S CHALLENGE
TO THE OLD FEMINIST ORDER 260 (1995) ("If there is a single attitude that would describe how
many young people feel about sex, it's this: It's nobody's business but our own. Young women do
not like anyone, whether archconservatives or feminists, telling them what to do in the bedroom-
which, unfortunately, is exactly what many current feminists are doing."); Melissa Klein, Duality
and Redefinition: Young Feminism and the Alternative Music Community, in THIRD WAVE
AGENDA 207, 221 (Leslie Haywood & Jennifer Drake eds., 1997) (stating that "[u]nlike older,
Dworkin-MacKinnon feminists, young punk feminists tended to be very pro-sex, more likely, for
example, to celebrate female-centered pornography than to censor male-centered por").
440. For some additional examples, see PAULA KAMEN, HER WAY: YOUNG WOM4EN
REMAKE THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION 189 (2000) (recounting how a group of young feminists at
the University of Illinois launched a protest advocating that "women have a right to control their
sexuality no matter what, no matter how they dress or how promiscuous they are"); and Richards
& Baumgardner, supra note 438, at 6 (insisting that "[w]e want the right to be sexually active
without the presumption that we were used or duped. We want the right to determine our own
choices based on our own morality."). The editors of Bust Magazine, a popular Third Wave
feminist publication, devoted three full issues to sex and sexuality and introduced the first "sex
issue" by stating, "What seems to be the common thread to these stories, if there's one to be
found, is the pursuit of pleasure, the acceptance of pleasure, and the allowance of pleasure, in
whatever form it takes." Debbie Stoller & Marcelle Karp, Editors' Letter, BUST MAG., Summer-
Fall 1994, at http://www.bust.com/stories/editor.html.
441. Consider Heather Corinna's trenchant criticism of Harvard's campaign to oust the Dean
of the Divinity School when it was discovered that his private computer contained pornographic
images. Heather Corinna, What Unbecomes a Dean Most, at http://www.maximag.com/current/
harvard/index.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2003). Corinna contends that the Dean was asked to
resign not for viewing pornography, but because his conduct held "the threat to make public that
even academics and Deans are sexual people with diverse carnal desires often attributed to the
uneducated masses ... and because in our culture, the mainstream notion is that divinity, high-
visibility public position and sex are opposing forces." Id.
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there, their version... is a land without dirty jokes, leers, and other
instances of 'unwanted sexual attention.' Whether or not visions of [such a
universe] are practical, the question becomes whether they're even
desirable."
442
Instead of suppressing sexual desire, these younger feminists seek ways
to empower women-along with other employees-to participate in it on
more equal terms. For feminist sociologist Christine Williams, who has
written widely on this topic, for example, the solution is not to eliminate
sexuality, but to ensure that women (and other disempowered cmployees)
have more power to shape how it is experienced.443 As Australian feminist
Rosemary Pringle has eloquently expressed the new goal: "Sexuality cannot
be 'banished' from the workplace.... It is only by insisting on its presence,
making it visible, asserting women's rights to be subjects rather than
objects of sexual discourses, that bureaucracy can be challenged. ' 444
Many scholars who write about issues pertaining to gay men, lesbians,
and other sexual minorities have taken a similar position. 45 Rather than
seeing sexuality as the problem, these writers see the drive to deny and
discipline it as a source of disproportionate harm to sexual minorities and,
along with them, everyone else. As Michael Warner has eloquently argued,
the impulse to "put sex in its place" creates "damaging hierarchies of shame
and elaborate mechanisms to enforce those hierarchies" throughout social
life.446 In sexual harassment cases in the courts, as we have seen, the
fixation on sexual advances has led to a two-tiered system of justice in
which people perceived to be homosexuals are frequently penalized as
442. KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER 111 (1993).
443. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 307, at 40 (arguing that it is neither realistic nor desirable
to seek to eliminate workplace sexuality "since the problem with sexual harassment is not that it is
sexual; the problem is that [it] is a form of workplace discrimination"); Williams et al., supra note
313, at 75 (arguing that employees "can and do make distinctions between sexual harassment and
assault on the one hand, and pleasurable, mutually desired sexual interactions and relationships on
the other," and that sociologists should seek to understand and distinguish between the
organizational contexts that elicit such different responses); Christine L. Williams, Sexual
Harassment and Sadomasochism, 17 HYPATIA 99, 105-06, 112-13 (2002) (arguing that some
organizations encourage sadomasochistic dynamics around sexuality, and urging that sexual
harassment policies must be part of larger efforts to reduce hierarchy and empower disadvantaged
workers).
444. PRINGLE, supra note 313, at 100 (emphasis added); see also CYNTHIA COCKBURN, IN
THE WAY OF WOMEN: MEN'S RESISTANCE TO SEX EQUALITY WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS 159(1993) (agreeing with Pringle that "'[o]pposition to sexual harassment is only one component of a
sexual politics in the workplace,"' and noting that "[t]he long agenda for the women's movement
in organizations must be to strengthen women's position and confidence in many different ways
so that we can reintroduce our bodies, our sexuality and our emotions on our own terms" (quoting
Rosemary Pringle, Bureaucracy and Sexuality: The Case of Secretaries, in THE SEXUALITY OF
ORGANIZATION, supra note 313, at 158, 166)).
445. For writers in this tradition, see WARNER, supra note 312; Franke, supra note 438;
Halley, supra note 312; Rubin, supra note 419; and Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of
Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000).
446. WARNER, supra note 312, at 195.
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sexual harassers, but rarely, if ever, protected as harassees. 447 Within
organizations, the drive to suppress sexuality has also created
disproportionate problems for homosexuals and other sexual minorities,
whose sexual expression-and even mere presence-may be perceived as
offensive or threatening in a world governed by the ethic of asexuality. 44 '
With these understandings, writers in this tradition have begun to refuse to
equate workplace sexual conduct with gender or sexual orientation
discrimination.449 Instead, like a growing number of feminists, they have
adopted a stance that acknowledges the inevitability and power of sexuality
in human affairs and calls for tolerating-and even cultivating-a wider
scope for sexual diversity and sexual expression in our institutions.
Adopting such a stance does not require a Pollyannaish attitude that
workplace sexuality is always benign or even a libertarian one that it is
usually private and beyond the scope of inquiry. Sexuality is often used as a
weapon against others in the workplace, as discussed above. Nor does it
require denying that, at present, many women may experience sexual
conduct as more threatening, or more uncomfortable, than most men do in
many workplace settings. 450 But the new stance does suggest that we need a
different strategy for dealing with these problems. As we have seen, sexual
harassment is linked to the gender-based stratification of work, most
notably the sex segregation of jobs (and the accompanying pay and status
inequalities). Where women have not been fully integrated, promoted, and
accepted as equals, it is predictable that some male bosses or workers will
be threatened and will engage in sexual (as well as nonsexual) forms of
harassment designed to highlight the women's difference or inferiority and
keep them in their place. Such harassment occurs in both male-dominated
job settings and in female-dominated ones governed by male authority.
Thus, to the extent that women may be more likely than others to perceive
sexual conduct as threatening, this is because they remain at a structural
447. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1777-89 (showing how under the desire-dominance
paradigm, courts presume that homosexuals are acting out of sexual desire while heterosexuals are
not, with the effect of casting gay men as harassers but almost never as harassees); Yoshino, supra
note 445, at 450-51 (showing how the erasure of bisexuality contributes to this dynamic).
448. Cf WOODS & LUCAS, supra note 16, at 20-25, 35-36 (showing how our society's
conception of the proper workplace is asexual, and revealing how many gay men buy into the
notion that to reveal their sexual orientation would be "unprofessional" and assume that they can
and should subordinate their sexual identities to their work roles); id. passim (same).
449. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 312, at 15 (arguing that current interpretations of sexual
harassment facilitate the phenomenon of "sexuality harassment," in which sexual minorities are
accused of sexual harassment by homophobic heterosexuals who invite the attentions of sexual
minorities but then deny their own desires); Yoshino, supra note 445, at 446-58 (arguing in favor
of making bisexuality visible so that heterosexuals will no longer be able to take advantage of a
presumption that their sexual conduct is always harmless horseplay, and will pressure courts to
move away from the current paradigm that equates sexually motivated conduct with sexual
harassment and assumes that homosexuals always act with sexual motivations).
450. See GUTEK, supra note 47, at 45-49.
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disadvantage in most workplaces, and this disadvantage makes them
vulnerable to the use of sexual shaming as a badge of gender-based
inferiority.
At a cultural level, we must seek ways to empower women to band
together to renounce the association of femaleness with sexual shame,
while, at a structural level, encouraging management to dismantle the
patterns of gender inequality that produce their vulnerability. In a world in
which some men seek to degrade women through sexual overtures and
ridicule, women can reclaim some control by refusing to exhibit the sense
of sexual humiliation and degradation the gestures are designed to inspire.
Activists can help women find ways to resist sexual forms of harassment by
refusing to cede sexuality as a "technology of sexism. ' 45' A parallel
strategy may apply to men who are perceived as failing to conform to the
dominant image of suitable masculinity for the job (including gay men),
who are also at risk for sexual harassment and discrimination in sex-
segregated job settings.
But as important as it is to mount campaigns of cultural resistance, it is
unrealistic to expect many people to do so when they are in a position of
structural weakness. To enable women and gender-nonconforming men to
adopt strategies of resistance and change, we must put them in positions in
which they have the power to participate in shaping their organizations'
cultural norms about sexuality along more empowering lines. In other
words, we must find ways to disaggregate sexuality from gender hierarchy
within organizations, so that no group can monopolize sexuality's power in
the name of male dominance, female sexual victimization, or managerial
control. Toward that end, we can reshape sex harassment law to offer
employers the incentive to desegregate their workplaces-rather than
desexualizing them-while, in the transition period, securing even better
protection against harassment than Title VII currently provides, as the next
Section explains.
B. Recommitting to Structural Equality Through the Law
The foregoing analysis opens up a new remedial strategy. Instead of
encouraging employers to deal with sex harassment by prohibiting sexual
interaction, the law should encourage them to attend to the larger structures
of gender inequality in which genuine sex harassment flourishes. We
should stop treating sex harassment as an individual transgression to be
solved by punishing individual employees and supervisors. Nor should we
45 1. See Franke, supra note 438, at 693 (referring to sexual harassment as a "technology of
sexism" because "the act embodies fundamental gender stereotypes" and "is both the manner of
accomplishing sexist goals, and the specialized instantiation of a sexist ideology").
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regard sex harassment as a problem of male "locker-room culture" that
requires management to tear asunder workers' hard-earned cultures in the
name of protecting some employees from subjective offense. Instead, we
should create incentives for employers to do away with the structures of sex
segregation and hierarchy that give sexualized work cultures and individual
sexual behaviors the power to harm.
As a precondition for any legal reform, we must be clear about the
types of conduct that can constitute sex harassment. As I have emphasized,
it is the misguided emphasis on sexual conduct that creates the legal
justification for sanitization. It is only by abandoning this sexual focus that
the legal system can convey clearly to organizations that their proper goal is
not to eliminate sexual conduct, but rather to dismantle sex discrimination.
Thus, as I have argued elsewhere,4 52 courts and regulators should make
crystal clear that the definition of sex harassment does not require sexual
conduct but instead may include any type of conduct that occurs because of
sex-regardless of whether it is sexual, nonsexual but overtly sexist, or
even gender-neutral in content.453
But correcting the definition of sex harassment is not enough, so long
as our understanding of harassment remains rooted in a conception of
individual bad behavior or culturally insensitive conduct, rather than being
regarded as a potential manifestation of larger patterns of sex segregation or
inequality. In fact, if all we were to do is broaden the definition of
harassment to include nonsexual conduct, without also broadening the
inquiry to examine whether the alleged harassment is linked to larger
workplace inequalities, we might risk merely encouraging employers to
prohibit nonsexual, but overtly sexist, speech in addition to prohibiting
sexual speech and conduct.
454
452. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1798 (urging that courts consider "all of the challenged
conduct-sexual and nonsexual-in connection with... hostile work environment claim[s]").
453. In the wake of recent criticisms in the scholarly literature, some lower courts have begun
to take seriously the notion that both sexual and nonsexual forms of harassment can create a
hostile work environment. See, e.g., Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 695 (2d Cir. 2001); O'Rourke
v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 730 (lst Cir. 2001); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d
139, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1999); cf Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 262 n.7 (3d Cir. 2001)
(applying similar reasoning in a race-based hostile work environment case). One court has even
held a sexual harassment policy inadequate on the ground that it did not include a prohibition on
nonsexual forms of harassment, in addition to sexual forms. See Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank,
202 F.3d 234, 245 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that such a policy was insufficient as a matter of
law to establish an affirmative defense that would relieve the employer of automatic liability for a
supervisor-created hostile work environment); see also Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387,
405-06 (lst Cir. 2002) (agreeing with plaintiff's argument that "L.L. Bean's sexual harassment
policy is fundamentally flawed insofar as it prohibits only sexually offensive behavior, not
nonsexual conduct motivated by gender bias," but noting in dicta that a company's failure to
protect employees adequately from all types of actionable harassment does not amount to a
discriminatory policy or practice).
454. Contrary to the suggestion of some commentators, see Young, supra note 157, at 31
(suggesting that my approach would "require employers to proscribe politically incorrect
comments about gender-for instance, that mothers with small children should stay home-and
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The most crucial step, therefore, is to create incentives for
organizations to fully integrate their workforces, rather than simply
desexualizing their environments, as a means of complying with sex
harassment law. The theoretical justification for doing so is straightforward.
In an ideal world, the goal would be to put women in a position of complete
equality in fully integrated work settings, so that they would have equal
power to shape the environments and cultures in which they work to their
own liking. In such a world, even if some women ended up working in
environments that included a lot of sexual conduct and expression, we
would be comfortable concluding that the presence of such conduct was not
itself a product of sex discrimination. Of course, even in such egalitarian
environments, sexual conduct-like any other form of conduct-might still
be used as a weapon of sex discrimination against individual women or
men, so we would still need to protect individuals from harassment directed
at them because of their sex. But, by definition, we would not equate the
mere presence of sexual conduct with sex discrimination.
Many things go into making an environment free from sex
discrimination, but for purposes of evaluating whether complained-of
sexual conduct is likely to be part of a larger complex of sex discrimination,
the available research suggests that the most important variable is the
degree of sex segregation in the job and work setting. As we have seen, the
gender composition of the work setting makes a difference as to how
women and men experience sexual conduct at work: The very same sexual
behaviors are understood differently depending on whether they occur in a
traditionally sex-segregated job setting or instead in a well-integrated,
egalitarian one. Thus, by tying the risk of liability for sex harassment to the
degree to which the employer has achieved sex integration and equality in
the relevant positions, we can provide women with the power and ability to
shape their work cultures along more empowering lines.
The basic idea is simple. For organizations that succeed in achieving a
high degree of integration and equality in the relevant positions, we would
offer the proverbial "carrot" of a lower risk of liability for sexual
harassment claims. But for organizations that remain significantly
perhaps even comments questioning an individual woman's competence in a 'masculine' job"),
the point of my approach is not to ban sexist speech. The point is to define hostile work
environments in a way that is sensitive to context, recognizing that the same speech or conduct
that is likely to signal a larger pattern of discrimination in a highly sex-segregated work setting
may have no such implication in a fully integrated, egalitarian one. Thus, in a highly segregated
setting, overtly sexist comments-such as comments that women do not belong in a "man's
job"-are likely to be part of a broader campaign of discriminatory conduct designed to drive the
womcn away or undermine their ability to pursue or succeed at the job. See Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1495-501 (M.D. Fla. 1991). But in a fully
integrated setting in which women have equal responsibility and influence, such comments are
unlikely to be part of such a broader pattern of discriminatory conduct and are unlikely to interfere
with the women's employment prospects in any meaningful way.
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segregated, we would use the "stick" of imposing an even higher risk of
liability for sexual harassment claims than they currently face.455 For
organizations in the middle, the current liability rules would continue to
apply. Under this approach, employers would have the option to
desegregate, rather than desexualizing, as a way to avoid sex harassment
liability. The shift would make sex harassment law parallel to disparate
impact law, which provides employers the option of hiring a balanced
workforce or validating selection procedures that can be shown to cause
imbalance.
Thus, for plaintiffs who work in jobs or settings that remain
significantly segregated or unequal, we would make it easier to prove a
hostile work environment claim. In addition to permitting them to challenge
nonsexual forms of harassment, we would create a rebuttable presumption
that any type of harassment that has been directed at them, whether sexual
or nonsexual, has occurred because of sex within the meaning of Title
VII. 45 6 This change would extend to nonsexual forms of harassment, such
as physical violence and hazing, the same presumption of but-for causation
that currently applies to more sexual forms, such as sexual advances and
assault.457 In addition, we might extend to such plaintiffs the benefit of a
rebuttable presumption that any complained-of harassment that had
occurred because of sex was sufficiently severe or pervasive to be
actionable. Thus, for example, where women who work in the trades or
firefighting have knives drawn on them, rats placed in their lunchboxes, or
sexual taunts and ridicule hurled at them, courts would presume that such
patterns of conduct are sex-based and sufficiently severe and pervasive to
cause employment-related harm.
For women who work in male-dominated job categories, such a shift
would be warranted because, as we have seen, they are frequently, even
predictably, the target of both sexual and nonsexual forms of harassment
that undermine their ability to do their jobs. As discussed above, similar
pressures may exist and may justify relaxed evidentiary standards for other
plaintiffs in sex-segregated settings, such as women who work in female-
455. Cf Paul J. Spiegelman, Remedies for Victim Group Isolation in the Workplace: Court
Orders, Problem Solving, and Affirmative Action in the Post-Stotts Era, 29 HOW. L.J_ 191, 254
(1986) (describing the threat of court sanctions as the "stick" that would create pressure for
employers to desegregate, and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), as the "carrot"
that would insulate them from legal liability for reverse discrimination if they did so).
456. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1801 (proposing that "[a]t least in close cases, courts could
assume that the challenged conduct is gender-based where it is directed at women who work in
'traditionally segregated job categories"' (quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 630
(1987))).
457. In doing so, it would eliminate the two-tiered structure of causation that I have criticized
in earlier work. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1739-43 (documenting that in cases involving sexual
advances thought to be motivated by sexual desire, the courts presume that the conduct occurred
because of sex, whereas in cases involving other types of harassment, the courts apply no such
presumption and ofien miss the gender dynamics involved).
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dominated settings and who experience harassment at the hands of their
male bosses, 458 or men who work in traditionally male-dominated settings
and who experience overtly gender-based harassment at the hands of their
male coworkers. 59
At the other end of the spectrum, for plaintiffs who work in settings that
are fully integrated and free from discrimination, we would make it more
difficult to win hostile work environment claims. Because, by definition,
the pressures associated with tokenism and skewed sex ratios would have
been alleviated in such settings, we would not expect any gender-based
patterns of harassment to occur routinely; nor would we expect any sexual
conduct to be part of any larger pattern of sex discrimination. Of course,
even in completely integrated, egalitarian settings, particular individuals
might still engage in sex-based harassment, and particular individuals might
still be singled out for it, so we would still need to protect people from such
isolated instances of sex-based harassment, but subject to more stringent
standards of proof. Thus, for purposes of establishing the requisite harm in
such settings, we might require proof that the challenged conduct materially
interfered with the plaintiff's ability to perform or succeed in the job
(personal perceptions of abusiveness or offense would not suffice to show
severity or pervasiveness). Similarly, for purposes of causation, we might
require proof that the conduct was undertaken with a discriminatory
purpose of treating the plaintiff differently because of her sex (mere sexual
content or presumed sexual desire wouldn't suffice). Under these standards,
proving a hostile work environment claim would become similar to proving
an individual disparate treatment claim, which requires proof of
discriminatory purpose and a material change in the terms or conditions of
employment.46 °
458. See supra notes 321-326 and accompanying text.
459. See supra note 327 and accompanying text. For these plaintiffs it would not be
appropriate to presume from the outset that any alleged harassment, however gender-neutral in
content, was sex-based. In many male-dominated fields, workers engage in rituals of hazing or
horseplay, see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Drilling Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998),
that are motivated by considerations other than gender, including a desire to build solidarity with
one another. But once a plaintiff had shown that his gender played some role in the harassment,
perhaps through evidence of overtly gender-based comments, see, e.g., Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F.
Supp. 1452, 1453 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (adjudicating a claim filed by a male maintenance mechanic
whose coworkers taunted him with overtly gender-based comments, such as belittling him for not
having a wife or girlfriend and telling him a man had to be married to be a machinist, as they
sabotaged his work and physically assaulted him), courts could apply a rebuttable presumption
that the pattern of harassment as a whole was based on sex within the meaning of Title VII.
460. As I have explained in earlier work, hostile work environment harassment is best
conceptualized as a species of disparate treatment; both claims require proof of causation, harm,
and employer liability. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 1714-16. To satisfy the causation requirement
in individual disparate treatment cases, courts typically require a plaintiff to show proof that the
complained-of conduct was undertaken with a discriminatory purpose of treating her differently
"because of sex"; in hostile work environment cases, courts traditionally have relaxed this
requirement by extending plaintiffs the benefit of a presumption that unwelcome conduct of a
sexual nature occurred "because of sex" within the meaning of Title VII. See id. at 1739-41. To
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This approach would shift incentives in the right direction for
employers. Employers would no longer face pressure to punish isolated
instances of sexual conduct and expression, because under the proposed
approach, no amount of sexual conduct or speech, in and of itself, would
create sexual harassment liability. Instead, complaints about sexual
conduct, like complaints about any other type of conduct, would simply
provide a signal for organizations to examine whether they need to "break[]
down old patterns of... segregation and hierarchy"461 -an inquiry that lies
at the heart of employment discrimination law. Once such problems had
been addressed, harassment would be actionable only under more stringent
disparate-treatment-like standards. Thus, the more organizations integrate
women equally into all lines of work and all levels of authority, the less
likely they will be to incur liability for hostile work environment
harassment.
Similar measures are needed to shift the incentives surrounding quid
pro quo sexual harassment claims alleging that supervisors conditioned
tangible employment benefits on sexual demands.462 As we have seen, the
fear of liability for this type of harassment has led firms to adopt
extraordinary measures to control supervisors' sexual behavior, including
rules against consensual dating or socializing with subordinates or even
meeting with them behind closed doors (for fear of creating the opportunity
for, or impression of, sexual harassment). Yet, because suits alleging
disparate treatment in the terms and conditions of employment are so hard
to win, there is little pressure for firms to address the nonsexual forms of
discrimination and abuse that many employees experience at the hands of
their bosses and coworkers. Particularly in traditionally female-dominated
satisfy the harm requirement in individual disparate treatment cases, courts typically require a
plaintiff to show that the complained-of conduct altered the terms and conditions of employment
by effecting a tangible job detriment; in hostile work environment cases, courts relax this
requirement by allowing plaintiffs to show that even conduct that does not effect a tangible job
detriment can be sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of employment for the
victim and a reasonable person in her position. See id. at 1714-16. Thus, under the approach I am
proposing here, requiring a hostile work environment plaintiff who works in a fully integrated job
setting to show that she was treated differently because of her sex, without presuming that sexual
conduct automatically satisfies this requirement, renders the proof of the causation element similar
to that required for a disparate treatment claim. Similarly, requiring the plaintiff to show that the
complained-of conduct materially interfered with her ability to perform or succeed in the job,
without allowing proof of personal offense alone to suffice to satisfy the element, moves the proof
of the harm requirement closer to that required for a disparate treatment claim.
461. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979)).
462. In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court made clear that for purposes of
assessing employer liability in cases involving harassment by supervisors, the important
distinction is not between quid pro quo harassment and hostile work environment harassment, but
between harassment that is backed up by a tangible employment action and harassment that is not.
524 U.S. 742, 751-54, 764-65 (1998). For ease of reference, I will refer to situations in which
supervisors condition employment benefits on demands for sexual services or other sex-related,
but non-job-related, services as quid pro quo harassment.
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settings, as we have seen, male supervisors often exercise paternalistic,
sexist forms of authority that demean female employees' intelligence and
undermine their self-confidence and competence on the job.
It would be difficult (and not always appropriate) to reverse the trend
toward antifratemization rules. In some organizations (including those
characterized by particularly hierarchical relationships or special concerns
about abuse between older and much younger people), it may make sense
for management to discourage supervisors from initiating sexual or other
intimate relationships with subordinates who report to them. But we should
take steps to create a legal environment in which quid pro quo harassment
is not singled out for more opprobrium than nonsexual sex discriminatory
abuses of managerial authority. By treating sexual impositions no better,
and no worse, than any other sex-based form of managerial abuse, we can
make clear that the law tolerates no form of sexism in the terms and
conditions of employment.
Applying the desegregation approach helps shift incentives in the right
direction for quid pro quo harassment cases. This type of harassment is
often linked to vertical sex segregation, which occurs when members of one
sex have job authority over members of another sex (usually male over
female, in our society). By tying the risk of liability to the degree of vertical
segregation associated with the positions in question, we would encourage
organizations to integrate their supervisory positions as well as their line-
level jobs. For example, in a setting in which men had traditionally
supervised female workers, we might apply to a male supervisor's demand
for feminine-stereotyped services that are not in a female employee's job
description 463 a rebuttable presumption that the demands were based on sex
within the meaning of Title VII. This proposal would extend to demands for
nonsexual services, such as serving food or cleaning up or performing
secretarial services, the same presumption of causation that currently
applies to demands for sexual services in vertically sex-segregated settings.
But in settings where women had been fully incorporated into the
supervisory positions and men into the jobs below, we would require the
usual, more concrete proof that any objected-to demands were gender-
based. Even in well-integrated, egalitarian firms, managerial abuses of
authority might continue, but they would be no longer tied to systematic
patterns of sex discrimination and no longer the special province of
463. See, e.g., Smith v. Tex. Dep't of Water Res., 818 F.2d 363, 368-70 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Politz J., dissenting) (involving a male division director of a Texas agency, who demanded that
his former secretary relieve his own assistant of clerical duties every day while she was on break,
despite an earlier promise that she would no longer have to perform clerical work once she
transferred into a traditionally male job in the topography department); see also supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
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harassment law; thus, the usual disparate treatment standards would suffice
to handle any isolated instances of sex-based mistreatment that may occur.
Some readers may be concerned that by focusing so heavily on
achieving desegregation and nondiscrimination at the expense of protecting
women from sexual abuse, the approach I am proposing leaves individual
women at the mercies of men in an arena that is still largely governed by
male norms. 464 But, it is important to recognize that for women who work
in significantly segregated job settings (still the vast majority of women),
my approach provides more, rather than less, protection from harassment
than does current law: Regardless of whether the setting is male-dominated
or female-dominated, the standards would be lower for proving harassment
than they are now and would better cover nonsexual forms of harassment.
For women who work in settings that are somewhat mixed but not
sufficiently integrated to alleviate the problems associated with skewed
ratios, the current liability rules would continue to apply. It is only women
who work in fully integrated, structurally egalitarian settings who will face
more difficult standards of proof for sexual harassment-and that is as it
should be. The ultimate goal should not be a separate-but-equal regime that
protects women from exposure to sexual conduct, but the creation of a
regime in which they have the power to shape workplace cultures and
norms for themselves.
Other readers may worry that I have placed too much emphasis on
desegregation and not enough on other forms of discrimination that might
prevent women from participating equally in forming their workplace
environments. As stressed above, however, desegregation is only being
used as a proxy for nondiscrimination. It may turn out that in some
organizations that have integrated women into all lines of work and
authority, residual or new patterns of sex discrimination in pay,
responsibility, or job status will continue to undermine some employees'
ability to shape their workplace environments equally. If so, then these
patterns would serve as proof of discrimination that could prevent the
organization from gaining the benefit of the more favorable liability rules
for sex harassment. Over time, as new research proceeds, scholars may be
able to specify additional measures that can be used, along with the degree
of sex segregation, to predict the circumstances in which organizations will
have achieved an equilibrium in which no group of employees lacks
meaningful power and influence over their workplace cultures. 465 In the
464. For an argument that the workplace is an institution that is governed by male norms, see
Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169,
1219-20 (1998) (arguing that sexual harassment is a strategy to entrench masculine norms and a
masculine imaginary in the workplace).
465. See, e.g., Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29
CONTEMP. SOC. 319 (2000) (suggesting that such measures as reducing the level of subjectivity in
the selection and evaluation processes, providing more and better-quality information about
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 2179
The Yale Law Journal
meantime, social scientists can help flesh out the details of the
desegregation approach.
One important issue is the degree of sex segregation that would subject
an organization to the less favorable liability rules and the degree of
integration required to claim the more favorable rules. Rosabeth Moss
Kanter's work provides a clear set of parameters for this analysis. Kanter
coined the term "skewed groups" to refer to "those in which there is a large
preponderance of one type over another, up to a ratio of perhaps 85:15.""466
In this situation, she noted, "[t]he numerically dominant types also control
the group and its culture in enough ways to be labeled 'dominants.' The few
of another type in a skewed group can appropriately be called 'tokens,'
for .. they are often treated as representatives of their category, as symbols
rather than individuals.
467
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Kanter wrote, a minority group
would have to achieve proportions of 40-50% in order to establish a
"balanced" group in which they would have meaningful influence over the
culture: "Finally at about 60:40 and down to 50:50, the group becomes
balanced. Culture and interaction reflect this balance. Majority and minority
turn into potential subgroups that may or may not generate actual type-
based identifications. 4 6 8 In between these extremes, Kanter noted, were
"tilted groups," with ratios of "perhaps 65:35," which "begin to move
toward less extreme distributions and less exaggerated effects.,
46 9
Kanter's typology suggests some sensible and easy-to-apply parameters
for my proposed approach, as follows: If a plaintiff were part of a skewed
group (i.e., one that comprised less than 15% of the relevant positions), the
organization would be subject to the less favorable liability rules that apply
to organizations that remain significantly segregated. If a plaintiff were part
of a balanced group (i.e., one that constituted 40-50% of the relevant
positions), the organization would be subject to the more favorable liability
rules that apply to organizations that have achieved full integration. In
between these extremes, if a plaintiff were part of a tilted group (i.e., one
that constituted between 15% and 39% of the relevant positions), the
current liability rules would continue to apply.
To the extent that Kanter's work has been confirmed by subsequent
research, the potential availability of such clear parameters simplifies the
reform process. Organizations would find it easy to predict where they
stood in relation to legal requirements, a transparency that makes it more
members of discriminated-against groups who are hired, and requiring supervisors to be
accountable for the treatment and performance of such employees may help reduce the harmful
dynamics associated with numerical rarity); Fiske & Glick, supra note 3 18 (same).
466. KANTER, supra note 13, at 208.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 209.
469. Id.
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likely that they would undertake reform. In addition, an organization would
have incentive to continue to integrate more and more fully because the
organization would continue to receive a benefit with the transition to each
new category. Finally, the new approach would be easy to codify. The
EEOC could urge the necessary changes through new policy-guidance
memos or guidelines, and courts could implement them as a matter of
judicial interpretation.4 7 0 No legislative action would be required.
Another important issue is how to handle harassment involving
intersectional minorities. It bears emphasizing that my approach could only
benefit such groups. For example, women of color who work in
significantly sex-segregated environments (as most do) and who are
subjected to harassment based even in part on sex (and perhaps on race,
also) would get the benefit of the more lenient rules for proving harassment:
Once they showed that they worked in such an environment, both the
470. Presumably, the standards proposed here could be harmonized with the applicable legal
standards. One concern is the extent to which employers are legally permitted to engage in
voluntary affirmative action or undertake other sex-consciuus measures to attract women or
gender-nonconforming men. The courts have created legal standards for determining when jobs
are sufficiently sex- or race-segregated to justify voluntary sex-conscious remedial action by
private employers under Title VII. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 630 (1987)
(citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979), for the notion of "traditionally
segregated job categories"). The standard is higher for public employers to justify such remedial
action under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, at least in the context of race-
conscious action, see City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (requiring a firm
evidentiary basis for concluding that the underrepresentation of minorities is attributable to past
discrimination, including evidence approaching a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory
violation), for which the governing constitutional standard is strict scrutiny, see Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that "all racial classifications,
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny"). Although the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the point,
some courts of appeals have held that the applicable standard is the same for public employers to
undertake sex-conscious remedial action, see, e.g., Brunet v. City of Columbus, I F.3d 390, 404
(6th Cir. 1993); Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1989), but others have held that,
because the governing constitutional standard for sex discrimination is only middle-tier scrutiny,
the test for justifying sex-based remedial action is lower, see, e.g., Eng'g Contractors Ass'n v.
Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 909 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that "a gender-conscious
affirmative action program can rest safely on something less than the 'strong basis in evidence'
required to bear the weight of a race- or ethnicity-conscious program"); Ensley Branch, NAACP
v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1579 (11th Cir. 1994) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender
classifications, and stating that "[w]hile it may seem odd that it is now easier to uphold affirmative
action programs for women than for racial minorities, Supreme Court precedent compels that
result").
It bears emphasizing that for most organizations, no sex-conscious action will be required to
achieve substantial desegregation. Organizations will simply need to set up systems to ensure
against conscious or unconscious discrimination against women or men on the basis of sex. See,
e.g., Reskin, supra note 465 (discussing measures that might be taken); cf Vicki Schultz, Telling
Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in
Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1815-39 (1990)
(showing that women's underrepresentation in male-dominated lines of work is not attributable to
any lack of interest in such work, but instead to discriminatory practices of employers); id. at 1758
n.25 (documenting that, where courts have held employers liable for sex discrimination,
employers have had little trouble attracting large numbers of women to traditionally male-
dominated jobs).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 2181
The Yale Law Journal
sexual and nonsexual harassment (including any racial harassment) would
count toward proving a hostile work environment, and plaintiffs would get
the benefit of the relaxed evidentiary standards for showing causation and
harm. 471 Furthermore, even sex-integrated organizations could not avoid
these more stringent liability rules by hiring only white women; under the
relevant case law, a firm would have to show that it employed a sufficient
number of the particular group of women of color in order to avoid the
more stringent liability rules for a combined sex- and race-based
harassment claim.47 Viewed from a different perspective, some readers
may fear that the existence of expanded liability rules in sex-segregated
settings could lead to increased and disproportionate monitoring of men of
color, because they are often hypersexualized. But, men of color who are
falsely accused of sexual harassment should be less likely to be disciplined
or punished under my approach, because it encourages companies to
engage in structural reform rather than imposing punitive sanctions against
individual employees as a way of addressing sex harassment. Apart from
these intersectional issues, the application of the desegregation approach to
claims of racial harassment alone and to other claims brought by numerical
minorities (such as sexual minorities) is an important issue that awaits
further work.473
471. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416-17 (10th Cir. 1987) (allowing
a Black female to aggregate proof of racial harassment with sexual harassment for purposes of
proving a hostile work environment claim).
472. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032-35 (5th
Cir. 1980) (holding that an employer could not defend against a disparate treatment claim brought
by Black women by showing that it had hired sufficient numbers of white women or Black men,
but instead had to show that it had hired sufficient numbers of Black women specifically); see
also Thomas F. Pettigrew & Joanne Martin, Shaping the Organizational Context for Black
American Inclusion, 43 J. SOC. ISSUES 41, 71 (1987) (arguing that to "address the issues of solo
status and tokenism, there must be a critical mass of a given minority group," rather than an
"accumulation of members of a variety of minority groups").
473. As a theoretical matter, the analysis of the dynamics of tokenism applies to any form of
discrimination in which it is possible to identify markers of dominance versus markers of
disadvantage. Thus, it is not surprising that these same dynamics have been documented for racial
minorities, such as African Americans, who enter traditionally white-dominated positions. See,
e.g., Pettigrew & Martin, supra note 472, at 41, 47-49, 56-58, 62-64 (discussing how Blacks
experience numerous forms of hostility and exclusion, including being subjected to an assumption
of incompetence and to the "ultimate attribution error," in which positive Black performance is
explained away while negative performance is used to reinforce negative stereotypes); see also
PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999) (providing a
poignant example of how the pressures of tokenism affected an African-American man in a
historically white law-firm setting). Yet, the application of my desegregation approach to racial
harassment claims made by racial minorities (or sexuality discrimination claims made by sexual
minorities) requires special consideration because, unlike women as a whole, these groups are in
many areas of the country only a small proportion of the population and thus, even in well-
integrated and nondiscriminatory companies, would remain present only in small numbers.
Despite these differences, Kanter's typology remains helpful in specifying how the desegregation
approach might be applied to such claims. Where a plaintiff who brought a harassment claim was
part of a skewed group (i.e., one that comprised less than 15% of the relevant work groups), the
organization would be subjected to the less favorable liability rules that apply to organizations that
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Ultimately, even readers who are attracted to my approach may be
concerned that it is too weak to bring about meaningful change. It is true
that the reform suggested here alone will not be adequate to shift incentives
away from desexualization, and toward desegregation, for all organizations.
But this can be seen as a virtue rather than a defect. For a variety of
institutional reasons independent of sexual harassment law, many
organizations may wish to prohibit at least some forms of sexual conduct.
Acting out of a sense of fiduciary obligation, for example, an organization
may want to prohibit sexual relationships between mentors and very young
charges, such as interns (though it may want to also protect them from
potentially exploitive demands for other non-job-related services, such as
babysitting or running errands). Or, in order to guarantee all employees
equal access to superiors who can make or break their careers, a large-scale
organization may prohibit or discourage sexual relationships between
managers and employees they directly supervise (though it may also need
to consider what to do about other one-on-one relationships that lead to
are significantly segregated, just as in the sex harassment context. (So, for example, the plaintiff
might not have to show racial remarks or racial epithets in order to prove causation; instead, the
plaintiff would get the benefit of the rebuttable presumption that the harassing conduct had
occurred because of race.) Yet, even where the organization had achieved full integration, the
plaintiffs work group would be unlikely to become a "balanced group" (i.e., 40-50% minority)
that would secure the organization the benefit of the more favorable liability rules. Instead, even
under full integration, the plaintiff's group would be likely to remain a "tilted group" (i.e., 15-39%
minority), and, as a result, the current liability rules for such harassment claims would continue to
apply.
According to Kanter's predictions, members of numerical minorities who work in tilted
groups are not completely powerless; they can form "potential allies among each other, can form
coalitions, and can affect the culture of the group." KANTER, supra note 13, at 209. Thus, in order
to defeat the dynamics of tokenism and significantly improve their status, members of racial and
sexual minority groups must work together to gain allies and form effective coalitions in order to
obtain the collective numerical strength needed to change their workplace cultures. It is worth
noting that, even in the context of sex discrimination, because women are not a monolithic group,
women of different races and sexual orientations also have to work together to achieve the
numerical strength needed to change their cultures. Thus, almost all campaigns to change hostile
work environments will involve numerical minorities who must join forces with other similarly
situated groups to change the workplace in ways that benefit all of them. In addition to adopting
my proposed reforms, we should consider adopting additional legal changes designed to facilitate
coalition building, and to address insider-group preference in a way that would benefit all
minority groups who are subject to the dynamics of tokenism. See, e.g., Clark Freshman,
Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science Theories Identify Discrimination and
Promote Coalitions Between "Different" Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 322-26, 352, 410-
26 (2000) (proposing a concept of "generalized discrimination" to recognize that discrimination
often consists of a dominant group preferring its own members at the expense of other groups,
rather than that group acting out bias toward other groups, and proposing appropriate legal
reforms); Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup
Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 123-41 (2002) (proposing that hostile work environment harassment
law be expanded to allow claims brought by white men who are discriminated against because
they align themselves with the cause of women or racial minorities, in order to facilitate cross-
gender and cross-racial efforts at solidarity). More social science research is needed to specify the
circumstances in which successful coalition building can occur.
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intimacy, such as playing golf or going out to a bar together, as explained
more fully below).
In these other situations, some organizations will not be swayed by the
proposed rule change, and that is as it should be. The goal of the proposed
reform is not to force every organization to have a sexualized culture, nor
even to induce all managers to allow sexual expression or conduct to the
fullest extent possible. (Indeed, for religious or other cultural reasons other
than gender, many people would not be comfortable working in a
sexualized company or job setting.) The goal of the proposed reform,
rather, is for the managers and employees in each organization, department,
and job setting to be able to work together to fashion their own work
cultures in a structure that is free from sex discrimination but is also free
from the pressure to suppress sexual conduct that sexual harassment law
now provides.
Thus, I have not suggested that organizations be prevented from placing
limits on their employees' sexual conduct. In fact, I resist the temptation to
expand other legal protections in order to develop countervailing pressures
on employers not to fire employees who are accused of harassment. Doing
so would place companies in a damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't
position, and it would not solve the underlying problem with sex
harassment law. The problem with sex harassment law isn't simply that it
overshoots in regulating private conduct or sexual expression; it is that it
misses the mark entirely in targeting sexuality rather than equal work
prospects as the underlying harm.
The approach I have proposed is designed to disrupt the current trend
toward desexualization in favor of greater pluralism. Organizations that
have independent reasons for suppressing sexual conduct may (and may
well) continue to do so-although they will no longer be able to rely on sex
harassment law or feminism as a justification for their actions. But for
organizations that have no such independent reason to prohibit sexual
conduct, and for those managers who believe it is good to allow employees
a wide degree of latitude in sexual matters, sex harassment law would now
provide an option. Instead of feeling that they have to suppress sexual
conduct in order to stave off sexual harassment liability, enlightened
managers could focus their energies on ensuring that women are recruited,
hired, promoted, and accepted equally in their organizations, as the next
Section explains.
C. Valuing Workplace Intimacy
At the organizational level, there is also much to be done. Most
obviously, employers should move away from standardized, stand-alone
sexual harassment policies that cover every possible form of "sexual"
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behavior. Instead, they should draft broader policies against sex-based
harassment and incorporate them into more comprehensive plans to achieve
gender integration at all levels of the organization and to prevent and
address sex discrimination throughout the firm. As I have emphasized
throughout this Article, it is only by creating contexts of structural equality
that women can meaningfully shape their own work cultures and sexual
norms.
Similarly, I would like to see firms abandon sexual harassment
sensitivity training sessions in favor of genuine measures of accountability
for achieving equality in all employment decisions-and keeping
employees challenged and happy, regardless of their sex. Training sessions
that tell male supervisors and employees to curtail sexual talk and conduct
in order to avoid insulting women's sexual sensibilities do nothing to solve
the underlying structural problems, and risk reinforcing stereotypes of
women as "different" and more easily offended.474 Indeed, men who are
told to monitor their behavior in the presence of others may resist by
claiming that they are the victims. 475 Instead, all employees should be
taught to treat each other as valuable, respected members of the work
group.
Finally, of course, there is no substitute for leadership at the top. Where
top management treats women as valuable players and places them in equal
positions of responsibility and authority throughout the organization, others
are likely to follow suit. Those who might seek to undermine women
through sexual or nonsexual means must worry that it is they-rather than
the women-who will end up on the margins; the same goes for gender-
nonconforming men. Similarly, where management expresses a tolerant
attitude toward benign sexual expression that does not undermine gender
equality, employees who are merely offended by such expression but who
have not been actually discriminated against may be less likely to feel they
can gain advantage by playing the sexual victimization card. Instead, all
employees may learn by example that gender equality and sexual openness
can coexist.
474. See Quinn, supra note 301, at 1178 (quoting a woman who claimed that her male
coworkers, after a sexual harassment training session, made jokes about how "We better not
offend the little girls! Better not say something or we're all going to get in trouble!"); see also
Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches, supra note 298, at 163-65 (criticizing the reliance on sexual
harassment training programs, and pointing out that no social science literature has proven their
effectiveness); Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's
Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 291, 376-77 (1995) (observing that
such training can have negative effects, such as prompting fears on the part of senior men about
mentoring young women); Elizabeth O'Hare Grundmann et al., The Prevention of Sexual
Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH AND TREATMENT 175, 182 (William
O'Donohue ed., 1997) (pointing out that such training programs can have negative effects,
including "giv[ing] the impression that 'something is being done,"' when "the reality is that it is
unclear whether the programs make any difference").
475. See Quinn, supra note 301, at 1178-79.
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Along these same lines, organizations should also consider carefully
whether they really need to curtail dating and other sexual relationships. In
general, managers should treat such relationships just as they treat
nonsexual, intimate relationships, intervening only where they have clear
evidence that specific organizational goals are being undermined. Of
course, dealing with sexual and other intimate relationships is not always
easy, but both organizations and employees stand to lose something vital
when consensual relationships between coworkers are restricted arbitrarily.
For employees, workplace intimacy, in all its forms, is a vital
mechanism for combating alienation and building morale and enthusiasm
for the job. Paradoxically, in their rush to sanitize the workplace wholesale,
some firms may even be sacrificing organizational productivity.
Sociological research has shown the importance of intimate bonds of
friendship between employees to organizational productivity. 476 Close
relationships among peers, like mentoring relationships, are valuable tools
for career advancement and for helping people "develop a continuing sense
of competence, responsibility, and identity as experts. ' ' 77 For similar
reasons, sexually charged but platonic "love" relationships among
employees, "unleashing as [they do] a great deal of creative energy, [have
been] shown to benefit both 'couple' and company. ', 478 In fact, a growing
body of empirical research shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
even more traditional forms of workplace romance 479 do not always
undermine employees' productivity, 480 but can actually enhance it.481 In
476. See Christine M. Riordan & Rodger W. Griffeth, The Opportunity for Friendship in the
Workplace: An Underexplored Construct, 10 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 141, 150 (1995); see also Lori
J. Ducharme & Jack K. Martin, Unrewarding Work, Coworker Support, and Job Satisfaction, 27
WORK & OCCUPATIONS 223 (2000); Jeanne S. Hurlbert, Social Networks, Social Circles and Job
Satisfaction, 18 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 415 (1991); Leonard 1. Pearlin, Alienation from Work: A
Study of Nursing Personnel, 27 AM. SOc. REV. 314 (1962).
477. Kathy E. Kram & Lynn A. Isabella, Mentoring Alternatives: The Role of Peer
Relationships in Career Development, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 110, 118 (1985); see also James G,
Clawson & Kathy E. Kram, Managing Cross-Gender Mentoring, BUS. HORIZONS, May-June
1984, at 22.
478. Eyler & Baridon, supra note 425, at 60; see also Lobel et al., supra note 427, at 10.
479. See supra note 233 (defining "'workplace romance"). Note that the typical definition of
workplace romance does not require physical consummation of the relationship, and hence, the
allegedly nonsexual love relationships referred to immediately above would satisfy the definition.
480. For over twenty-five years now, researchers have been examining the consequences of
workplace romance on employee productivity and the organizational bottom line. For summaries
of the literature, see Pierce et al., supra note 226, at 17-26; Gary N. Powell & Sharon Foley,
Something To Talk About: Romantic Relationships in Organizational Settings, 24 J. MGMT. 421,
434-36 (1998); and Williams et al., supra note 313, at 78-79. For studies finding mixed effects or
predominantly negative effects on romance participants' productivity or job performance, see, for
example, Quinn, supra note 233, at 46-47 tbls.6-7 (reporting from third-party observations that
15.3% of respondents thought that women and 17.1% thought that men in romantic workplace
relationships were more productive, while 21.9% thought men and 27.0% thought women in such
relationships did less work); and Anderson & Hunsaker, supra note 254, at 61-62 (reporting from
third-party observations that 21% of the women and 9% of the men in romantic relationships were
perceived as more productive, while a lower quality of work was attributed to 24% of the women
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 112:20612186
The Sanitized Workplace
terms of larger organizational effects, employees report that workplace
romance can create excitement among the work group, enhance
communication and cooperation, enhance teamwork, simulate creativity,
and create a happier work environment. On the negative side, employees
report that romance may take time away from work, increase gossip, and
412
create concerns about favoritism among coworkers.
Given this mixed picture, a number of management theorists and
organizational behavior scholars reject the impulse to sanitize the
workplace that human resource managers are promoting. According to
these scholars, policies that try to prevent and stop all sexual intimacy and
affect-related concerns may be more costly to firms than less restrictive
approaches. For one thing, the effort to prohibit romance may lead to
discriminatory outcomes because in many firms, for employees in
heterosexual couples, women will be more likely than men to be fired or
transferred.483 For married couples, no-spouse rules-which can be viewed
and 14% of the men). See also Anne B. Fisher, Getting Comfortable with Couples in the
Workplace, FORTUNE, Oct. 3, 1994, at 138, 139 (reporting from a poll of CEOs that 39% of them
thought couples working together, whether married or unmarried, could undermine productivity,
while 29% said they thought it could increase productivity, 22% said either or both could happen,
and 10% weren't sure).
481. For example, one recent study found that self-ratings of personal productivity and
performance were greater for those involved in workplace romances than for those not involved.
See Charles A. Pierce, Factors Associated with Participating in a Romantic Relationship in a
Work Environment, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1712 (1998). Other studies have found a
positive impact of workplace romance on the performance, job involvement, and enthusiasm of
participants who entered the romance out of a "love" motive, or a sincere desire to find affection
and long-term companionship. See, e.g., James P. Dillard, Close Relationships at Work:
Perceptions of the Motives and Performance of Relational Participants, 4 J. SOC. & PERS.
RELATIONSHIPS 179, 185 (1987) (finding that 28% of thosc who had participated in or observed
workplace romances thought that the overall performance by men who entered relationships with
coworkers improved, while 37% thought female performance improved (compared to 8%
assessing declines for men and 15% assessing declines for women)); James P. Dillard & Scott M.
Broetzmann, Romantic Relationships at Work: Perceived Changes in Job-Related Behaviors as a
Function of Participant's Motive, Partner's Motive, and Gender, 19 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 93, 106
(1989) (reporting, based on surveys of third parties, that employees "motivated by love were
perceived by others to take a more positive approach to their jobs" and "to carry out their work
with greater enthusiasm"); see also James Price Dillard et al., Close Relationships in Task
Environments: Perceptions of Relational Types. Illicitness, and Power, 7 MGMT. COMM. Q. 227,
250-51 (1994) (finding no effects on individual job performance of romance participants with a
love motive, and only minimal effects on individual job performance for those with job-related
motives). It is worth noting that these empirical studies do not rely on direct measures of job
performance, but rather rely on self-reports or third-party reports about the effects of observed
romances on productivity and other organizational outcomes.
482. See Williams et al., supra note 313, at 79 (collecting sources). Researchers have
cautioned that because many of the studies of the consequences of workplace romance have relied
on individual reports, they may be affected by a negativity bias in which research participants are
more conscious of, and better able to report on, the negative effects of workplace romance. See
Lisa A. Maniero, A Review and Analysis of Power Dynamics in Organizational Romances, 1
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 750, 755 (1986); Hal Witteman, The Interface Between Sexual Harassment
and Organizational Romance, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: COMMUNICATION IMPLICATIONS 27, 48
(Gary L. Kreps ed., 1993).
483. Witteman, supra note 482, at 48; see also Williams et al., supra note 313, at 80.
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as a type of antifraternization policy-have been demonstrated to have such
a discriminatory effect.4 84 But even in the absence of such biased effects,
scholars have argued, such policies may interfere with the development of
good working relationships that are vital for organizational effectiveness
and employee happiness. As one researcher put it, "[E]xplicit use of the
policy of stoppage and prevention signals members that they must limit
their emotional and interpersonal involvement with fellow workers.
Member acquiescence may produce interpersonal anxiety, distance, and
formality in the organization and, in general, prevent the emergence of
fulfilling interpersonal relationships."
485
For these reasons, a number of scholars and popular writers recommend
that companies create open climates and take a permissive approach to
romantic relationships, intervening only where it is clear that genuine
conflicts of interest exist or where it is clear that productivity is being
undermined.4 86 To paraphrase the recommendations made in one recent
book, companies should maintain a positive or at least neutral attitude
toward employee dating and socializing; support the inevitable marriages
and partnerships that occur; become involved only when relationships end
and cause workforce disturbances; be watchful with chain-of-command
relationships, taking steps to deal with potential favoritism charges, but
retaining the employees in the relationship; and support concepts of
employee trust and gender equality. 87 According to the author, companies
that create an open climate around dating and sexual issues are more likely
to also adopt other humanistic measures (such as eliminating no-spouse
rules, accommodating couples, and providing day care and family leave)
that may promote gender equality for women. 488 Thus, by recognizing the
inevitability of sexuality in organizational life and addressing it with
openness and tolerance, as sociologists Christine Williams and Dana
Britton put it, "we can begin to formulate less oppressive forms of
organizational life, ways of living in organizations that allow for diversity
in sexual norms and expressions and that encourage mutual respect....
[This] is a crucial first step in making the workplace a more equitable
environment for everyone." 4
89
484. See Chandler et al., supra note 436, at 64-66.
485. Witteman, supra note 482, at 47 (citation omitted).
486. See, e.g., Maniero, supra note 482, at 760; Witteman, supra note 482, at 52; Anderson &
Hunsaker, supra note 254, at 63.
487. See DENNIS M. POWERS, THE OFFICE ROMANCE: PLAYING WITH FIRE WITHOUT
GETTING BURNED 93-94 (1999).
488. Id, at 107 (observing from a survey of the "100 Best Companies for Working Mothers"
that "the more 'pro' a company is toward women and their careers, the more flexible that firm is
with romance").
489. Williams & Britton, supra note 295, at 18.
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Some readers may be concerned that, if organizations do not have rules
against dating and sexual relationships between supervisors and employees,
there will be nothing to prevent supervisors from exercising personal
favoritism toward employees with whom they are romantically involved.
This is a serious concern, but it is important to recognize that the problem
of favoritism is not confined to dating and sexual relationships. 490 After all,
supervisors may also develop nonsexual attachments that predispose them
to favor particular employees. (As women have long complained, playing
golf with the boss can lead to gender-based exclusion just as surely as going
to bed with him.) Nor is the problem of favoritism confined to boss-
employee relations. In organizations in which training or learning occurs
horizontally, among coworkers, women are frequently frozen out of the
social networks through which crucial job information is shared. (Going out
to a sports bar together may be just as likely to lead to gender-based forms
of exclusion as going out on a date together.)
As this discussion makes clear, the problem of favoritism cannot be
solved by an antifraternization rule alone. Approaching the problem that
way singles out sexual relationships in a way that obscures the exclusionary
dynamics that often underlie other personal affiliations. Under my
approach, the law would treat sexual and nonsexual forms of intimacy (and
exclusion) alike. This does not imply that organizations should ban all
forms of contact and intimacy-both sexual and nonsexual-between their
employees. But it does mean that organizations should take more seriously
the potential for discriminatory dynamics to develop in connection with
nonsexual forms of affiliation between supervisors and their employees, or
between coworkers who can affect each other's employment prospects.
The best way to deal with this problem is through desegregation, just as
my approach encourages. Once women are integrated fully into all
supervisory positions as well as the jobs below them, any problems of
favoritism or exclusion that remain will not be linked to sex discrimination.
In a context in which there are relatively equal numbers of male and female
supervisors who are overseeing relatively equal numbers of male and
female employees, any intimate associations that arise between a particular
supervisor and employee (or between one employee and another who can
affect her employment status) may still raise concerns about favoritism, but
the favoritism will not be linked to any systematic patterns of sexism that
exclude people from access to those in charge on the basis of sex.
In a world in which sexual harassment law no longer creates pressures
to desexualize, most organizations should have less incentive to address
490. For an illuminating discussion of this issue, see Carol A. Heimer, Doing Your Job and
Helping Your Friends: Universalistic Normns About Particular Others in Networks, in NETWORKS
AND ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE, FORM AND ACTION 143, 143-44 (Nitin Nohria & Robert G.
Eccles eds., 1992) (pointing out this paradox).
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potential favoritism charges by banning and punishing intimacy. Some
scholars have suggested, for example, that organizations with dynamic,
liberal cultures-organizations "which are characterized .. by creativity
and innovation, ' ' 91 and "which often contain an atmosphere of intense
pressure and activity that stimulates sexual excitement'"92-may embrace
more relaxed mores about sexual and other forms of intimacy as part of a
larger commitment to creating close synergies and an atmosphere of social
and intellectual openness within the organization.493 Indeed, some theorists
contend that the same forces that have led many firms to debureaucratize in
other respects should lead them to be more accepting of employees'
intimate relationships. As one organizational theorist summed it up:
"Warmed up" workplaces, in which interdependence,
cooperation, and communication between co-workers are
encouraged, offer greater opportunities for interpersonal affection
to arise than do workplaces in which workers have less frequent
contact with one another. Characteristics of effective relationships
(trust, respect, interaction, openness) overlap with characteristics
that can promote sexual attraction and romantic involvement.494
Thus, if firms want their employees to work together informally to
exchange ideas and to work together intensely to accomplish organizational
goals, managers may have to set aside traditional ideas of rationality that
depict intimacy and sexuality as irrational forces that belong outside
organizational life. As a burgeoning new literature on emotions in the
workplace suggests, rational aims are always carried out in workplace
social contexts alive with personality and passion. Human intimacy and
sexuality are the hidden fabric of organizational life, weaving together
people who, for better or worse, have linked fates.495
491. Powell & Foley, supra note 480, at 430.
492. Pierce et al., supra note 226, at 16.
493. For an example of this approach, see POWERS, supra note 487, at 116-17 (quoting an
executive who says they use mediation to resolve "even the knotty problems" such as "claims of
favoritism" and to help those involved in workplace romance solve their problems, rather than
taking a punitive approach).
494. Sharon A. Lobel, Sexuality at Work: Where Do We Go from Here?, 42 J. VOCATIONAL
BEHAV. 136, 140 (1993).
495. This is a one of the themes of the new literature on emotion in organizations, which
emphasizes both the rationality of emotion and the emotional component of rationality. See
GHERARDI, supra note 313, at 158 ("[F]eelings are at home in organizations. Indeed, the true glue
of organizations is the emotional structures that map out invisible walls and corridors according to
the positive and negative feelings that tie people together."); id. at 153 (arguing that
organizational scholars should "study, not a purported cold and abstract rationality which
identifies the emotions with the devil, but an emotional rationality where reason is colored by
sentiment and is part of everyday consciousness"); Blake E. Ashforth & Ronald H. Humphrey,
Emotion in the Workplace: A Reappraisal, 48 HUM. REL. 97, 97 (1995) ("[Olrganizational
scholars and practitioners frequently appear to assume that emotionality is the antithesis of
rationality.... In contrast to this perspective, we argue that emotionality and rationality are




No recent legal campaign for equality has seemed to achieve more
immediate and complete success than the one against sexual harassment.
Yet, the idea that the law has succeeded in creating egalitarian workplaces
is largely an illusion. Early on, as we have seen, the promise of sex
harassment law to help dismantle sex segregation and inequality was lost
and replaced with an emphasis on eradicating workplace sexuality. In the
process, sexual harassment law has bestowed new life and increased
legitimacy on an age-old managerial dream of achieving a perfectly rational
workplace devoid of sexuality and other distracting passions.
As the sexual sanitization campaign advances, some people are harmed
more than others, but we all lose. In the name of preventing sexual
harassment, employers increasingly ban or discourage employee romance,
chilling intimacy and solidarity among employees of both a sexual and
nonsexual variety. Many companies are punishing employees for behavior
that does not meet the legal definition of sex harassment, costing many
workers their jobs and undercutting their ability to express themselves and
create their own cultures and sexual norms. Women are encouraged to
translate-and perhaps even to understand-broader forms of
discrimination and managerial abuse as sexual harms. Perhaps most
disturbingly, managers sometimes invoke sex harassment law as a pretext
for firing people on discriminatory or otherwise suspect grounds, and
employees use it to legitimate their bias against coworkers of a different
race, sexual orientation, or class whose sexuality threatens or offends them.
In the face of these developments, neither managers nor their advisers
are considering the all-important question that Title VII demands we ask: Is
the sexual conduct in question being used to discriminate in purpose or
effect? As I hope to have persuaded readers, workplace sexual conduct isn't
necessarily discriminatory or harmful; employees often use sexuality in the
service of benign and even empowering ends. The sexual model of sex
harassment and the resulting sanitization campaign are based on a false
premise that sexuality is an individual attribute that can be isolated and
purged from institutions. Contemporary theorists of sexuality rightly point
out, however, that sexuality is a dynamic process that will inevitably be part
interpenetrated, emotions are an integral and inseparable part of organizational life, and emotions
are often functional for the organization."); Dennis K. Mumby & Linda L. Putnam, The Politics of
Emotion: A Feminist Reading of Bounded Rationality, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 465, 480 (1992)
("Rationality... is not a purely cognitive condition that people carry around in their heads; it is a
social phenomenon in which emotion plays an integral role. From this perspective, rationality
develops intersubjectively and is produced by the consensus that emerges through the
communicative practices of institutions.").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 2191
The Yale Law Journal
of organizational life. Above all, sexuality can only be understood in
context.
Recent sociological studies show that if we succeed in vertically and
horizontally integrating workplaces, we can make them safe for, rather than
from, sexuality. In order to achieve the greater gender equality that makes
this possible, we must restructure Title VII law to give employers more
incentive to desegregate, instead of desexualizing, their workplaces.
Toward this end, I have suggested a few simple doctrinal reforms. First,
courts and regulators should make crystal clear that any type of conduct can
count toward establishing sex harassment-regardless of whether the
conduct is sexual, nonsexual, or even gender-neutral in content. Second,
courts should adopt standards of proof that reflect widely accepted social
science knowledge that sex harassment is more likely to be a problem in
sex-segregated work settings. Judges should make sex harassment easier to
prove in significantly segregated and unequal settings, and harder to prove
in fully integrated and equal workplaces, than it is under current law.
My purpose, however, has not been simply to construct a more
transformative body of sex harassment law, for as I have suggested
throughout this Article, the law never operates in a vacuum. Those who
seek to use the law for social change must develop a more nuanced
historical and sociological account of how the law intersects with other
social forces to fulfill, and all too often derail, the desired ends.
My account of how sexual harassment law has played out within
organizations highlights the importance of the interaction between legal and
nonlegal forces in constructing the meaning and content of the law. To a
large extent, this process reflects what sociologists call the
managerialization of law: I have shown how employers, acting on the
advice of human resource specialists and management-side labor lawyers,
have mobilized harassment law in the service of a traditional organizational
imperative of suppressing sexual conduct. Yet the conventional sociological
account's emphasis on legal ambiguity neglects the important role of social
movement activists and legal actors in determining the cultural tilt of the
law that organizational actors inherit. Although it is true that Title VII itself
was silent with respect to the issue of sexual harassment, by the time the
law was handed down to organizational actors, it was by no means
ambiguous. Feminist arguments had already helped shape the definition of
harassment adopted by the EEOC and the federal courts, a definition that
emphasized the harm of unwanted sexual advances. This focus on sexuality
in the judge-made law, combined with feminist appeals to productivity-
oriented arguments for implementing it, meshed well with the classical
organizational view of workplace sexuality in a way that appealed to
managers and gave them an interest in extending the law's reach in
organizational life. By the same token, the fact that employers could justify
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their actions with reference to a body of feminist-inspired law facilitated
HR managers' ability to implement broad measures to control employees'
sexual conduct. Thus, my account emphasizes the role of social activists,
lawyers, and judges in shaping the cultural meaning and direction of the
law in a way that facilitates a certain type of institutional action. Depending
on which way the law gets tilted, institutional actors will be more or less
able to interpret and push the law in a way that serves their own interests.
Ultimately, then, the history of sexual harassment law teaches that law
makes a difference, but the difference it makes depends on the larger
institutional and cultural forces that will shape its meaning in everyday life.
This means that those of us who seek to use law to spark social change
must think carefully about what we ask for, and how we ask for it. To the
extent that we make demands and arguments that appeal to conservative
traditions of thought and elements in our culture, we may end up unleashing
forces that undermine our own goals and produce lasting damage. In the
hands of managers and judges, a body of law conceived by feminists has
become a force for eradicating a workplace sexuality now cast as disruptive
and discriminatory. In my view, we can oniy hope to halt the drive toward
sanitization by articulating a more humanistic, and more appealing, vision
in which sexuality and intimacy can coexist with, and perhaps even
enhance, gender equality and organizational rationality. Whatever else we
are, we are creatures who exist to love and work. Why not dare to envision
a workplace where we can stand together as equals and intimates at the
same time?
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